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In this thesis I will explore a recent trend and its relationship with 
contemporary art known as ‘the speculative turn.’ My analysis of this trend 
works with the insights of both contemporary philosophy and contemporary art 
together. Furthermore, I use the work produced within my own art projects to 
develop this  analysis. 
 
This thesis also provides a useful definition of speculation based on an 
analysis of existing contemporary art and philosophy, and what these things 
actually do. The definition that I elaborate is that of ‘heresy’ which likens the 
activity of the social turn to the acts of working outside of the ordained 
practices of the church by religious heretics and mystics. For these individuals 
have often created new texts of their own that work with the material of their 
faith in a different way. 
 
I also enact this form of speculation by explaining my own work in such 
a manner. This work shares how I have established a way of looking at  the 





This practice-led Ph.D. intertwines a written thesis, a folio of my own 
curatorial work, and relevant case studies of contemporary art projects: a 
multi- modal research project that traces the emergence of a ‘speculative turn’ 
across diverse fields, examining its impact on and through contemporary art. 
 
In particular, it identifies and explores a particular milieu of speculative 
work concerned with refusing inherited and pre-formatted logics, institutions, 
values, doxa, even metaphysical frameworks, as immutable, natural or 
perennial. Consequently, I argue that in contrast to a wholly critical method, 
the focus of such speculative work is to construct, to revise and to explore. It 
enacts a turn away from a perceived epistemicide, towards elaborating and 
experimenting with unorthodox vocabularies, concepts, models, and practices. 
I argue that such unorthodoxies, or speculative heresies, are adaptive 
navigational protocols and ultimately expand the parameters of the Overton 
window. They reflect the political, climatological and technical contingencies 
of a moment that has earned a variety of useful, yet controversial, inter-related 
designations that each afford different forms of speculative and navigational 
modelling (‘The New Normal’, ‘The Anthropocene’, ‘The Posthuman Nexus’, 
‘The Thick Present’, The Long Now’, ‘The Post-Truth Era’, ‘The Speculative 
Time Complex’). 
 
As such, this Ph.D. also commits to operate speculatively alongside the 
work it foregrounds and analyses: it speculates. Through my curatorial 
projects, I offer a unique dynamic model for thinking with and through 
contemporary art and the speculative turn. From this model emerges my own 
speculative cosmology, concepts and vocabulary to be tested both within the 
analysis of this thesis and the active multi-modal discourse of the milieu I 
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0. Introduction: The Speculative Turn 
 
The explicit and highly varied uptake of speculation as a method, as a 
theme, and as a buzzword, has been increasingly evident among contemporary 
art projects (and those of various other disciplines) throughout the early 21st 
century (from the late 2000s to the time of this thesis’ final submission in 
2021). From specialised academic workshops such as the seminal ‘Speculative 
Realism’ event held at Goldsmiths, University of London in 2007 to a 
proliferation of international high-profile art biennals variously deploying 
‘speculation’ as a conceptual and methodological motif, the ‘speculative turn’ 
has evolved through multiple scales and registers. 
 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the active role contemporary art has 
played, and continues to play, in this evolution. As an explicit term or as an 
implicit logic, speculation has persisted throughout the last decade of work in 
contemporary art, and, significantly, many other fields (related examples that I 
will discuss include advancements in continental philosophy which are 
outlined in the following paragraph, the development of ‘posthumanisms’ 
through the humanities, and even certain experiments in the commercial field 
of trend forecasting). 
 
Crucially, this evolution has involved a fundamental re-thinking of 
prevailing assumptions and orthodoxies - how things are is not taken as 
perennial or natural; how things can be are inexhaustively explored and re- 
configured. It is in this sense that the speculative turn names a broad cultural 
inclination: it exists beyond theory, academia, and technocratic specialisms. It 
is practiced across scales and registers which suggest now that, to adapt 
Raymond Williams’ well-known phrase, the constitutively extraordinary work 
of speculation is ordinary. Examining contemporary art’s active role in the 
speculative turn will prove to validate this statement whilst showing how 
speculation has gained extensive traction as an interest and as a necessity. For 
example, in terms of the opportunities it delivers “in the face of the looming 
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ecological catastrophe, and the increasing infiltration of technology into the 
everyday world” (Bryant, Harman and Srnicek, 2011: 3). 
 
These latter developments have significantly adjusted the parameters of 
how we re-think how things can or ought to be. Foremost across the 
speculative turn is a turn away from anthropocentrism and towards a 
fundamental reformulation of where the human and social relations are situated 
within technical, ecological, and cosmic orders. It is this reformulation, and its 
impact, that is a significant focus of my thesis. Particularly how it is 
encouraged and mediated through contemporary art. That is, my analysis of 
contemporary art and the speculative turn tends to follow, and using a diverse 
array of methodological techniques unpack, the definition of speculation 
proffered by philosopher Alfred North Whitehead: 
 
“The true method of speculation is like the flight of an airplane. It starts from 
the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of 
imaginative generalization; and again it lands for renewed observation 
rendered acute by rational interpretation.” (Whitehead, 1979: 5) 
 
Furthermore, when tethered to this recent acknowledgement of the limitations 
of anthropocentrism, specifically through the arguments of continental 
philosophy that fall under the banner of Speculative Realism (SR), which I 
outline in Section 1.1, we can begin to understand that 
 
“human modalities of apprehension and relationality are only one among others 
that, for all their particularity and dominance for us, have no particular 
privilege among other modalities.” (Avanessian and Malik, 2016: 4). 
 
Thus speculation, and even ‘thinking through things,’ as a form of 
apprehending and inferring the implications of  such alternative modalities, is 
pursued as a method for parsing, navigating, working through, and working 
with, the 
 
“Increasing pressure of material, technical and natural processes at the 
microlevel of personal and even subindividual engagement, the mesolevel of 
networked social processes, and the macrolevel of the globality of climate 
change, each of which leads to the weakening of traditional-modern anthropic 
determinations of these processes, if not the outright subordination or even 
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elimination of the human as a factor or determinant of how things are with one 
another, and also of what they mean to one another.” (Ibid.) 
 
Across diverse fields then, the speculative turn manifests as experimental 
work and practices that refuse inherited and pre-formatted logics, institutions, 
values, doxa, even metaphysical frameworks, as immutable, natural or 
perennial. From deeply embedded economic and political systems along with 
their long-standing institutions, to traditional systems of gender identification 
and sexual orientation, to re-thinking the very category of the human (and a 
concomitant humanism), the speculative turn is characterised by an ambition 
that is ultimately fastened to the idea of imagining altogether new realities to 
inhabit (by changing what is). The  practical focus of such speculative work is 
then to construct, to revise and to explore with unorthodox alternatives that 
deny the weight of orthodoxy, the circumscriptive horizon of perceived 
finitude and the conservation of the given:1 it is the active revision of the 
Overton window as a possibility space (“a way of thinking precisely about 
complex situations” (Hillis, 2011)) when such a matrix of fixed probabilities is 
perceived as serving the reproduction of dominant orthodoxies. 
 
The speculative turn is thus presented as the development of experimental 
modes of thinking and concomitant bodies of knowledge (vocabularies, 
concepts, discourses) that provide navigational opportunities for a historical 
context that has earned a variety of useful, yet controversial, inter-related 
designations. These include: “The New Normal” (Bratton, 2017), “The 
Anthropocene” (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, and McNeill, 2011), “The 
Posthuman Nexus” (Wolfendale, 2019), “The Thick Present” (Haraway, 2016), 
“The Long Now” (The Long Now Foundation, 1996), “The Post-Truth Era” 
(D’Ancona, 2017), “The Speculative Time Complex” (Malik, 2016). 
Speculation is posited as necessary for navigating the complexities and the 
contingencies inferred by such designations, while such designations are also 





1 “The Promethean trespass resides in making the given” (Brassier, 2014: 478). 
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complex, multifarious, entangled, planetary-scale, and imperceptible conditions 
can be mapped and analysed. 
 
The articulation of the ‘speculative turn’ suggests, also, that speculation as a 
method, is necessary precisely because other, more traditional methods alone 
(for instance the modes of criticality that enjoy an orthodox status within the 
humanities), are not so well-equipped to parse and navigate the conditions 
inferred by the above designations. This thesis then defines what it is that 
speculation offers for such an impasse. Specifically, the tendency towards 
proposing and constructing terms, concepts, images, and models with which to 
work with, rather than simply denouncing those that already exist. I will be 
examining examples of contemporary art, especially the milieu of work within 
which my own projects sit, that contribute to the fostering of a postcritical 
conceptual thought for apprehending, navigating, and manipulating the real. 
Furthermore, it is with my own projects presented through this thesis that I am 
able to test and develop these ideas, and to substantiate a speculative practice. 
This means that through such projects, I can accumulate and synthesise a 
glossary of terms, models and concepts consistent with this definition of 
speculation. Speculation is both a theme and a function of this thesis. 
 
In firstly outlining a schism with what curator Lars Bang Larsen has termed 
the long nineties, I foreground the criteria of a historical and programmatic 
orthodoxy stemming from the spirit of art’s ’social turn’ of the 1990s which 
developed into what I locate as a deeply entrenched and institutionally 
embodied Mannerism. With this inquiry I establish an opportunity to frame the 
emergence of the speculative turn, at least in terms of its manifestation in the 
field of contemporary art, as a combined and uneven heresy. Furthermore, I 
argue that this composite heretical response to the perceived orthodoxies 
sustained by the long nineties forms a distributed information processing 
protocol for contemporary art. 
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Presenting the emergence of the speculative turn in this way introduces a 
heretofore unarticulated narrative and analysis of speculation as method and as 
practice in contemporary art, while resolving initial questions such as: What is 
the speculative turn? What isn’t the speculative turn? Why has it emerged? How 
has it emerged? Has it emerged (is it even a distinct thing, and if so, does it 
merit significant enquiry)? 
 
On the one hand, this interrogation offers a global view of the speculative 
turn, which includes outlining some of the definitive generic invariances that 
appear across the diverse milieu that constitute it, and to provide a broader 
context for its emergence. On the other hand, in the answers I develop for these 
opening questions it is acknowledged that I am also opting to proceed with a 
partial perspective which is necessarily informed by particular 
epistemological framing, methodological commitments, research paths, case 
studies, and, significantly, my own situated position as a curator developing 
projects with selected artists. 
 
This multi-scalar perspective conclusively provides some necessary tools 
for rigorously theorising the work of the speculative turn (and for critiquing 
some other attempts to do so). Specifically, the thesis adopts a socio-cognitive 
approach engaged with posthumanisms and related discourses, such as that of 
‘extended cognition’ and a niche anthropological method of ‘thinking through 
things’. The approach proves ideal for theorising a topic that is constitutively 
exploratory and permissive in its traversal of disciplines, discourses, histories, 
media and methods. My methodological framework offers formal 
opportunities to rigorously think through and with contemporary art, which, I 
argue, is essential  to the core principles of the speculative turn. 
 
Therefore, in engaging selected case studies along with my own folio of 
practical work, I consciously diverge from the path of committing this thesis’ 
function to an outright art historical overview, which I argue would be 
methodologically inconsistent with both the subject at hand as well as the 
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requirements of developing a practice-led Ph.D. project. Rather than fully 
embodying a critical distance typical of the long nineties and modernist 
mannerisms, I demonstrate through this thesis that practice-led research 
provides an ideal opportunity to advance an analysis that is deeply entangled 
and intimately embedded among the material culture of a particular milieu; an 
opportunity to think with and through the speculative heresies of a distributed 
scene within the field of contemporary art. Thus, the narrative, conclusions and 
speculations developed by this thesis extrapolate the logics and ways of 
thinking that I argue underpin the production, presentation, distribution of 
contemporary art in the speculative turn. 
 
In discussing the entanglement of contemporary geopolitics, technological 
infrastructure, and our inhabitation of these systems, the sociologist and design 
theorist Benjamin Bratton argues that 
 
“Today we lack adequate vocabularies to properly engage the operations of 
planetary-scale computation, and we make use of those at hand regardless of 
how poorly they serve us… Going forward, we really do need new and better 
models.” (Bratton, 2015: xviii) 
 
And so this thesis project is an exploration of the models and vocabularies that 
contemporary art has inherited and also those that contemporary art, through its 
speculative labour, constructs in order to “engage the operations” and to better 
apprehend the realities of technical, political, and climatological complexities. I 
will go on to review how such models are produced with contemporary art as a 
distributed laboratory that socially tests and implements revised perennial 
images and speculative models that generate new vocabularies for acting with. 
Furthermore, this is to locate contemporary art within a broader speculative 
turn that involves influential philosophical movements such as SR (discussed 
in section 1.1) as well as the uptake in fields such as Speculative Design, which 
is embodied in high-profile studios such as Superflux whose work similarly 
commits to “translating future uncertainty into present day choices” (Superflux, 
n.d.). 
18  
0.1 Outline of Chapters 
 
0.1.1 A Speculative Methodology for Curating a Heresy 
 
The first chapter outlines a methodology, or, what François Laruelle refers 
to as a “theoretical installation” (Laruelle, 2012: 11). For Laruelle this is the 
construction of a conceptual or theoretical apparatus with which to approach 
objects, practices, and discourses outside of philosophy towards the production 
of a form of thought native to them. However, this does not involve looking 
immediately at contemporary art examples, nor directly at contemporary art as 
an abstract idea. Instead, I begin by traversing the influential work of SR and 
its relationship with contemporary art in order to review how art’s speculative 
turn has been more popularly considered, before articulating my own response. 
SR is worth reviewing due to the varied positions it accommodates and their 
differing commitments. I primarily leverage instructional elements of Quentin 
Meillassoux’s and Ray Brassier’s work in order to begin developing an 
argument for contemporary art’s speculative turn as a navigational practice that 
involves the revision and construction of conceptual schema with which to 
apprehend reality and manipulate given circumstances. 
 
To do so, I introduce theories surrounding the idea of ‘extended cognition’ 
with which I situate contemporary art as contributing to and manipulating 
cognitive ecologies; as a dynamic field of socio-cognitive technologies. 
 
Another significant argument of this chapter, is the articulation of 
speculation as a method which operates by way of an axiom of heresy, and that 
such an uptake of this axiom results in what I call an epistemic long tail; what 
Laruelle would refer to as a “modelist explosion” (Laruelle, 2012: 135). This 
positions those who motivate the work of the speculative turn as working 
against the effects of a perceived epistemicide wrought by the “inadequate” 
vocabularies and models we inherit or simply “have to hand” (Bratton). 
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0.1.2 Tracing a Speculative Schism 
 
This chapter, which embodies the bulk of this thesis’ written component, 
maps the ideas I have just introduced on to recent activity in contemporary 
art. 
 
Firstly, I expand on Larsen’s review of the long nineties, locating and 
discussing tangible mannerisms that encapsulate inherited orthodoxies in 
thinking. Namely, this is found in the perennial ontology of liberal humanism 
that I argue the speculative turn has sought to overturn and revise. I thus review 
and analyse in-depth specific examples of methodologies and contemporary art 
projects that embody such orthodoxies, concluding that, despite rhetoric that 
expounds otherwise, they contribute to a systemic cognitive inertia. 
 
I also continue to discuss in further depth some examples brought up in the 
first chapter that exemplify a somewhat more established perspective of 
contemporary art’s speculative turn; how they begin to form a speculative 
cognitive ecology. 
 
This then leads me to discuss examples that substantiate my argument for a 
more precise understanding of the speculative labour of working concepts 
(Canguilhem, 1963: 452) and forging “new and better models” with existing 
materials. Such revisionary work, I argue, is fundamentally heretical. I utilise 
as examples projects from my own portfolio and also those from the milieu in 
which my work operates. Furthermore, I conclude by showing how this work 
continues through the invention of a (strange) science. That is, new models 
and new terms, refigured  concepts and speculative images, are iteratively and 
procedurally implemented  by way of processes of evaluation for their 
continued deployment as socio-cognitive technologies. I make significant use 
of Michel de Certeau’s notion of mystics as a model for this distributed 
enterprise: “rather than fictionalizing science, a mysticism for today would 
have to Weird it” (Wilk, 2019: n.p.). 
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0.1.3 Most Dismal Swamp: Dredging a Dank Enlightenment From a 
Swamp of Heresies (means going in up to the chin) 
 
Finally, I focus on the practical curatorial projects that are presented in the 
accompanying thesis folio as Most Dismal Swamp (MDS). 
 
The final chapter is not simply a summary of conclusions but rather an 
embodiment and deployment of them, which also couches the work of MDS 
documented in the  folio. It provides some explication of a glossary of terms 
and concepts emitted (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2018) from the work of MDS 
while offering the opportunity for this work to continue to act as a model 
rather than a theory: a space for simulating possibilities; a space for thinking. 
 
With this kind of end in mind for the thesis, it is significant to note that I 
begin and end it with a commitment to an embodiment of the ideas it traverses. 
I present in the following chapters coherent analyses and arguments weighted 
with evidence, yet I do so with a fidelity to the aim that this thesis will function 
speculatively. Concepts sprout forth from “damned data” (Charles Fort) and 
from the margins as heresies, as well as from established knowledges that must 
be continually tested and challenged. When new glossaries and conceptual 
schema begin to sprout and entangle the path ahead with thickets and vines, 
traversing such a sprawling swamp of heresies will require the relevant 






Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Swamp Protocol (still), Most Dismal Swamp, 
London. 
 
1. A Speculative Methodology for Curating a Heresy 
 
In this chapter I outline what philosopher François Laruelle refers to in his 
work as a “theoretical installation” (Laruelle, 2012: 11). For Laruelle this is the 
construction of a conceptual or theoretical apparatus with which to approach 
objects, practices, and discourses outside of philosophy towards the production 
of a form of thought native to them. That is, Laruelle’s theoretical installations 
are committed to the speculative endeavour of modelling unfamiliar forms of 
thought. I will detail Laruelle’s approach within this chapter. The theoretical 
installation of this thesis though, is composed of numerous other discourses 
with which Laruelle’s approach finds traction. Namely, I will be focusing on 
work surrounding extended cognition (ExC) and the anthropological project of 
thinking through things (TTT). 
 
In order to position these methods for developing new conceptual materials 
with which to substantiate speculative practices and to understand speculative 
practices, I will firstly discuss the work of Speculative Realism (SR). 
Additionally, I will draw closer attention to the work of SR’s rationalist 
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variants, providing this thesis with tools to properly discuss and examine the 
role of contemporary art in the speculative turn, and also with the opportunity 
to approach an undeservedly over-looked branch of contemporary philosophy. 
 
1.1 Speculative Realism 
 
‘The speculative turn’ is a term I have acquired from the para-academic 
margins of continental philosophy (Bryant, Harman and Srnicek, 2011). The 
term’s provenance plays an apposite role in this thesis’ tracing of a speculative 
turn in and through contemporary art, as well as more generally. 
 
It methodologically tethers my own use and application of the term to a 
dynamic nexus of philosophical positions germinating around the label 
Speculative Realism (SR), specifically those that have engaged with a post- 
Kantian rehabilitation of realism in contemporary philosophy. Which is to 
acknowledge the possibility of a significant influence and even the 
transformative impact of SR on contemporary art and its future (Malik, 2015). 
In terms of recognising the challenges SR provides for the gamut of “critical 
orthodoxies” that have defined the humanities through the twentieth century, 
contemporary art’s adjacent role in broadening the speculative turn has been 
heretofore under-researched and inadequately theorised (Cox, Jaskey and 
Malik, 2015: 15).2 
 
 
2 Cox, Jaskey and Malik (2015) suggest the critical orthodoxies which have come to dominate 
the humanities are “staunchly anti-realist” in that they fundamentally insist upon natural and 
social phenomena as “constituted or mediated by a discursive field or  a cognitive subject.” 
Nothing exists for this orthodoxy beyond the spheres of discourse  and their social context. 
Thus, the theoretical doctrines that have come to dominate how we think and how we 
apprehend the world are those that are essential to the dogmatic entrenchment of the experience 
of the subject as the only accessible measure  of reality: phenomenology, post-structuralism, 
hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis. 
Artist Amanda Beech notes that what has emerged from such doctrines in terms of the 
“orthodoxies of critique” of contemporary art is a dominant proclivity for “‘social 
engagement,’ ‘good political practice,’ ‘participation’” (Beech, Canini, Fisher, Grant, and 
Mackay, 2010; n.p.). I will discuss these in greater detail, as orthodox mannerisms in recent 
contemporary art, in the following chapter. 
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In order to correct this, I will be working from an assembly of specific 
propositions and selected philosophers’ work that have emerged from and 
around SR (as well as its broader genealogy). This is because, as has been 
recognised by anyone introducing the work of SR in numerous articles, essays 
and press releases, as a label it acts as an umbrella term for a divergent set of 
philosophical positions. However, what has also been frequently recognised, is 
that these positions also tend to diverge from a common attempt to overcome 
what Quentin Meillassoux has crucially named “correlationism” in the seminal 
text, ‘After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency’ (Meillassoux, 
2008). 
 
With this neologism, Meillassoux identifies a deeply embedded and 
coercive modern orthodoxy; “the central notion of modern philosophy since 
Kant” which has marked realism as a naive pursuit and presented the finitude 
of subjective phenomenology as the only measure of the world one may know 
(5). For by ‘correlation’ 
 
“we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered 
apart from the other… Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it 
is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently 
of one another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp 
an object “in itself,” in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also 
becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would 
not always already be related to an object.” (5) 
 
To work towards thinking what-is apart from how it is perceived by a subject 
(beyond “factiality” or the transcendental structure of what is empirically 
given); to break out of the “correlationist circle” (7), Meillassoux interacts with 
ancestral statements of the like that the Earth was formed 4.56 billion years ago 
(14), for such statements refer to scientific realities untethered from the 
dependency of a human-world correlation. In pursuit of this noumenal access, 
Meillassoux constructs a heuristic index of ancestrality, a thought-experiment 
he names the “arche-fossil” which designates 
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“not just materials indicating the traces of past life, according to the familiar 
sense of the term 'fossil', but materials indicating the existence of an ancestral 
reality or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial life. An arche-fossil thus 
designates the material support on the basis of which the experiments that yield 
estimates of ancestral phenomena proceed - for example, an isotope whose rate 
of radioactive decay we know, or the luminous emission of a star that informs 
us as to the date of its formation.” (Meillassoux, 2008: 10) 
 
So Meillassoux argues to convene with the Real3 on the basis of a scientific, 
and later in his text a mathematical, rationalism: forms of logic that 
simultaneously grant cognitive ingress to temporalities outwith 
phenomenological formulation and confound the correlationist dogma 
 
“that there can be no cognizable reality independently of our relation to reality; 
no phenomena without some transcendental operator – such as life or 
consciousness or Dasein – generating the conditions of manifestation through 
which phenomena manifest themselves” (Brassier, 2007: 51). 
 
It is essential to introduce correlationism and its rejection, both as a 
defining characteristic of SR’s positions and as a key moment in the 
development of the speculative turn. It was around this rejection, along with 
the repudiation of limitations set by the dominant mannerisms of the linguistic 
turn in the humanities,4 that Meillassoux gathered with Ray Brassier, Iain 
Hamilton Grant and Graham Harman (with moderation by Alberto Toscano) to 
form the foundational conference Speculative Realism in 2007. Here, these 
philosophers introduced their related yet distinct ongoing projects that 
variously “problematize[d] the subjectivistic and anthropocentric foundations 
of much ‘continental philosophy’” (Brassier, Grant, Harman, Meillassoux, 
2007: 307). 
 
While Meillassoux here continues his project of “building a materialism – 
or realism – able to refute clearly the correlationist circle… the argument that 
we never have access to something apart from that access” (426-7), Brassier 
discusses the challenges faced in building such an edifice which would demand 
 
 
3 Or, in closer correspondence with the ‘speculative materialism’ advocated by 
Meillassoux, the Real as indexed by materials and the realities known by such. 
4 See footnote 2. 
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“some kind of communication… between the speculative audacity which is 
characteristic of so-called ‘continental philosophy’ and the really admirable 
level of engagement with the empirical sciences which is a feature of the most 
interesting work being done… with cognitive science” (320-1). For Brassier, as 
I will discuss in the following section, finds in the sciences the opportunity to 
transform conceptual parameters and develop a mode of reasoning which 
permits a break in the correlationist circle: 
 
“For surely it is not just ancestral phenomena which challenge the latter, but 
simply the reality described by the modern natural sciences tout court. 
According to the latter, we are surrounded by processes going on quite 
independently of any relationship we may happen to have to them: thus plate 
tectonics, thermonuclear fusion, and galactic expansion (not to mention 
undiscovered oil reserves or unknown insect species) are as much autonomous, 
human-independent realities as the accretion of the earth” (Brassier, 2007: 60) 
 
1.1.1 Speculative Realism and Contemporary Art 
 
Rather than presenting either a generous outline of each position 
represented at the SR conference, or indeed a caricature, it is relevant to direct 
focus towards more specific positions adopted by Brassier and Meillassoux. It 
is essential to bear in mind the remit and the focus of this thesis. It is not of 
primary concern here to evaluate SR’s claims with the forensic and specialised 
rigour of a philosophy thesis, nor to test the more specific claims of 
Meillassoux et al. against one another.5 This brief introduction to SR functions 
rather as a gathering of key terms and arguments that have motivated the 
growth and uptake of the speculative turn, and also to acknowledge that SR, 
 
 
5 Although I am differentiating various strands and practices of SR, what this thesis is not 
doing, is differentiating them to a degree that would require moving the focus away from their 
application and development though contemporary art. This thesis is not the venue to test, to 
the fullest degree, the differential inferences of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism, 
Brassier’s rationalistic naturalism, Harman’s object-oriented  ontology, or Grant’s materialist 
idealism. Nor even the broader categories to which these positions are often tethered, 
neomaterialism and neorationalism. Instead, it is of  greater importance to discuss how these 
positions have been taken up by contemporary art, which supposes a more productive and 
experimental form of cross- contamination. 
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regardless of its academic or institutional value, was undoubtedly received and 
often explicitly cited by contemporary art as a major interest, especially  
c. 2010-15.6 What is imperative here is to track, contextualise and analyse 
trends in recent contemporary art that has contributed to the speculative turn 
alongside and with SR (whilst acknowledging significant genealogies for 
both:  historically situating the speculative turn as converging from an uneven 
and combined stemma of attitudes and discourses distributed across diverse 
fields, rather than a sudden, arbitrary and singular event).7 
 
Moreover, as evidenced in the case studies of my own projects and the 
work of others throughout this thesis, contemporary art is considered here to 
proffer contributions to the speculative turn without the guidance of a position 
defined by any philosopher(s). A significant reason for making this point is 
that actual examples of contemporary art in SR’s literature are thin at best, 
even in texts produced by those who work as or with  artists.8 Therefore this 




6 Among the wealth of exhibitions and biennals across the globe name-checking Speculative 
Realism, as well as its uptake in various journals and magazines (many of  which 
commissioned SR philosophers such as Graham Harman and Timothy Morton to write short 
texts (Harman, 2014; Morton, 2015), one unusual example of SR’s traction is to be found in 
Art Review’s inclusion of SR at No. 81 in their 2013 ‘Power 100.’ The feature is updated and 
presented annually as “a ranked list of the contemporary artworld’s most powerful figures.” 
7 “It began not with a whimper but a bang” is the phrase used by by Rick Dolphijn in  his 
review of Peter Gratton’s ‘Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects,’ which echoes 
many other introductions to SR that present the 2007 conference as a kind of ground zero 
(Dolphijn, 2014: n.p.). However, the phrase is somewhat apposite in its depiction of SR’s 
exponential uptake and the impact of SR on a scale broader than most developments in 
continental philosophy. 
8 Publications such as Speculative Aesthetics (Mackay, 2014) and Realism, Materialism, Art 
(Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015) provide many theoretical challenges  and postulations worth 
considering for contemporary art and its future. However, this  is done with very little, if any, 
reference to actually existing contemporary art examples, and a significant knowledge of 
contemporary art in general (although various images by relevant contemporary artists are 
included in the publication Realism, Materialism, Art, none of the essays therein directly 
reflect on them). It is common to refer to examples such as Marcel Duchamp (Beech, 2015); 
Malik, 2015) and Robert Smithson (Trevatt, 2014), who are nonetheless pivotal figures with 
artworks worth discussing in such contexts, yet they are not illustrative of contemporary art, 
nor art generally simultaneous with SR discourse. In Art Review texts by Morton and 
Harman, samples offered include M. C. Escher and, somewhat more presciently, a recent film 
by Lars von Trier. However, I will also go on to acknowledge, with reference to Malik’s 
work, the opportunities this might have in terms of operating with and from abstract terms in 
the use of inferential reasoning to  construct new possibilities; to speculate. 
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just a field transfigured by realism and materialism; it is also a method for 
convening and extending what they are taken to be and do when extended 
beyond philosophical argument” (Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015: 15). But, to be 
clear, any debt to the work of SR is indeed acknowledged, specifically in this 
thesis’ exploration of artist and theorist Amanda Beech’s discussions on “how 
art thinks” which, on the face of it, at least rhetorically plays off of SR’s known 
tendencies to ascribe some form of independence, agency or indeed animist 
vitality to nonhuman matter. 
 
Among the most visible of contemporary art projects that have responded 
to SR-related proposals in one way or another are exhibitions of such 
prominence that it is easy to conclude that SR, and the turn of which it is a 
significant part, has indeed enjoyed a sharp uptake. Familiar to many is 
dOCUMENTA (13) curated by Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev in 2012, which 
brought an object-oriented thematic to bear on international contemporary art, 
enacting a “vibrant materialism” (Mulholland, 2019) through a wealth of 
historical artworks, new commissions, sacred objects, eco-architectural 
prototypes, publications, letters, lemonade stalls, borrowed objects, scientific 
projects, geological samples, video footage of protests, and found objects. As 
Christov-Bakargiev explains, this heterogeneous assembly aims to incite “a 
more balanced relationship with all the non-human makers with whom we 
share the planet and our bodies” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012: 34). 
 
Section 2.2 discusses in greater detail such examples of SR’s integration 
with contemporary art which have evidently tended towards exploring the 
implications of Object Oriented Philosophy (OOP) espoused by Harman as 
well as Levi Bryant and Timothy Morton. These explorations tie in with a 
modern history of art’s concerns regarding some relative autonomy of art 




and/or the limitations of human perceptual affordances. Furthermore, they 
reflect a growing interest in the social sciences regarding the questioning of a 
divide between things and people; between nature and culture. This trajectory 
could be mapped according to the literature that engages with materiality 
according to its social, relational and/or biographical ‘life’ (Appadurai, 1986; 
Miller, 1987; Strathern, 1988; Latour, 1993; Gell, 1998). And also to more 
posthumanist discourses that seek “to enhance the status of things, not by 
associating them with humans, but in their own right, showing how, suitably 
reconcieved, things can radiate light of their own” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 
2017: 202). Drawing from this lineage and its eruption through the 
experiments of OOP, further contemporary art projects to be discussed process 
the current relevance of animist worldviews, enchanted objects, de- 
anthropocentrism/human exceptionalism, anonymous materials, quasi-objects 
and the expanded networks and ecologies of subjects, objects and environment. 
 
Additionally, from this trajectory of contemporary art and SR’s 
imbrication, it has been noted that the memetic popularity in projects exploring 
OOP has meant comparatively less interest in exploring the challenges and 
implications of “the more staunchly rationalist versions of speculative thought 
associated with Brassier and Meillassoux” (Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015: 27). 
It is here that this thesis project finds an opportunity to contribute to an under- 
researched area. While I examine the speculative turn and its relationship with 
contemporary art, I do so with a methodology that at once gains insight from 
the work of those who have developed the so-called ‘neorationalist’ branch of 
SR, and, offers this discourse opportunities to develop in and through 
contemporary art (how contemporary art and its recent developments are best 
considered from such perspectives; which projects are relevant and how; what 
impacts each may have on the other). 
 
Projects such as dOCUMENTA (13) work towards making visible “a space 
of relations between people and things” in order to parse and explore an 
expanded “political space were the polis is not limited by human agency only” 
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(Christov-Bakargiev, 2012b: 15). Thereby, some work is done in terms of 
presenting an image of the world, even ourselves, (in all its political, 
technological, and climatological complexities) that is divested of human 
exceptionalism and anthropocentrism. But, to what extent can these assemblies 
of things9 cohere, as envisaged by Christov-Bakargiev in her curatorial 
“choreography”10 of the centrally-located (at the traditional locus of 
Documenta exhibitions, the Fridericianum) collection of extremely disparate 
objects, as a “Brain”11? That is, in employing the exhibition format (in terms of 
what it is, but also, crucially, what it might be) I will follow the rationalistic 
naturalism of Brassier in “that humans are not necessarily the privileged 
bearers of rationality (antihumanism); that humans may not be the only rational 
agents (trans-humanism); that rationality may extend itself through post-biotic 
systems (post-humanism)” (Brassier, 2015: 220). 
 
How do contemporary artworks fit into this scheme? Can they? Might 
objects (in the broad sense of Christov-Bakargiev’s heterogenous 
“participants”), or indeed exhibitions, be likened, functionally, to 
Meillassoux’s arche-fossil, or the findings of “modern natural sciences” 
(including the concept of extinction (Brassier, 2007: 231)) alluded to by 
Brassier, in terms of providing a sufficient cognitive heuristic framework to 
“elaborate how thought can think outside itself, how reason can think nature as 
a whole” (Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015: 22)? 
 
9 In a commissioned interview for the dOCUMENTA (13) series of publications, artist Paul 
Chan suggests, following Latour (Latour, 2005), that “a thing is not a thing but an  assembly of 
relations” (Farquharson and Wilson-Goldie, 2012: n.p.). Among this expansive assembly of 
things-as-relations included bottles painted by Giorgio Morandi, 4,000 year old figurines 
known as the Bacterian Princesses, objects found in the apartment of Adolf Hitler, photographs 
of bomb-craters in Vietnam, experimental models created by the physicist Anton Zeilinger, and 
many more. 
10 “The choreography of dOCUMENTA (13) is instead un-harmonic and frenetic, while also 
producing some shared understanding of this condition through alternative  alliances and 
bonds” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012b: 4, emphasis added). 
11 It would be easy to register the opening sentence of Christov-Bakargiev’s statement- essay, 
‘The dance was very frenetic, lively, rattling, clanging, rolling, contorted, and lasted for a long 
time’ as art-world hyperbole: “documenta is a state of mind” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012b: 4). 
But, following the rationalistic naturalism or materialism proposed by Brassier and 
Meillassoux, there is an opportunity to start to treat this suggestion with a sense of literalness. 
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In section 1.3 I introduce the premises for answering these questions. I look 
towards theories of Extended Cognition (ExC) in order to argue for a model of 
“cognitive stimulation” (Wolfendale, 2019) leveraged by contemporary art. A 
kind that is engaged in processes of abductive cognition through the 
(collective)12 building and reformation of mental models. And in section 1.4 I 
will introduce the speculative function of contemporary art (remembering that 
speculation is a mode of thinking, an abductive cognition) that will be 
elucidated throughout the thesis, with attention paid to the artistic mode13 of 






12 By this I mean to infer that the work of contemporary art (its discourses, trends, memes, 
values, and indeed the mental models it presents) is a collective effort, yet this is not to be 
taken as a harmonious, concerted, preconceived, or consensual project. 
Like sciences, humanities, and myriad other disciplines, conflict, agonism, discussion, 
experiment, and speculation is embodied in a field’s tentacular, de-centred and diverse 
makeup. It is composed of various institutions, milieux, individuals. This might be an obvious 
point to make, but, certainly in contemporary art discourses anyway, it seems far too easy to 
project a singular direction or common sense, especially when it confirms the biases of the 
writer. Also, contra the work of writers such as Beech, Malik and Negarestani who bring the 
challenges and opportunities of SR upon contemporary art, I do not treat art as an abstract 
category but as a situated and active constituent of a cognitive ecology (see Section 1.3). 
13 To better qualify this ‘artistic mode’ in order to avoid romanticising and obscurantism, we 
might best think of the processes of making, distributing, and discussing contemporary art as 
“manipulative abduction… [a] thinking through doing… [an] action-based cognition” 
(Magnani, 2013: 51). Therefore this involves all  of the embodied orthodoxies that sanctify 
contemporary art and its contingent methodologies through its multifarious educational, social, 
and professional systems and institutions. Edwin Hutchins’ publication Thinking in the Wild 
(Hutchins, 1995) is a touchstone work in the development of ExC and its variants, in that it 
proposes that cognition is a social enterprise where cultural activity systems possess additional 
cognitive properties of their own, but, I mention this to highlight that this “thinking in the 
wild” is not intended to be considered as a “wild” form of thinking (the connotations 
wrongfully bring to mind an irrational or feral intuition). The kind of thinking beyond the 
brain, beyond thought, pursued here, is that which is still constructed via normative constraints 
that extend navigational, rational, and manipulative capacities. In terms of “how thought [can] 
conduct itself in art” (Küchler, 2001: 57), I will go on to consider contemporary art’s collective 
development and revision of mental models, as well as condering contemporary artworks and 
their distribution as stigmergic phenomena, where “stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect 
communication mediated by modifications of the environment” as a means of sharing and 
processing information outside of the brain/body and across time (Sun, Marsh, and Onof, 
2007: 136). 
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schemes, with which to “extend” rationality. To this end Brassier conjectures 
that: 
 
“There is no cognitive ingress to the real save through the concept. Yet the real 
itself is not to be confused with the concepts through which we know it. The 
fundamental problem of philosophy is to understand how to reconcile these 
two claims. We gain access to the structure of reality via a machinery of 
conception which extracts intelligible indices from a world that is not designed 
to be intelligible and is not originarily infused with meaning. Meaning is a 
function of conception and conception involves representation—though this is 
not to say that conceptual representation can be construed in terms of word- 
world mappings. It falls to conceptual rationality to forge the explanatory 
bridge from thought to being. (Brassier, 2011: 47) 
 
To establish some reconciliation between the two initial claims Brassier looks 
to contemporary neuroscience, which examines the human biological 
machinery in a realist manner that is “indifferent to our existence and oblivious 
to the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ which we would drape over it in order to make 
it more hospitable” (Brassier, 2007: xi). And so in neuroscience’s 
disenchantment of deeply-held ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ (such as the 
neurological fabrication of selfhood (Brassier, 2011; Metzinger, 2009)) 
characteristic of Enlightenment rationality,14 Brassier finds “not an existential 
quandary but a speculative opportunity” (Ibid.). Which is to say that among the 
“speculative anomalies thrown up within the order of phenomenal 




14 Brassier aims for his work to offer a “much-needed corrective to the tide of anti- 
Enlightenment revisionism with which so much twentieth-century philosophy has been 
complicit. The disenchantment of the world deserves to be celebrated as an achievement of 
intellectual maturity, not bewailed as a debilitating impoverishment.” However, it might be 
somewhat more useful to consider a renewal or even a mutation of enlightenment according to 
our ‘axiomatic heresy’ (See section 1.2). Such a heresy might follow science’s disenchantment 
with a humanism incompatible with the findings of contemporary neuroscience (see section 1.4 
on Thomas Metzinger’s “Enlightenment 2.0”) which, for example, revises the centrality of 
human experience by positing a “methodological nemocentricism” (Metzinger, 2003: 628) 
which throws up the possibility of a post-self subject, a subject “not accompanied by the 
phenomenal experience of being someone (336, emphasis added). Brassier goes on to suggest 
that such a post-self subject would be “a physical entity gripped by concepts: a bridge between 








challenge to the manifest order,”15 Brassier explores the conceptual resources 
needed to exceed conventional and intellectually debilitating folk- 
psychological, folk-semantical and correlationist forms of knowledge: the tools 
with which to speculate; for “overcoming of the opposition between reason and 
imagination: reason is fuelled by imagination, but it can also remake the limits 
of the imagination” (Brassier, 2014: 487). To crystallise a new possibility 
space (composed of a renewed suite of concepts; a reconfigured episteme) 







15 Critical to the work of Brassier, and to the present discussion on revising doxa with the 
‘speculative anomalies’ delivered by sciences, is the philosopher Wilfrid Sellars’ description of 
the manifest and the scientific orders, or images of man. The manifest image is the result of 
“using reason first to develop a picture of the human and its community, and then to develop a 
picture of the world that correlates with this community of thinkers” (Gratton, 2014: 137), 
which marks this self-conception and its  projection in to the world as inherently correlationist. 
The scientific image, however, is that which continues to overturn this self-conception and its 
consequences by committing to discoveries that de-centre the position and status of the human 
being in the world. So, the significance here is not the destruction of the manifest image, but a 
more heretical form of revising it, and to defy its primacy in the order of conception. Brassier 
foregrounds the opportunities available when we “shuttle back and forth between images, 
establishing conditions of transposition, rather than synthesis” (Brassier, 2007: 231). 
16 Among the various media and elements that constituted Script for a Machine Synthesis 
(2015) by artist Florian Hecker (stage setting, sound design, perfume, vocal synthesis) was a 
libretto written by Reza Negarestani. Here, an adaptation of Wilfred Sellars’ thought-
experiment concerning a pink ice cube in which we “[s]uppose a virtual cavity, a local 
discontinuity in the homogenous body of pink. The pink is no longer through and through 
since, by way of a thought experiment, we have generated a cavity, a locus of inhomogeneity in 
it. This virtual cavity is a source of designated instability, a site for deployment of our 
manipulative abductive agents. We have thus catastrophically rearranged the parameters 
responsible for the behaviour of the system, the pink ice cube. Tendencies, ramification and 
navigation pathways liberated by this catastrophic reconfiguration reveal new salient points 
about the behaviour of pink across the structure of the ice cube” (Negarestani in Hecker, 2015: 
4). With this image Negarestani illustrates the speculative tendency to not simply explore a 
given possibility space but to maladapt and intervene productively within an existing dynamic 
system of material and conceptual possibilities. The virtual cavity that possesses the ice cube is 
then a vital figure denoting something significant enough to gain purchase within the existing 
structural properties of a system (ice cube) to tailor its navigational dynamics (its pinkness, the 
speed at which it melts): “But rather than counting as an impediment, the obstruction enriches 
the navigation map of the chromatic demon and diversifies the conceptual behaviour of pink 
throughout the ice cube” (6). 
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With this in mind I argue for a kind of “choreography,” as espoused by 
Christov-Bakargiev, but instead of drawing together wildly heterogeneous 
artefacts with no explicit agenda (dOCUMENTA (13) rejected the supposed 
constraints of a “preconceived curatorial concept” (Schoene, 2012: 36) in 
favour of a more open space of object-oriented relationality)17, I will go on to 
discuss a kind of conceptual choreography18 that might forge the kind of 
“explanatory bridge” suggested by Brassier as a “cognitive ingress to the real”. 
In particular, I focus on instantiating Brassier’s assertion that “conceptual 
representation” is not to be “construed in terms of world-world mappings,” by 
considering contemporary art as the memetic development, testing, and 
distribution of speculative models. 
 
1.2 The Speculative Turn is an Uneven and Combined Heresy 
 
It is through such models that this thesis argues the heresies of speculative 






17 In chapter 2 I argue that this approach is similar to that of the social turn and to ‘the  long 
nineties’ where exhibitions bring together participants within a social space as an exploration 
of social relations and their organisation. This in fact belies a more insidious form of 
‘curatorial concept’ that I will discuss also. 
There are other examples that bring heterogeneous materials and ‘participants’ together where 
a ‘pre-conceived curatorial concept’ is advantageous to the production of a space that does 
foster new ideas beyond that of illustrating an ideological form of openness, such as the 1985 
exhibition Les Immatériaux, curated by French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard and Thierry 
Chaput at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the 2005 exhibition Making Things Public curated by 
Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel at Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie in Karlsruhe, 
and also The Institute of Cultural Anxiety presented at ICA, London in 1994 curated by 
Jeremy Millar. 
18 Following the critique of ‘openness’ proposed in the previous footnote, my own use  of the 
term ‘choreography’ differs somewhat from Christov-Bakargiev’s. In her curatorial statement-
essay she emphasises the qualities of choreography that are more “frenetic” than they are 
concerned with a rule-bound “harmony” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012b: 4). However, in my 
suggested mode of ‘conceptual choreography,’ which again, follows the logic of heresy (See 
1.2), I do not oppose one set of constraints with  that of a delirious uncertainty, or as Malik 
would describe it, an “axiom of indeterminacy” (Malik, 2013). Rather, the labour of 
speculation is the provision of alternative normative constraints to direct and motivate such 
exploration. This is speculation as a navigational practice. 
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“Heresies is understood here to have a different meaning [from the mere 
critique of received ideas]… [T]he issue is not one of critique (pretending to 
stand outside of the institution) or criticality (shifting the parameters within the 
institution), but about inventing new terms that defy the odds. … [T]he aim is 
not to put forward new opinions (doxa), but of regenerating knowledge 
(episteme)”. (Martinon, 2013: 9, emphases added) 
 
The SR-adjacent philosopher François Laruelle (the formal approach of whom 
will be discussed below) posits heresy as a practice “of transmutation or 
transvaluation,” “rather than apocalypse” (Laruelle, 2012: 280). Which chimes 
well with the above quotation from curatorial theorist Jean-Paul Martinon in 
the sense that we can get a sense of heresy as a practice not of critical 
destruction, but rather of speculative (re-)construction.19 In chapter 2, for 
example I discuss how speculation in contemporary art does not re-iterate the 
destructive (Laruelle’s ‘apocalypse’)20 impulse of critique by condemning the 
institutionalised practices of criticality that have become orthodoxy (Beech, 
2007; Beech, 2018; Malik, 2008; Malik, 2015a; Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015), 
but instead follows a “transvaluation of critique” (Chandler, 2018). And, in 
chapter 2 I unpack this kind of heresy further and explore how it is embodied 
through contemporary art in relation to Michel de Certeau’s conception of 
mystics,21 a “new science” formulated through the work of Christian mystics 




19 “Deconsecration assumes the legitimacy of the consecrate - only a re-consecration can 
achieve what’s needed here” (Shipley, 2015). See Section 1.2.2a for my inclusion of Shipley’s 
work in my Exta project. 
20 This wording is instructive in the sense of apocalypse relating to a revelation or unveiling, 
as well as the character of critique as a mode of something similar: “Using the vast range of 
structuralist, post and post post structuralist tools and models of analysis we have at our 
disposal, we have been able to unveil, unravel, expose and lay bare the hidden meanings of 
cultural circulation and the overt and covert interests that these serve” (Rogoff, 2006: 7). 
Whereas both heresy and speculation is a constructive mutation or transvaluation of such 
conditions. 
21 On the use of this word in its italicised form, which I adhere to throughout this thesis: “The 
theme of Michel de Certeau’s Mystic Fable is la mystique. This term cannot be rendered 
accurately by the English word “mysticism,” which would correspond rather to the French le 
mysticisme, and be far too generic and essentialist a term to convey the historical specificity of 
the subject of this study. There is no need here to retrace the steps by which la mystique, the 
noun, emerged from the prior adjective, mystique. But it may be of some interest to note that 
this grammatical promotion has its parallel in English, in the development of such terms as 
“mathematics” or “physics,” fields of inquiry of increasing autonomy, also taking their 
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These are figures whose unorthodox practices and religious lives often 
provoke condemnation by their church. In his two-volume analysis of 16th and 
17th century Christian mysticism, ‘The Mystic Fable,’ de Certaeu uses the term 
mystics (la mystique) in the delineation of a field of practice to be understood 
in terms of systematic disciplines such as physics, mathematics, or optics. 
Among the aspects of mystics that de Certeau outlines, attention is paid to it as 
“a manner of using received language differently” (de Certeau, 1992: 16). It is 
this (mis)use of the established language, symbols and concepts of their faith 
that marked the mystics as heretics: those who defy the orthodoxy of the 
church not by any desire to destroy it (nor to trespass the will of God) but to 
transform and mutate the institutional narratives and practices that dominate 
their spiritual life. Their heresy was thus not destructive in character, but 
speculative. Such transformations were practiced through a radically intimate 
commitment to their faith; an immersion into the ecstasy of divine communion 
that the church saw as undermining their authority as mediator of the gospel. 
Sense and thought disoriented in the ecstatic intoxication of divine experience. 
Religious doctrine tainted with mystics’ use of the deviant views of science, 
philosophy and direct, personal experience. However, it is to be made clear that 
de Cerateau’s mystics is here used as a model for contemporary art’s 
speculative turn as a programmatic uneven and combined heresy (that, as it did 
for the spiritually consumed mystic, reconfigures fundamental ‘values’ and 
‘meanings’; their manifest image of the world), and not a direct comparison for 
contemporary artists that might romantically re-iterate art as ineffable or 
mystical (in an obscurantist sense of the word): no “world-world mappings” as 






names from an adjectival forerunner. I have, therefore, in extremis, adopted the bold solution 
of introducing a made-up English term, mystics . . . to render la mystique, a field that might 
have won (but never did, in English) a name alongside metaphysics, say, or optics” (Smith in 
de Certeau, 1992: ix-x). “[A]nd it tends to define the status of  a discourse or a science in its 
own right that will be referred to by a new noun, la mystique [mystics]” (de Cearteau, 2015: 
112). 
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For instance, in a theoretical reflection on what a non-correlationist logic 
would infer for art by art theorist Suhail Malik (Malik, 2015b), it is suggested 
that a “rationalist SR” (188) provides opportunities to speculate on “what an art 
other than contemporary art could be” (189). By foregrounding the core 
generic trait of contemporary art as the “aesthetic experience” which “depends 
upon its receiving subject, the addressee of the work, who is taken to constitute 
it rather than arrive as latecomer after its production,” (185) Malik determines 
its fundamentally correlationist character (that he elsewhere calls “the 
interpretive paradigm of contemporary art”). That contemporary art is made for 
a subject to experience and thus to complete its production by allocating 
meaning or functionality is what renders it as a mode of correlationism, and is 
thus now liable to be set in relief against the profoundly unorthodox (perhaps 
even unthinkable, seeing as Malik can only provide a tentative historical 
example)22 alternative of a non-correlationist art that works “against the 
primacy of experience as condition for definition for art”(Malik, 2013: n.p.). 
 
Malik does however narrow the scope in terms of what such a regeneration 
of art does not look like. He too refers to dOCUMENTA (13) as emblematic of 
projects that mobilise OOP and thus still positions a viewing, interpretive 
subject (even if placed on the equal footing of a ‘flat ontology’) within an 
ecology of participants (subjects, objects) interacting via aesthetic experience 
(Harman, 2007). For Malik, this is not enough to initiate a substantially non- 
correlationist art. And so he looks to Brassier and Meillassoux’s variants of SR 
which as well as demoting anthropocentrism in the apprehension of the real, 





22 In an earlier version of this essay published in Spike magazine Malik writes, “there is no 
need to find artists, curators, critics making “SR art” to justify, to ground, or lead the 
investigation. What it imposes, and what corrodes the interpretive paradigm of contemporary 
art as well as its concomitant soft heroism of artistic, curatorial, or interpretive anti-
systemacity, is art as a rational exercise that eviscerates all lingering experiential conditions.” 
(Malik, 2013: n.p.). 
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telos of the artwork, and therewith collapses the entire edifice of the 
contemporary art paradigm” (Malik, 2015b: 188). In this postulation (indeed, 
this speculation arrived at via rational inference) “art [when it is] responsive to 
this theoretically-led imperative would be indifferent to the experience of it” 
(189), which is certainly a step beyond heresy towards outright hostility against 
contemporary art as it is presently manifest. And so, although Malik infers a 
strong argument that outlines what a non-correlationist art would do when 
logically mapped and scaled directly to the non-correlationist philosophy of 
“rationalist SR,” to collapse the edifice of contemporary art’s interpretive 
paradigm would surely demand a kind of speculation that navigates 
contemporary art in such a manner that is not ‘theory-first’ as his argument is. I 
will return to Malik’s argument in chapter 2 where his postulation operates less 
as a rule for contemporary art but as a kind of navigational protocol. It is with 
Malik’s (perhaps impossible) challenge to contemporary art that we may better 
see some of its deficiencies and inhibiting orthodoxies; that it may provide 
some conceptual resources to act with the contemporary art forms we have 
now.23 That is, Malik’s argument might be better read as a use of rationalist SR 
to produce a speculative future for art in order to write its present: it need not 
be a correct forecast in order to provide resources from a theoretically 




23 However, this is a productive (mis)reading of Malik in light of the current model of  heresy. 
Especially in light of his appeal for art to “exit” the strictures of contemporary art (Malik, 2013). 
24 A useful concept to consider here is something that Malik along with many others 
mentioned throughout this thesis have shared an interest in, which is hyperstition (Avanessian 
and Malik, 2016a). I will not be discussing the full provenance and development of this term - 
it is enough for this thesis to simply note that its distributed evolution has taken place through 
experimental discourses that combine fiction, art, music, and philosophy (see below of 
Negarestani’s work of theory-fiction for example). A para-academic project beginning in the 
mid-nineties known as the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit suggested that hyperstitions are 
“fictions that make themselves real” through a nexus of circulation, distribution, and social 
valorisation. The term has been used to describe the re-arrangement of the present by the 
future, which might provide some motivation for Malik’s inferred future for art. Practically 
speaking, this inferred future might also act in the way that Rosi Braidotti describes the 
speculative articulation of a posthuman entity not as a verifiable or accurate extrapolation of 
the present (nor as fantasy or science fiction), but, crucially, as a “navigational tool” (Braidotti, 
2015). That is, a model. As Avanessian and Malik put it: “It is the outside or the future that 
recursively rearranges the past, retrieving it 
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inferential reason over empirical experience as a means of constructing generic 
coordinates for an art that does not follow what he defines as “contemporary 
art,” and might thus engender “art’s exit from contemporary art” (Malik, 2013). 
However, I will go on to follow a course of enquiry that treats contemporary 
art as already presenting a multi-modal space of abductive inference with 
which to take up Malik’s challenges.25 
 
And so, in returning to Whitehead’s assertion that 
 
“The true method of speculation is like the flight of an airplane. It starts from 
the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of 
imaginative generalization; and again it lands for renewed observation 
rendered acute by rational interpretation” (Whitehead, 1979: 5) 
 
we can find in Malik’s speculation the parameters for contemporary art’s 
“renewed observation.” Contemporary art may find here some “new terms” 
with which to enact heresies on current orthodoxies. This (as well as the 
definition of heresy provided thus far) is aligned with what artist and theorist 
Amanda Beech sees as motivating her ongoing interest in SR, that it’s 
abductive inferences afford tools for 
 
“the construction of another language, that demands to be negotiated again. 
Which is what I’d see as the optimism of SR: the possibility of recoding and 
revising and reconceptualizing what we might have ever thought to have been 
 
 
otherwise than how it has shaped the present in order to open up another future than one that 
has been given by the past” (Avanessian and Malik, 2016: 12). 
25 “…non-linguistic practices can draw up inferences… independently of language. Although 
the inferentialist premium on discursive practices privileges the game of giving and asking for 
reasons, this game is not only or exclusively realized in specifically linguistic discourse. The 
category of discursive practice is broader than that of linguistic practice” (Brassier in Brassier 
and Malik, 2015: 230) Furthermore, while Malik’s manner of speculation is not to be devalued, 
I find that contemporary art fosters its own capacities to speculate: while some of the 
orthodoxies in contemporary art that I go on to discuss in chapter 2 certainly do work in the 
favour of conserving inherited, even out-dated, concepts and worldviews, some of those 
working across the speculative turn, as suggested, are involved in a heretical revision and 
reclamation of concepts for discovering more speculative trajectories. Yet regardless of which 
of these two positions that I am focusing on in the much broader field of contemporary art, they 
are emblematic of cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch’s insistence that “concepts and 
categorisations only occur in concrete complex situations” (Rosch, 1999: 76). 
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manifest in the first place. So it doesn’t move away from the idea of the given 
and the manifest, but thinks about the rearticulation, the reconfiguration, of 
what that might be.” (Beech, Canini, Fisher, Grant, and Mackay, 2010: n.p.) 
 
But, even though Malik’s inferential postulation of a non-correlationist 
model for contemporary art, and SR in general, affords such possibilities for 
‘recoding and revising and reconceptualizing’ or even ‘collapsing’ edifices 
such as that of art’s paradigmatic orthodoxies, it is worth re-iterating the 
unique propositional value of contemporary art as a field of thinking 
participants. Even the initial proposal for this thesis, as submitted to the 
Scottish Graduate School for Arts and Humanities and University of 
Edinburgh, sought to correct a “trivialisation” and “biennialisation” of SR that 
saw the invocation of “an already established canon that is not representative 
of the true extent of SR- practices, nor of SR’s profound implications for 
contemporary aesthetics.”26 This is indeed something I have continued to 
examine, yet, with an attunement (or a re-tunement) to the likelihood of 
something more akin to a mutual recoding, revising and reconceptualisation 
between contemporary art and SR; that its influence is significant yet not 
unilateral and results in a mutual “reconstruction of the disciplines” (Cox, 
Jaskey, and Malik, 2015: 30). 
 
Contemporary art provides an opportunity to open up the speculative turn 
beyond the remit, codification and valences of philosophy, and vice versa. 
And, to go a step further, this kind of cross-pollination and disciplinary 
superposition highlights the contingent orthodoxies of both, motivating their 
speculative work to take place in unorthodox manners, in unorthodox spaces 
(see footnote 36). 
 
While the connotations it has earned from contemporary philosophers and 
those engaged with SR are significant and influential, ‘the speculative turn’ 
 
26 My earlier criticism of this trivial thematising of SR rather than taking up the fundamental 
challenges of its philosophies has been echoed in the introduction to the publication Realism, 
Materialism, Art: “…we should anticipate not only new themes for art practices, exhibitions, 
and cultural production, but also starkly different ways of making, perceiving, thinking, and 
distributing them” (Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 2015: 30). This is still the case for the present 
project, as evidenced in my adoption of ExC alongside SR as a means by which I conduct 
analyses as well as develop practical work such as the projects of Most Dismal Swamp (chapter 
3). 
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actually marks a much broader cultural inclination towards speculation; 
towards creating and exploring possibilities beyond the circumscriptive 
protocols and cognitive affordances of a variety of perceived cultural 
orthodoxies - akin to the “critical orthodoxies” noted above (see footnote 1). 
Not just those found in a single discipline. The orthodoxies that this thesis 
locates in fields such as contemporary art are enabled by and reflect deep- 
seated, widely instantiated doxa.27 
 
Across diverse fields then, the speculative turn manifests as experimental 
work and practices that refuse inherited and pre-formatted logics, institutions, 
values, doxa, even metaphysical frameworks, as immutable, natural or 
perennial. From deeply embedded economic and political systems along with 
their long-standing institutions, to traditional systems of gender identification 
and sexual orientation, to re-thinking the very category of the human, the 
speculative turn is characterised by an ambition that is ultimately fastened to 
the idea of imagining altogether new realities. The practical focus of such 
speculative work is then to construct, to revise and to explore with unorthodox 
alternatives that deny the weight of orthodoxy, the circumscriptive horizon of 
perceived finitude and the conservation of the given:28 it is the active revision 
of the Overton window as a possibility space (“a way of thinking precisely 
about complex situations” (Hillis, 2011)) when such a matrix of fixed 




27 That is, what in Bordieu’s terms self-evidently represents “the universe of possible 
discourse” (Bordieu, 1972: 167). From here, I will represent the dynamic, discursive and 
therefore potentially flexible nature of this universe of possible discourse with the notion of the 
Overton window - a tool conceived by public policy specialist Joseph Overton (further 
developed and named by his colleague Joseph Lehman). The Overton window denotes the 
range of ideas considered acceptable for public discourse. For an idea to be politically viable, 
even conceivable, it must be within that range, which has become known as the Overton 
window. It marks the challenge for policymakers as not so much passing laws, but moving 
ideas into that window. Therefore, the significance of this idea for me also lies in considering 
contemporary art’s role in both  maintaining and altering the parameters of the Overton 
window. 
28 See footnote 14. Brassier also tethers the aforementioned practice of revising what is given or 
manifest, in terms of a political project comprised of his renewal of prometheanism: “The 
Promethean trespass resides in making the given” Brassier, 2014: 478). 
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Thus, crucially, it is also a turn towards elaborating and experimenting with 
radically unorthodox vocabularies, concepts, models, and practices as a means 
to revise the orthodox affordances of a possibility space, or, in more 
sociological terms, the discursive terms of the Overton window. I argue that 
such unorthodoxies, or speculative heresies, are transformative navigational 
protocols and ultimately work towards expanding the parameters of the 
Overton window in order to cultivate a cognitive ecology that is in tune with, 
and apprehensive of, the radically multi-scalar political, ecological, and 
technological realities that constitute and impact life on earth. 
 
The speculative turn is an uneven and combined heresy: it is multi-modal 
and distributed, and as such, nurtures “more heterodox, and dynamic 
categories” (Rosler, 2010: 118)29 with which to think beyond what is 
immediately sensed by our limited biological faculties alone, beyond the realm 
of subjective experience, and beyond what is understood as given. It is at once 
what Arjun Appadurai has described as “imagination as a social practice” 
(Appadurai, 1990: 5) and what I posit as the categorical reformulation of what 
the ‘social’ now means, concomitant with a reformulation of fundamental 
categories such as ‘human’.30 
 
 
29 This what Martha Rosler suggests is a defining characteristic of Feminism’s achievements: 
that it inherently worked to “rethink what and who an artist is and might be, what materials art 
might be made of and what art meant” towards effecting heterodox replacements for singular 
and sacred, inherited dominant categories that oppress emergent possibilities. This is key to 
the logic of speculation, and thus also highlights the actively speculative character of 
Feminism’s projects. One such project in recent years which makes this connection explicit is 
that of Xenofemism which seeks to invest in a reformation of the faculties of reason and 
enlightenment principles which it views as being neglected by more traditional forms of 
Feminism: “Reason, like information, wants to be free, and patriarchy cannot give it freedom.” 
The Xenofeminist collective, Laboria Cuboniks, attempt to wrest the development of reason 
from powerful systems, looking towards the possibilities for its future development, and 
revision, engendered in the exclusion of women, non-binary folk, and those further along the 
long tail of difference: “Instead of eliminating differences between genders, we want them to 
proliferate. Let a hundred sexes bloom!” (Laboria Cuboniks, 2015). 
30 In section 2.2.2 I map this reformulation on the contemporary art’s uneven and combined 
interest in ‘the body’ and ‘the body politic.’ The revision of such fundamental, even sacred, 
categories is a keystone of the discourses of posthumanism, a further genealogical touchstone 
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1.2.1 The Speculative Turn is a Long, Long Tail 
 
The term ‘speculative turn’ also points towards a formally transdisciplinary 
approach embodied by the methodological, discursive, and distributive 
architecture of SR. SR disregards the perceived boundaries separating analytic 
and continental branches of philosophy (especially the work of Brassier and 
latterly Reza Negarestani), and even assembles its discourse through the 
conceptual materials afforded by various strands of biology, cognitive science, 
neuroscience, ecology, finance, chemistry, astrophysics, quantum physics, 
cognitive psychology, mathematics, fiction, and art (which goes some way to 
accounting for the SR variants noted thus far). This permissive cross- 
pollination of concepts and materials not only expands the terrain of these 
disciplines and creates fertile partnerships, but has evidently produced a long 
tail of experimental and obscure sub-fields including dark materialism, theory- 
fiction, xenofeminism, dark ecology, venomenology, sonic fiction, 
hyperstition, cosmic pessimism, accelerationism, Shoggothic Materialism, and 




for the speculative turn. This is so in their shared understanding of the human as a contingent 
category that is shaped and reshaped according to nonhuman environmental and technical 
factors. Art’s relationship with such concerns have been explicit since at least the exhibition 
Post Human (1992) curated by Jeffrey Deitch which sought to explore what “new kind of 
‘person’” emerged from human entanglement among new technologies and their trajectories. 
Among more recent proliferation of morphological speculations that work towards expanding 
the Overton window of how bodies, subjectivities, minds, etc should be thought of include the 
accelerated, hyper-condensed and networked techno-mashups of Ryan Trecartin (Åkervall, 
2016), the granular gut-brain-AI oracles of Jenna Sutela, the digi-queered bodies of Jacolby 
Satterwhite (Burrows and O’ Sullivan, 2019), the neurodivergent chimeras of Andrea Crespo, 
the ‘€conomystical Cybermedieval’ RPG characters of ¥€$Si Perse, and the bestiary of 
avatars that populate the transmedia fiction of Plastique Fantastique. 
31 See the 2011 conference Dark Materialism at Kingston University, London; seminal theory-
fiction experiments such as Negarestani., R. (2008). Cyclonopedia. Melbourne: Re.press; 
Cuboniks, L. (2015). Laboria Cuboniks | Xenofeminism. [online] Laboriacuboniks.net. 
Available at: http://www.laboriacuboniks.net/ [Accessed 01 Feb. 2019]; Morton, T. (2018). 
Dark Ecology. Columbia: Columbia University Press; Fox, 
D. (2012) Venomenology. In: Masciandaro, N. and Negarestani, R. eds., Glossator, Volume 
6. New York: Glossator, 121-122; Eshun, K. (1998). More brilliant than the sun. London: 
Quartet Books; anon. (2017). CCRU Writings 1997-2003. Falmouth: 
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Therefore, in an already splintered ‘field’ such as SR, this long tail that 
extends out towards uncharted, unexpected and unorthodox territories further 
suggests the importance of this thesis locating, defining and paying attention to 
a specific milieu, or “scene,” of participants around contemporary art and the 
speculative turn. I use the term scene after artist and theorist Simon O’ 
Sullivan, who further complicates this situation by using the phrase in a 
Deleuzoguattarian sense to suggest that a scene “need not involve more than a 
single individual” (O’ Sullivan, 2016: 83).32 The implication here is that one 
may construct, or “fiction” (to use another term associated with the work of O’ 
Sullivan (Burrows and O’ Sullivan, 2019)) a scene, and perhaps even entire 
philosophical programs or sub-fields as above. I argued for such a possibility in 
the first term of my Ph.D. candidacy with a paper that charted various artists 
utilising fictional avatars as “semi-autonomous speculative agents, or as 
epistemico-morphological prostheses” (See Appendix 1). For instance, in 
Negarestani’s theory-fictional text Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous 
Materials (Negarestani, 2011) the fictional entity Dr. Hamid Parsani allows 
Negarestani to combine philosophy, occultism, international relations, horror 
and fiction to produce and discuss altogether new arguments and concepts such 
as “hypercamouflage” (61), “hidden writing” (61), and “hyperstition” (9). The 
invention of Dr. D. C. Barker (who is a descendent of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Professor Challenger, who had also been appropriated from the fictions of 
Arthur Conan Doyle - O’ Sullivan refers to this as the “nesting” of fictions (O’ 




Urbanomic; Thacker, E. (2020). Cosmic Pessimism. [online] Continentcontinent.cc. 
Available at: http://www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/84 
[Accessed 15 March. 2018]; Mackay, R. and Aanessian, A. (2014). Accelerate. 
Falmouth: Urbanomic; Woodward, B. (2011), Mad Speculation and Absolute Inhumanism: 
Lovecraft, Ligotti, and the Weirding of Philosophy, continent, 1.1, 3-13; Bryant, L. (2013) 
Politics and Speculative Realism. In: Austin, M., Ennis, P., Gironi., Gokey, T., Jackson, R., 
eds., Speculations: A Journal of Speculative Realism, Volume 
IV. New York: Punctum, 15-21. 
32 “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us were several, there was 
already quite a crowd” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). See the work of Jenna Sutela 
discussed in 2.3 which also re-configures the liberal humanist image of the singular, 
discrete individual as a dynamic and multi-scalar microbial open system. 
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philosophers Nick Land and Robin Mackay. The artist project, Plastique 
Fantastique, made up of O’ Sullivan along with David Burrows (and various 
others from 2005 to the present day) has often constructed avatars that consist 
of elements of living individuals, myths, commodities, animals, sacred objects, 
memes, and assorted materials (if the aggregate ‘Brain’ of dOCUMENTA (13) 
was endowed with a voice and a character it might resemble one of these 
avatars) who forward the transmedia narrative of the overall project, exploring 
posthumanism, contemporary technology, magic, ritual, counter-culture, and 
politics. And the Confraternity of Neoflagellants, whose theory-fictions set in 
the multi-dimensional and post-Westphalian ‘mall’ are populated by a dynamic 
bestiary of characters that embody, perform, and explore the concept of 
neomedievalism along with posthuman corporeality, transtemporalities and 
temporal anachronism, hypereconomy, and “relic-ing” (Hogg and Mulholland, 
2013: 110).33 
 
This long, long tail of experimental, hybrid and even fictional ways of 
thinking and practicing around new concepts and terms serves to exacerbate, to 
the nth degree, Laruelle’s suggestion that “only heretics have both philosophy 
and religion, philosophy and science together at their disposal” (Laruelle, 2012: 
284). Which is to suggest that acts of heresy are those that not only cross 
between the boundaries of disciplines but also utilise their materials towards 
“inventing new terms” and “regenerating knowledge” (Martinon). An example 
of this seemingly flagrant practice being used in the rationalist manner of a 
“science” is that of Laruelle’s chief accomplishment which is the development 
of non-philosophy: “a use of philosophy that remains constitutively foreign to 
the norms and aims governing the properly philosophical practice of 
philosophy” (Brassier). In the following chapter I discuss and exemplify 
through works of contemporary art Laruelle’s practice, with regards to the re- 
 
 
33 Such fictions have been used throughout the history of science also, whether in thought 
experiments such as Maxwell’s Demon and Donald Davidson’s Swampman, or as in the 
“Zarathustrians,” a fictional alien race in the popular science literature of Jack Cohen and Ian 
Stewart that in their words were used “to jog us, and our readers, out of the safe, familiar, 
parochial way of thinking…to push our minds in new directions, to stimulate lateral 
thinking” (Cohen and Stewart, 1994: 51). 
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invention of concepts: a re-use of language concomitant with that of de 
Certeau’s mystics (particularly in Laruelle’s construction of “mystic fiction,” a 
kind of superposition of philosophy and mysticism)34 and the inferential 
production of a syntax native to such nascent conceptual schemes. 
 
I thus suggest that the speculative turn constitutively enacts a turn away 
from a perceived epistemicide (“the killing of other knowledge systems” (Hall 
and Tandon, 2017)) and instead explores the valuable contingencies eclipsed 
by resilient orthodoxy and dogma. The diverse work of the speculative turn, 
considered as a variously collective, differentiated and distributed activity, 
cultivates an epistemic long tail. Such a long tail might indeed be authorised by 




34 Just as in his “use of philosophy” in the construction of an experimental science of 
philosophy (or, as has been suggested by Laruelle, the making of “art with philosophy” 
(Mackay, 2012: 29) with the treatment of philosophy as as raw material), that he calls non-
philosophy, his “mystic fiction,” or non-mysticism “takes mysticism and mystical language as 
its raw material” (Laruelle, 2007: 258). Laruelle’s interest in  the language and resources of 
mystics is apparent in the non-philosophical scheme of appropriating and re-deploying 
philosophy, ultimately towards a “re-vision of what counts as thought, taking it well beyond 
the hype of philosophical mastery and into a materialism that sees philosophy as only one kind 
of thinking” (Ó Maoilearca, 2015). One way in which Laruelle manages this is through a 
“superposition methodology” drawn from quantum mechanics as an alternative to the 
orthodoxy of dialectical logic (Gangle and Greve, 2017: 9; Laruelle, 2012: 239). This follows 
the constructive possibilities of conjugating distinct subsystems or texts or forms of discourse 
in the production of new suites of concepts and new ways of thinking that emerge from the 
material (as opposed to the tradition of philosophy exerting its way of think upon other areas 
whether this is art, mysticism or indeed any other topic. Laruelle refers to this latter exertion as 
the “Principle of Sufficient Philosophy” which Laruelle contends is common across all 
philosophies regardless of their allegiances to a materialism, idealism, transcendentalism, 
immanence, etc. and ineffectually tends to accord a higher status than that of (the revisionary 
capacities of) reason (Laruelle, 1999: 139). And non-philosophy seeks to afford such materials 
the opportunity to insist on their own conceptual schemes (See also discussion of TTT 
throughout). As philosopher John Ó Maoilearca puts in in his An Introduction to François 
Laruelle, “In place of seeing philosophy go to the Real (with its categories, its concepts, its 
wisdom), from an outside, transcendent, position, we reorient ourselves to see philosophy 
coming from inside the Real” (Ó Maoilearca, 2015: 174) which is to describe non- 
philosophy’s concept of “unilateral duality” (Laruelle, 1999: 143), a kind of immanence from 
the Real that suggests “thinking is everywhere” (Ó Maoilearca, 2015: 175) by acknowledging 
the propositional potentiality of all (matter) that is outside of philosophy, and which sits 
alongside it in the Real (philosophy is but one experiment in thinking. Again, see TTT for a 
similar treatment in anthropology). 
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also a deeper kind of decolonisation that attends to a profoundly broader 
conception of what knowledge could be (rather than inheriting a singular idea 
of what it is) and the attendant possibilities of its production; “to construct 
other theoretical images of theory” (de Castro, 2014: 77). (Here, the 
anthropological work of Eduardo Vivieros de Castro that assumes the 
“permanent decolonization of thought” (40) through the supposition of the real 
by “treating indigenous ideas as concepts” (187).) This speculative long tail is 
then an enriching “cognitive exotica” (arguably even a “conscious exotica”) 
(Shanahan, 2016) that widens the parameters for what thought is, what it can 
achieve and how thinking operates.35 
 
Speaking at the first annual Mark Fisher Memorial Lecture at Goldsmiths, 
University of London in 2017, Kodwo Eshun (whose work will be discussed 
further below and in the following chapter’s “Interlude” section) shares an 
illustrative account of what I am calling the epistemic long tail, and how it is 
instantiated as an uneven and combined heresy. In calling to mind the diverse 
explosion of speculative work circulating and germinating through para- 
academic hybrid spaces such as The New Centre for Research and Practice as 
well as minor enclaves such as artist-run galleries, chat servers, zines, and 
raves, Eshun extensively lists:36 
 
 
35 It is not a key example to be analysed further, but given the discussion thus far on 
dOCUMENTA (13) it is worthwhile to note The 14th Istanbul Biennial, SALTWATER: A 
Theory of Thought Forms also curated by Christov-Bakargiev, which is ostensibly an attempt 
to combine art with “other knowledges” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2015: XLIII). This suggestion, 
combined with the biennial’s title, which refers to a 1901 publication by the Theosophists 
Annie Besant and Charles Leadbeater, is emblematic of an uptake of occulted and unorthodox 
systems of knowledge. Furthermore, the display of drawings from this publication alongside 
scientific drawings of synaptic connections, Thalamic Afferent Axons in the Human Cerebral 
Cortex by Spanish neurobiologist Santiago Ramón y Cajal as well as other neurological 
experiment documentation and neuro-aesthetics materials, is notable at present for the 
potential resonances between this esoteric spiritualism and a science dedicated to the 
disenchantment of prevailing assumptions regarding how we understand ourselves. Something 
akin to, or on the way to approaching, Laruelle’s superposition of philosophy and mystics. 
36 What de Certeau refers to as “privileged spaces” for the social practice of mystics – the 
circulating forms of minor or popular communication – can here be likened also to the para-
academic organs of discourse such as Punctum and Collapse who are committed to publishing 
and circulating experimental research and literature beyond the perceived strictures of the 
academy: “Para-academia is parasitical upon, and convergent with, the 
academy, forming an addendum or paragon constitutive of academic practices. Para- 
academia, thus conceived, is a commoning counter-strategy to the enclosure of knowledge” 
(Mulholland, 2019b: 61-62) 
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“the differentiated positions and the antagonistic alliances and the factional 
forces of the CyberGoths that move through the calendrical systems of 
templexity; the CyberFeminists that situate themselves in the time streams of 
patriarchy; the AfroFuturists that hack the systems of chrono-power and 
chronography; the Speculative Realists that dismantle the barriers to the Great 
Outside; the Hauntologists that diagnose the ‘slow cancellation of the future’ in 
order to dismantle its enforced depression; the Eliminativists that dismantle the 
coordinates for experience; the Accelerationists that aspire to decode flows; the 
Left-Accelerationists that seek to build a stack whose platform logics generate 
our entrenchment; the Right-Accelerationists that summon the Basilisk; the 
Unconditional-Accelerationists that seek to dis-couple themselves from the Left 
and from the Right; the students of Black study who argue that, ‘being black is 
a thing you can only do with others. I don’t know that it’s possible to be black 
by oneself, insofar as being black, or black-being, is a necessarily, irreducibly 
social thing that is general and that is ongoing’; the #AltWoke that write, ‘our 
amorality isn’t a bankruptcy of ethics so much as an emotional discipline in 
response to global existential threats. A learned stoicism and pragmatism is 
crucial to #AltWoke’; the Mundane AfroFuturists that claim, ‘WE ARE NOT 
ALIENS’; the NeoReactionists, engaged in promoting highly advanced drastic 
regression; the Xenofemists that’s announced that ‘Xenofeminism indexes the 
desire to construct an alien future with a triumphant X and a mobile map. This 
X does not mark a destination. It is the insertion of a topological keyframe for 
the formation of a new logic’; the Black Feminist Poethicists that know that 
studying Blackness announces the end of the world as we know it; the 
Prometheans that ‘consider revolution not as a passionate attachment to some 
flash of negation but as a process of undoing the abstract social forms that 
constrain and humiliate human capacities along with the political agencies that 
enforce those constraints and humiliations; the Forensic Architects that ‘invert 
the direction of the forensic gaze’, that seek to designate a field of action in 
which individuals and independent organisations can confront abuses of power 
by states and corporations in situations that have a bearing upon political 
struggle, violent conflict and climate change; the Inhumanists that argue that 
the universal wave which erases the self-portrait of man drawn in the sand, that 
Inhumanism is a vector of revision that relentlessly revises what to means to be 
human by removing its supposedly self-evident characteristics while reserving 
certain invariances; the AfroFuturists 2.0 that assert the social physics of 
Blackness; the AfroPessimists that assert ‘the slave’s cause in the cause of 
another world in and on the ruins of this one in the end of its ends; the Black 
Quantum Futurists that work on the temporal dynamics of retro-currencies, of 
backwards happenings - an event whose influence is not discrete and time-
bound but extends in all possible directions and encompasses all possible time 





to one another proposes that Accelerationism always-already exists in the 
territory of Blackness whether to knows it or not. And conversely, that 
Blackness is always-already Accelerationist’; the Gulf Futurists that emerge 
from ‘the isolation of individuals via technology, wealth and reactionary Islam, 
the corrosive elements of consumerism on the soul and industry on earth, the 
erasure of history from our memories and our surroundings, and finally our 
dizzying collective arrival in a fire that no one was ready for; the SinoFuturists 
that argue that ‘SinoFuturism is an invisible movement, a spectre already 
embedded into a trillion industrial products, a billion individuals’.” (Eshun, 
2017) 
 
Even this impressive roster of activity is representative of but a mere 
sample of a flourishing speculative long tail. Eshun talks specifically of work 
that has pertained to the fractal milieux surrounding himself and colleagues 
such as Mark Fisher. To show how broadly the speculative turn sweeps we 
might refer also to the seemingly infinite recombinant field of experimental 
political ideologies formulating among a younger generation of online 
personae, as compiled and studied in-depth by artist Joshua Citarella.37 Or, the 
matrix of “memetic tribes” that entrepreneur and podcaster Peter N. Limberg 
has catalogued as constituting a recent “culture war 2.0”.38 Furthermore, 
Eshun’s, Citarella’s, and Limberg’s samples of this long tail also demonstrate 
the point made in this thesis’ introduction. That speculation is ordinary. For 
what the invocation of a long tail proposes is that though there may be an 
intense multitude of varying perspectives, cultural codings, and emerging 
communities, to say that they simply occupy the margins of social life akin to 
what one might call a ‘subculture’ is inaccurate. The long tail is a model that 




37 “Politigrammers revel in adding as many prefixes and suffixes to their ideology as 
possible. Sometimes I think there are as many ideologies as there are members of Politigram. 
Some of the more unusual titles I’ve come across; National Trotskyism, Dharmic Eco-
Reactionaryism, Libertarian Neo-Monarchism, Traditional Primitivist Caliphatism, Christian 
Bolshevism, the list goes on…” (Citarella, 2018: n.p.) 
38 Limberg maps not only the names of movements and ideologies proliferating with the aid 
of online communications but also their forebears, media “campfires” around which they 
collect, the mental models they adopt, the “sacred values” around which they coalesce, and 
the diverse political teloi they each envision in Limerg’s Google Document (Limerg, 2018). 
See also Limberg and Barnes, 2018. 
39 The model is exemplified somewhat in the Occupy movement’s refrain, “We are the 99%”. 
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Whether some of these marginal subfields, micro-genres, or tentative 
subculture-like movements are in fact short-lived expressions of an interest in 
generating new terms and arguments with which to expand the Overton 
window or if they have some lasting impact such as SR has achieved, Eshun 
goes on to affirm that 
 
“Each of these neologisms are actually forms of life. Each of them is the names 
of and for aesthetico-political positions that operate by disagreements and 
differentiations, that make claims that must be argued. Each of these is not so 
much a term as a war of and over interpretation, the stance that aims to 
intervene in cultural politics, that fashions itself to articulate a discontent, to 
focus despair and depression into theories to live by, theories that are 
embodied, theories that live in us and through us and with us and on us.” 
(Eshun, 2017) 
 
The “disagreements and differentiations” by which they come to be, indicate 
their position within the broader cultural inclination towards speculation that I 
mention above. They are the result of “discursive practices [that] constitute the 
game of giving and asking for reasons and outlining the space of reason as a 
landscape of navigation rather than as a priori access to explicit norms” 
(Negarestani, 2014: 433), and thus such neologisms are not simply a form of 
posture but indicative of multi-modal cognitive processes involving 
(re)generative combinations of disciplinary resources; of “multiple activities of 
modeling between philosophy and science, philosophy and art, leading all the 
way to risking a model-ist explosion” (Laruelle, 2012: 135, emphases added). 
 
It is efficacious here to consider this speculative long tail as an eruption of 
models (for “forms of life,” for possible futures, for counterfactual alternatives 
to the “despair and depression” administered by the given) by which 
orthodoxies and given conditions are speculatively re-worked. Models are 
precisely manipulable “technologies of investigation” (Morrison, 1999: 32) 
that afford their users ways of understanding and insights that may not be 
achievable though other means (for example, weather patterns are more 
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accurately understood and predicted through modelisation rather than 
observation).40 
 
This is also how we might appreciate Eshun’s characterisation of each 
“term as a war of and over interpretation.” Limberg’s directory of political 
ideologies sets this idea in sharper relief. It sets out a range of political ‘tribes’ 
along with the various factors by which each constructs and maintains an 
operative model of the world (such as what they believe, their political aims, 
and who their political and theoretical forebears are). And for each tribe 
Limberg also lists the mental models they adopt as a means for understanding 
their environment, constructing arguments and theories, and for setting aims 
(see footnote 38). However, this ‘war of and over interpretation’ is something 
that has been rendered much more mundane and insidious for decades by the 
critical humanities. One example of work that aims to forge a new model for 
apprehending the realities of human conception and reproductive biology is 
anthropologist Emily Martin’s The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has 
Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles (Martin, 
1991).41 
 
In the second half of chapter 2 I elaborate contemporary art’s role in the 
(re)formulation of such models with which to generate and exemplify new 
terms and concepts. Specifically, how notions of ‘the body’ and ‘mystics’ have 
proved, in the view of this thesis, valuable for a certain milieu in contemporary 
 
 
40 Statistician George E. P. Box famously stated that “all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” which lends further weight to the consideration of each of the neologisms catalogued 
by Eshun as representative of a model, in that as collectively constructed shared technologies 
of investigation they each carve out a “cognitive niche” where through their native prostheses, 
or “epistemic mediators” (whether this might be a physicists simulation programme or an art 
work), problems can be approached and an  image of the world can be (re)produced (Magnani, 
2016). 
41 Also, considering the socio-cognitive and eco-cognitive perspectives embodied in this 
thesis, this kind of conflict between orthodoxies and their alternatives, and between the 
varying alternatives themselves, could be described in terms of “eco- epistemic warfare” 
“which sees scientific enterprise as a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which 
it is crucial to distinguish epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for 
example fictions, falsities, propaganda) weapons” (Magnani, 2013: 56). 
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art to revise as models (See the section 2.2.2 and subsections relating to my 
own projects, Exta, CHEMHEX EXTRACT, and Vaporents ). To do so I will 
refer further to Eshun’s own practice of “concept engineering” as well as 
methodological resonances between the work of Laruelle and anthropologist 
Martin Holbraad. Moreover, in the final chapter of this thesis I share my own 
practical modelisation through art projects, with regards to the ‘swamp’ as a 
fertile conceptual model. 
 
Based on all of this, I conclude that on one hand the multitude of other 
‘turns’ taking place across the humanities and sciences42 similarly embody a 
turn motivated by a single core methodological emphasis, such as the emphasis 
on socially-constructed meaning of the cultural turn or the pre-individual and 
pre-conscious bodily forces that constitute social interaction of the affective 
turn. Such emphases are taken to be the result of perceived deficit of attention 
towards a more vital perspective. These turns have also witnessed an uptake 
across multiple disciplines and delivered complex discursive terrains (or “space 
of reasons” to use the Sellarsian phrase from Negarestani’s quote above). On 
the other hand, while the speculative turn might also be said to operate 
according to the core abductive logic of speculation, by heresy raised to the 
status of methodological principle (a kind of “axiomatic heresy” (Brassier, 
2003)), it is a turn that sets in the sharpest possible relief the heuristic logic of 
these turns’ aims to think their subjects, fields, end environments anew. Rather 
than the mere provision of a model, it also constitutes a “model-ist explosion.” 
While other turns proceed according to a set of fixed coordinates, for the 
speculative turn these coordinates are multiplied across a long tail of fecund 
subfields. Furthermore, I contend that the speculative turn, and its long tail, is 
ordinary (whereas many more turns have struggled to venture beyond 
academia, if not cloistered academic communities). The popular response to 
certain political, technological, and climatological complexities has instilled a 





42 Sociologist Mark Carrigan notes 47 different ‘turns’ (Carrigan, 2014: n.p.). 
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in which common resources are used and even how a common future ought to 
look from different, yet equally concerned, perspectives. 
 
Joey Holder’s iterative and distributed project Adcredo: The Deep Belief 
Network (2018) captures and explores this eco-epistemic warfare particularly 
well. I will refer to this project in more detail below, but for the current train 
of thought it provides a dynamic image for an epistemic long tail that 
combines and superposes esoteric knowledge, political populism, predictive 
algorithmic manipulation, fiction, future narratives, conspiracy theory, 
dystopian commercial artificial intelligence projects, and meme economies. 
With one aspect of the work consisting of a variety of CGI talking heads 
ranging from a serpentine Kanye West, the distorted self-image of Donald 
Trump (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) and Pepe the Frog,43 with each avatar representing 
such different worldviews, conceptual schemes, and ways of thinking that 
they might each seem to belong to entirely different worlds (this idea is 
exacerbated in the use of alien figures as some of the talking heads - as they 
discuss ideas such as synchromysticism and Bilderberg Group saurian 
patrilineages, or even just an alternative political perspective, they render 
themselves ‘alien’ to what one might see as the familiar discourse of their 
Overton window.44 And, such worldviews, according to the research of 
Citarella and my own invocation of marginal or para-academic spaces, have 
taken to percolating out of mainstream sight). This allows one to conclude 
that, in addition to my above argument, the long tail of the speculative turn 
also acts as a curative explosion of what is perceived to be epistemicide. 
From the perspective of different “campfires,” to use one of Limberg’s key 
phrases, different orthodoxies are assumed to be dominant. Take for example 
the imposition of the term “cathedral” as a model for a right-libertarian view 
of what they take to be a dominant aggregate of liberal media, education, and 
institutions. While a left-wing variant of such a view would take a right-
motivated neoliberalism at work in the domination of contemporary life. 
 
 
43 Pepe the Frog is a comic strip character first produced by Matt Furie in a comic called 
Boy's Club. Since being shared online as a meme-image representing various moods, the 
image has become synonymous as a symbol of alt-right coding. 
44 Adcredo’s exhibition guide from its iteration at QUAD Gallery, Derby (2018) notes that “we 
live in a time of ‘hyperpolarisation’ where we think that people with different political or 














1.3 Socio-Cognitive Technologies of the Speculative Turn 
 
Beyond such illustration however, contemporary art fosters its own 
practical and theoretical shifts by which it affords particular opportunities and 
functions in terms of contributing to the broad, multi-modal discursive space of 
the speculative turn. It is uniquely positioned within (the formation of) a 
speculative cognitive ecology: contemporary art offers distinct resources in 
what Andrew Clark refers to as our propensity to materially “dissipate 
reasoning” and to “use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can 
succeed with less intelligence” (Clark, 1997: 180). Following the implications 
surrounding Clark’s and David Chalmers’ (heretical) articulation of the 
extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), this thesis offers a review 
of how the speculative turn has emerged in and through the field of 
contemporary art. Work surrounding extended mind and extended cognition 
hypotheses provides opportunities to consider contemporary art as a dynamic 
process of cognitive scaffolding - contemporary art is uniquely placed among 
the wealth of artefacts where thinking is seen to reside beyond the brain (or, 
“beyond the skin” when we consider that neural activity is certainly affected by 
a variety of non-brain based fluctuations throughout the body). While much of 
material culture, in the scheme of ExC, might serve to embody, preserve and 
augment the abstract concepts that structure our experience of the world, the 
contemporary art of the speculative turn would be a form of artefactual 
intelligence concerned with (re)making the concepts with which we find some 
“ingress to the real” (Brassier). 
 
The argument could be put forth that the diverse work of contemporary art 
is a distributed form of “eco-cognitive engineer[ing]” (Magnani, 2013: 50), 
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whereby artworks constitute stigmergic environmental modifications (in terms 
of being artefacts that circulate and forge varying degrees of influence within 
the cognitive ecology described here and in Adcredo) that share information 
across time and space. 
 
But I would like to go a step further in order to focus on the properties of 
contemporary art examples, as “socio-cognitive technologies” (Pedersen, 2007: 
154), that augment extant processes of cognition in such a way as to contribute 
to the formation of new terms, new concepts, and new ways of thinking. This 
means distinguishing how different contemporary artworks operate as “part of 
the material environment in which an ever-expanding array of human cognitive 
and epistemic activities unfold” (Smart, Heersmink, and Clowes, 2017: 253). 
Do they contribute to an existing paradigm by embodying and signal-boosting 
its core values and assumptions (see for example footnote 98)? Or do they 
revise such concepts, and extrapolate from these new terms a counterfactual 
space of alternatives? 
 
Smart, Heersmink, and Clowes argue that it is a mundane certainty that we 
are each “actively involved in the construction of and configuration of a bio- 
external nexus of material resources that helps to influence the course of our 
cognitive processing and define the limits of our cognitive capabilities” (275). 
While cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald suggests that art has been 
generally “aimed at the deliberate refinement and elaboration of mental models 
and worldviews,” and has historically been engaged in altering “the prevailing 
images and worldviews of their societies in a highly selective manner,” 
towards an intervention in “cultural-cognitive governance” (Donald, 2006: 5- 
6). Although the discourses to which these assertions belong may furnish this 
thesis with the tools to examine how the speculative turn practically manifests 
in and through contemporary art, these comments are also indicative of a 
residual adherence to a correlationism, even a classical humanism, albeit in a 
modified form that has worked towards eliminating the line that divides nature 
and culture; things and people. This version of “humanism and its elevation of 
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the status of things by association to humans” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 
203), renders ExC analogous with Latour’s description of a “hybrid 
assemblage of humans and non-humans in mutual transformation” (206; 
Latour, 1999: 180). In Latour’s schema, as well as Donald along with Smart et 
al., although the ontological division between person and thing (biologically- 
based cognitive system and external material resource) is bridged, there is still 
an ontological determination used to conceptualise and render meaningful the 
thing-in-tself, and the dynamic hybrid of thing-person (whether this is 
collectives, assemblages, or the Actor Network) (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 
210). And furthermore, in terms of cognitive processing, there is a latent 
assumption to be found in Donald and in Smart et al. that determines a 
common coding of information across this ontological divide. In order to 
unbind ExC’s latent correlationism I turn to Laruelle45 along with the lesser 
known anthropological project, thinking through things (TTT) (Henare, 
Holbraad, and Wastel, 2007; Holbraad, 2011; Hobraad and Pedersen, 2017). 
 
To this end, while introducing the Speculative Solution work by artist 
Florian Hecker (which was distributed across audio, object, and textual 
artefacts that each variously expanded, explored, and illustrated Hecker’s 
concerns), Mackay reflects on the 
 
“objects or situations that occasion or facilitate a certain meditation at a given 
historical juncture operate a selective pressure on thought: Certain turns in 
thinking can only take place in the company of certain objects, which thereby 
become instruments of philosophy, and the worldly indices of transformations 
in the conception of reason itself, the ‘image of thought.” (Mackay, 2011: 3) 
 
Although a highly instructive formulation, Mackay’s suggestion that such 




45 With Laruelle it is possible to explore the possibility of ExC’s ‘extension’ by working in the 
manner of his ‘unilateral duality;’ that cognition is extended not from a biologically-based 
cognitive system, but back to it (and, thus, following both Mackay (2011) and Viveiros de 
Castro (2014), results in this systems’s fundamental transformation). This might also be 
considered in terms of TTT’s logic of considering the “thing-as-heauristic” in order for it to 
engender its own theory and conceptual schema (Henare, Holbraad, Wastel, 2007: 5). 
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Laruellian inflection that proposes the very same objects as instruments of a 
kind of thinking that is not beholden to the authority of philosophy. This 
alternative phrasing would be an articulation of Laruelle’s “cognition of the 
third kind.”46 Laruelle’s non-philosophy here chimes well with the supposition 
that “external resources need not replicate internal resources; instead they can 
have different properties, functions and formats to those of the biologically- 
based cognitive system” (Smart, Heersmink, and Clowes, 2017: 269). Which is 
to acknowledge the sui generis materiality of external resources, such as an art 
project or a typewriter or a smartphone, as functionally different from 
biologically native apparatuses. And, according to TTT, ontologically different, 
with “conceptual affordances” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 217) distinctly 
indifferent to our own theoretical criteria, or indeed, system of philosophy.47 In 
the following chapter I elaborate upon TTT, along with its resonances with 
Laruelle, in terms of substantiating the axiomatic heresy of the speculative 
turn. That is, how concepts are re-thought and created, resulting in unorthodox 
“transformations in the conception of reason itself, the ‘image of thought.’” 
Cognition as a synthetic and manipulable edifice.48 
 
A significant model for much of my thinking thus far, particularly the way 
in which it aims to be speculatively constructive, is that of “cognitive 
scaffolding” (Wood, Bruner, and Ross, 1976; Day 2004; Caporael, Griesemer, 
and Wimsatt, 2013). The term is emblematic of a heuristic logic found in many 
of this chapter’s subjects be they Meillassoux’s archer-fossil, Brassier’s 
 
 
46 "The Real is rather like Kant's 'thing-in-itself: unknowable and even unthinkable, but with 
this difference: it is constituted by a foreclosed immanence rather than by transcendence (it 
is the One rather than the Other), and consists in an experience or cognition of the third 
kind; the vision-in-One" (Laruelle, 2013: 271) 
47 For philosophy in this scheme is constitutively correlationist in that (using Brassier’s 
definition of correlationism again) it designates “some transcendental operator – such as life or 
consciousness or Dasein – generating the conditions of manifestation through which 
phenomena manifest themselves” rather than immanently fostered criteria. 
48 “it must no longer designate the deviant quality of a scientific theory or a religious 
interpretation, the errancy and unorthodoxy of a doctrine - it must no longer be a critical or 
insulting attribute, instead being elaborated and treated as a consistent, autonomous manner of 
thinking possessing an internal essence that can be ascribed to  nothing else” (Laruelle, 2012: 
268). 
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scientific data, Laruelle and TTT’s treatment of things (again, ‘things’ in a 
broad sense), conceptual models, and, as I suggest, artworks as socio-cognitive 
technologies, that do not simply “off-load some of the heavy computational 
cargo into the surrounding environment” (Day, 2004: 107) but also create a 
space for thought populated by an ecology of emergent terms and provisional 
concepts; speculations. The cognitive scaffold then is a space for assembly and 
production according to certain structural parameters (scaffolding is “external” 
and “temporary” (Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt, 2013: 1)) presented to 
“overcome some of the brain’s native cognitive limitations and conquer new 
territories in the Space of Reason” (Day, 2004: 112). While TTT’s things 
produce their own terms for engagement via their native ontologies Laruelle’s 
subjects immanently re-configure thought and theory, the contemporary 
artwork has the opportunity to be thought of as an “ontology machine” (Beech, 
2018: 5). 
 
It is tempting to foreground a contemporary art exhibition such as The 
Extended Mind, which as a collaborative effort between University of 
Edinburgh’s Talbot Rice Gallery and The History of Distributed Cognition 
Project, rigorously explores the facets and roles of embodied, embedded, 
extended, and enactive cognition, along with their social dimensions. It is thus 
a more effective overview of the discourses which foster the arguments that 
develop ExC than this thesis is, and a significant resource for how artworks 
have and can be thought of through such terms. Firstly however, while I am 
contributing to the development of ExC as a theory, it is not the primary 
concern - it is a methodological resource that, like those considered already, 
gain their significance for this thesis in their novel combination and practical 
implementation (in the building of actual and “theoretical installations”). With 
ExC I am able to discuss in practical terms the evolution of the speculative turn 
in and through contemporary art, particularly with regards to the comparitively 
overlooked rational variants of SR. And with the resources of ExC it is possible 
to characterise the context for contemporary art’s activities in terms of a 
cognitive ecology. Secondly, as with the aforementioned ‘biennialisation’ of 
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SR, it is of no interest to merely take these fields as another theme for 
contemporary art.49 Instead, it is the general commitment of this thesis to 
explore how such ideas, and their inferences, are taken up in practice, and also, 
crucially, to explore them with my own curatorial practice. This shows how 
contemporary art can contribute to the development of such theories rather than 
being called upon to illustrate them. 
 
Again, this will be laid out and worked through in more detail in Chapter 3, 
but it will be useful for now to look again at Holder’s Adcredo. As much as 
dOCUMENTA (13)’s exhibition, “The Brain,” referred to a space where 
connections might be made between disparate objects and novel research was 
promoted, Adcredo elicits this through the project’s narrative in a more tacit 
manner. And, that this kind of thinking is happening without our presence. My 
reasoning for this lies in Holder’s articulation of the project within a narrative 
which posits Adcredo as the name of a “fictional data-analysis company” 
(Holder, 2018). This company was represented by a website, as well as 
inhabiting a vestibule area in the QUAD Gallery iteration of this project. These 
spaces were presented as typically corporate in nature, identifying company 
history, values, and, its core aim: “We help organisations or bodies implant 
their ideologies in communities around the world, both on and offline” 
(Holder, 2018). With this information along with the articulation of a “Deep 
Belief Network,” one can assume such predictive processes favoured by the 
company as those developed by companies such as DeepMind, working with 
highly advanced Generative Adverserial Networks and Artificial Intelligence. 
The Adcredo corporate ‘entrance’ was vastly different from the main gallery 
space which house Holder’s films: the latter consisting of two advertising 
screens mounted on rockfaces, surrounding walls and floors covered in vinyl 




49 Such a move would be to mirror that of philosophy’s ‘principle of sufficient philosophy,’ 
which grants philosophy an overview of all other subjects for it to take into its pre-determined 
discursive norms; it the “philosophical decision” that dialectically extricates philosophy from 
the world in order to grasp it (Laruelle, 2013: 56). 
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dark, red lighting (Fig. 4).50 This space calls to mind the other Google project 
Deep Dream, which ‘hallucinates,’ or rather extrapolates what it thinks certain 
forms look like based on a learned dataset. Holder’s nightmare landscape then 
might be her presentation of what is thrown up by Adcredo’s Deep Belief 
Network after ingesting the long tail of political opinion brewing through 
social networks, or even her presentation of the Deep Belief Network’s 
infrastructural black box operations. A synthetic mode of cognition in action; 




Holder, J, 2018, Adcredo: The Deep Belief Network (installation view), 
QUAD Gallery, Derby. 
 
So what kind of thinking might we discover in this edifice? If this space 
constitutes an alternative ontological order that belongs to the Deep Belief 
Network then how does it work as a scaffold for us? What terms does it offer 
for an “ontological revisionism” when thought of as a heuristic (Holbraad and 
Pedersen, 2017: 202)? 
 
 
50 Such different worlds are presented that they call to mind Holder’s invocation of ‘hyper 
polarisation’ (see footnote 44) but also the alternative ontological order of things proposed 
by TTT. 
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Of course, Adcredo brings to mind some relatively mundane ideas, for 
example the fact that communications networks extract data from users in 
order to “give rise to new narratives” through proprietary algorithms that 
determine how information is shared therein (Holder, 2018). And such ideas 
are certainly educational in that they emplore us to think more critically about 
the technologies we use: how they are situated within a network of actors. But 
of greater interest here is how, in the film elements of Adcredo, Holder 
embodies a form of thinking in the combination and superposition of esoteric 
knowledges, political ideologies, conspiracy theories, occult symbolism, 
internet memes, Ted Talk think-pieces, mythology, celebrity rants, alchemy, 
and modern scientific postulation. Holder here excavates materials from the 
long tail of an online cognitive ecology, where information, opinion, fiction, 
and ideas can often find unregulated spaces to circulate and cohere into 
narratives. The vast heterogeneity of Adcredo’s long tail worldviews is 
emblematic of the very definition of cognitive ecologies as the 
“multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, 
communicate, imagine, act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich 
ongoing interaction with our environments” (Tribble and Sutton, 2011: 94, 
emphasis added). 
 
In presenting us with the materials of this epistemic long tail in their state 
of “hyperpolisation,” Adcredo conjures a world of multiple and simultaneous 
realities (this is a phrase of my own that I find highly relevant for discussing 
this work and also the particularities of contemporary cognitive ecologies; it is 
a phrase I have used in motivating my own Most Dismal Swamp (MDS) 
projects (see combined chapter 3 and relevant portfolio material). This is a 
world where Donald Trump can see himself as a strong, muscular hero leading 
his tribe’s fight against a perceived threat to Western values and Christianity 
(Holder, 2018). Yet this world also houses the image of Vladimir Putin as a 
similarly heroic and swashbuckling figure defending Russia’s unique 
“cultural-logical” philosophy (Holder, 2018). And when one sees the familiar 
62  
face of Kanye West distorted by serpentine features, discussing the malleability 
of symbols’ meanings such as the swastika in front of an animated background 
of occult motifs (Fig. 5), he seems to merge with the perceptions of those who 




Holder, J, 2018, Adcredo: The Deep Belief Network (still). 
 
The kind of thinking enacted in these sequences is that of a kind of 
“speculative association” (Holder, 2018) that is visualised here not as a 
dialectic logic but rather as a conjunctive logic of superposition where 
associations are simultaneous with one another. Rather than exhibiting the 
“unity of opposites” (Laruelle, 2012: 239) that the individuation of classical 
logic depends on (from Kanye West to Reptile to Conspiracy Narrative to 
Donald Trump to Hero), the mutational conjugation and entanglement of forms 
present in Adcredo (Kanye West-and-Reptile-and-Conspiracy Theory-and- 
Donald Trump-and-Hero) proposes a way of viewing and thinking about this 
mediascape (the cognitive ecology from which Holder draws) as multiple and 
simultaneous. This is opposed to the debilitating mode of “hyperpolarisation” 
that contributes to seeing the views of others as alien, or even not registering 
them at all when our gaze is firmly situated within “social media echo 
chambers” (Holder, 2018). 
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This kind of thinking, and the “ontological revisionism” that it might offer, 
is explored using my own speculative model, which is implemented in the 
curatorial projects of MDS. With MDS as a whole I have proposed to consider 
the kind of cognitive ecology presented in Adcredo as a swampscape, with 
which I experiment and develop ways of thinking about the multiple and 
simultaneous forms therein. As such, I describe projects with especially novel 
curatorial methods that make use of CGI, film, 3D compositing, special effects, 
and ways in which such works might be entangled. 
 
In the project Swamp Protocol I explore, with various artists, some of the 
emergent rituals and tacit procedures necessary for navigating the shared space 
of the swampscape. And in Whale Fall, a speculative bestiary of avatars, 
persons, data-shadows, hybrids, and tulpas visualise a long tail of post-digital 
bodies and how they challenge orthodox conceptions of personhood, 
intelligence, corporeality, and life. Throughout MDS I gather such resources, in 
order to ask: is there a collective rationality emerging from the digitally altered 
states wrought by the swampscape? Some kind of Dank Enlightenment? 
 
1.4 A Long Tail of Enlightenments 
 
These latter questions are aimed at drawing together any “new terms,” 
revised concepts, heresies, alien theories, or any other speculations that are 
thrown up by the contemporary art (including my own projects) that this thesis 
engages with, towards the formation of some system of progressive thought; 
towards an Enlightenment programme that corresponds with and is renewed by 
current cognitive ecologies; that corresponds with TTT’s “plurality of 
ontologies” (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel, 2007: 7). My speculative gambit to 
test here is that there is a long tail of Enlightenments, coalescing around and 
exploding forth from its core disenchantment of the world through the sciences 
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as a “speculative opportunity.” Which is thus an opportunity to renew our 
“image of thought.”51 
 
In discussing how the findings of contemporary neuroscience (such as 
those that have motivated the speculative work of Brassier) have not only 
contributed to such a disenchantment of the world, but also a disenchantment 
of ourselves (that is, disregard of evolutionary atavisms such as the ‘self’ 
which impede progress that follows scientific discovery), Thomas Metzinger 
has used the term “Enlightenment 2.0” (Metzinger, 2009: 211). This 
neuroscientifically-inflected Enlightenment, he suggests, “will tell us more 
about what the conditions of possibility for knowledge are” (Ibid.). These 
possibilities for knowledge are only tangible as a result of gathering, fostering, 
and implementing the suite of concepts that the neuroscience communities aim 
to provide for and eliminate from a public lexicon. 
 
Enlightenment 2.0 might indeed be one such sub-system operating across 
the Enlightenment’s long tail. My own experimental neologism (this thesis 
proposes that it is necessary for it to devise and test speculative models and 
concepts according to the logics I am discussing: there is a functionally 
speculative aspect to the thesis project that matches the challenges made to 
practice speculation rather than to treat is as a theme), the Dank 
Enlightenment, is a ludic exploration of what another such sub-system may 
look like. It is proposed as one facet among a speculative field of uneven and 
combined heresy. While Enlightenment 2.0 may be a name for the result of the 
incursions wrought by the natural sciences, the Dank Enlightenment may be a 
name for the “new” and “strange” science of a renewed mystics (see section 
2.3). Note that it is not a prescription for contemporary art, and the speculative 
turn in general, but my own heuristic device and is native to the work and 
world of MDS. 
 
 
51 Brassier’s work charges philosophy to “draw out the ultimate speculative implications of 
Enlightenment” by “expediting science's demolition of the manifest image.” To be clear, 
Brassier goes on to argue for a revision of the manifest image according to the anomalies 
thrown up by the scientific image (Brassier, 2007: 231). 
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Donna Haraway has famously dreamed “not of a common language, but of 
a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (Haraway, 2001: 316). This notion of a 
common language is for Haraway “totalizing and imperialist” which accords 
with a general postmodern allergy towards grand narratives, and a way of 
thinking that has materialised in art through a preference for the open-ended 
“catalytic art” (Chin, 2001: 133) of the social turn and of the “interpretive 
paradigm,” and a corresponding “fear of making meaning” (Beech, Canini, 
Fisher, Grant, and Mackay, 2010: n.p.). However, in following the logic of the 
proposal that we might trace a long tail of Enlightenments composed of sub- 
systems following an axiomatic heresy, then Haraway’s statement must be 
reformulated, in the conjunctive manner specified above, as a common 
language-and-infidel heteroglossia; a rational schematisation of and with the 
immanent conceptual expressions of speculation; a realisation of Beech’s 
aforementioned “construction of another language.” For this is to substantiate 
Whitehead’s definition of speculation in the sense that it is not only a “flight in 
the thin air of imaginative generalization” but also “lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.” With such speculations 
as the Dank Enlightenment for example, I can render a glossary of new and 
revised terms through the swampscape model and with the entanglement of 
various artworks towards the articulation and renewal of what Clark calls 
“public language,” the “magic words” and external artefacts that augment 
human cognition (Clark, 1998; see also Wheeler, 2007 and Culpitt, 1998: 120 
on the mystic “use” of language). 
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2. Tracing a Speculative Schism  
 
In this chapter, the ’speculative turn,’ in relation to contemporary art, is 
traced as a schism with what the curator and critic Lars Bang Larsen has 
termed ‘the long nineties’ (Larsen, 2012). I thus build on Larsen’s foundational 
use of the phrase, towards a coherent understanding of what it signifies more 
broadly as a pervasive and deeply entrenched orthodoxy in terms of the 
concepts, models, practices, ideologies and discourses it crystallises and 
promotes. Although the term itself has not found widespread purchase within 
art’s discourses, this chapter will make the case for its necessary inclusion 
within a critical vocabulary attuned to grasping and elaborating the conditions 
for the emergence of the speculative turn, as well as the crucial motivations 
that guide its emergence. 
 
The arbitrary bracketing of a single decade, along with the artists, fashions, 
theories and concerns with which history or memory has deemed it 
synonymous, is of course not a sufficient reason for shifting the collective 
focus of contemporary art. Discourses and hype cycles undoubtedly flourish, 
resolve, splinter and perish at different paces, without paying attention to 
reductive and vague categories such as ‘the nineties’. There was no Y2K bug 
that short-circuited contemporary arts discourse. Nor had the 1st of January 
2020 witnessed the live-streamed unboxing of new artists and trends to work 
with over the following decade in order to insulate this period from the 
#long2010s.52 
 
But, I do argue that such a sudden ascension in the hype cycle of 
‘speculation’ in the markets and social networks of contemporary art (as well 
as many other fields) is indeed contextually-motivated. Which is to say that the 
work of the speculative turn broadly perceives and responds to a set of 




52 “Unlike Cinderella, methods of making and thinking about art don’t become unwelcome at 
the ball just because the clock strikes midnight.” (Morton, 2005: n.p.) 
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increasingly described as the Anthropocene, the New Normal, and the 
Posthuman Nexus among many other speculative designations. And such a 
context is, conversely, fundamentally inhospitable to the relevance of the 
cultural and methodological orthodoxies that the long nineties represent. For 
the ways of viewing the world as named in this brief list each allude to a 
manner of thinking that acknowledges an objective and indifferent reality that 
exists independently of our subjective perception of it (such a conceit is 
pursued and unpacked in various ways by the galvanising work of SR). 
 
Consequently, I will thus develop the idea that the speculative turn is a 
particular kind of discursive shift in cognitive orientation (Seibt, 2015). That is, 
as an active, imaginative form of thinking and theorising beyond orthodoxy; 
beyond the “cultural confinement” (Smithson, quoted in Vishmidt, 2014: 253) 
of an established Overton window, and beyond a matrix of possibility.53 
Philosopher Eugene Thacker has described this as thinking “beyond thought” 
(Thacker, 2011: 190), which accounts for such commitments as already 
discussed as abductive reason. What this means for the present chapter is the 
adoption of a socio-cognitive register with which to evaluate and discuss the 
work of the long nineties and the speculative turn, which has heretofore been 
uncommon in contemporary art discourses and art theory. Especially, in those 
reflecting on the significance of contemporary art’s recent explicitly 
speculative rhetoric, which should be taken as surprising given the definitively 
cognitive impulse of speculation. Regarding how this shift is implemented and 
instantiated by the speculative turn, I will explore this in further detail in the 
second half of this chapter. 
 
I will thus focus on the kinds of concepts, images and mental models 
circulating within and generated by the long nineties, as well as the distinct 
‘space of reasons’ it has cultivated. What kind of thinking (what type, 
 
 
53 Smithson’s full statement, for reference later in this chapter: “Cultural confinement takes 
place when a curator imposes his own limits on an art exhibition, rather than asking an artist 




limitations and opportunities) is enabled among the “communities of mind” 
(Donald, 2006: 3) of the long nineties? If we follow the implications of SR and 
its related discourses, what might we say constitutes such communities of mind 
(is our definitions of ‘community’ and ‘sociality’ revised somewhat)? What 
kind of cognitive apparatus or scaffolding for fostering enquiry and navigation 
is constructible from the materials that constitute the long nineties? Which 
norms are produced in this space of reasons? With such questions we can pick 
up and explore the issues posed by Amanda Beech in her provocative, even 
heretical, work regarding ‘how art thinks’ (Beech et al., 2015-16; Beech, 
2018). What is the role of contemporary art in the act of speculating? 
 
This turn, then, similarly marks a point of active reformulation; a point of 
socio-cognitive re-orientation provoked by a) accelerating technological 
advancement, financial risk and ecological crisis, and b) the various popular 
narratives through which these phenomena find purchase on broader public 
perception. These factors have prompted questions and speculations across 
news media, film, music, fashion, science, academia and indeed contemporary 
art that are consequently elemental in their explorations and queries. From 
deeply embedded economic and political systems along with their long- 
standing institutions, to traditional systems of gender identification and sexual 
orientation; to re-thinking the very category of the human. Such a ‘socio- 
cognitive re-orientation’ is not so much defined by a hermeneutics of suspicion 
(nor indeed, a hermeneutics of faith) but rather a speculative impulse that looks 
towards generating and experimenting with new possibilities outside the 
Overton54 window.55 Which is to say that a core concern here is the differences 
in the supposedly subtractive work of critique and the comparatively additive 
work of speculation, or, more specifically, the navigational work of 
speculative reason (Whitehead, 1979). 
 
 
54 And thus reconfiguring the parameters of public discourse. 
55 Nor is this cultural reconsideration defined by consistency or consensus: as Eshun 
suggests of an epistemic long tail that “operate[s] by disagreements and differentiations, that 
make[s] claims that must be argued” (Eshun, 2017). 
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I argue that speculative reason, when embodied and developed through the 
work of the speculative turn, is a socio-cognitive mechanism that allows for the 
parsing, navigating and exploration of a particular context(s), as noted above. 
Following Whitehead’s definition of speculative reason as a process which 
discursively elaborates a form of thought augmented by “a flight in the thin air 
of imaginative generalization… [which then] lands for renewed observation 
rendered acute by rational interpretation,” we can elaborate such a mechanism 
as that which operates differently from critique. I will explore how speculation, 
as it is implemented in the speculative turn, can be better defined and 
explicated through the model of heresy (already the rhetoric of this thesis is 
composed of language and concepts such as un/orthodoxy). Therefore, while I 
locate certain well-worn ‘orthodoxies’ in the mannerisms of the long nineties, I 
will clarify how they enter into a speculative transvaluation that is more 
attuned to the practice of heresy than it is to critique. Such orthodoxies are also 
deeply embedded, to the point of achieving a status of commonsense folk 
logic; as gospel to be intuitively distributed, reproduced and sanctified 
throughout the markets, institutions and social networks of contemporary art. 
This includes not only the naturalisation of critique (Beech, 2018),56 but also 
the liberal subject as the foremost rational political actor of modernity (and the 
subject positions this assumes for ‘artist’ and ‘audience’), the investment in 
subjective ‘lived’ experience as the measure of reality, and, the unquestioned 
polestar around which each of these circle: Humanist anthropocentrism. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter also acknowledges that any given period is of 
course much more diverse in terms of discourse and artistic production than 
any single ‘turn’ may name. Different histories are visible from different 
perspectives, and the nineties was a period that also incubated many key ideas 
and practices pertinent to constructing a genealogy of the speculative turn. 
Although the latter task is not the primary concern of this chapter, it is essential 





56 As well as its mannerist variant, “criticality” (Rogoff, 2003). 
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foundational work for what otherwise appears ex nihilo (Braidotti and 
Vermeulen, 2014). 
 
Framing the nexus of practices, artists, artworks, discourses, memes, 
models and concepts that constitute the long nineties in this way is not simply 
to create a dualistic foil through which the speculative turn is directly opposed 
(hence my turn to heresy as a model). Rather, I argue that ‘the long nineties’ is 
a useful, descriptive and diagnostic category and thus treat the materials it 
represents non-reductively in seeking out positive and negative resources for 
deeper engagement. So, the orthodoxies and mannerisms which define the long 
nineties provide this chapter with the resources to elaborate an axiom of heresy 
by which the work of the speculative turn can be better understood: From what 
and how does the speculative turn, turn? This is to say that the fundamental 
vocabulary of concepts and models embodied by the long nineties are limiting 
and inadequate tools for navigating the cultural, scientific, ecological, 
infrastructural and cosmic realities from which the work of the speculative turn 
emerges and is concerned with exploring. 
 
On one hand, invoking the specific dynamics of heresy as a model 
highlights the revision of establishment doxa which I argue is a defining 
principle of the speculative turn. On the other hand, it allows this chapter to 
name and focus upon specific functional characteristics of the long nineties and 
the substantive transvaluations initiated in the work of the speculative turn. In 
other words, this chapter, in outlining both the long nineties and the speculative 
turn as distinct networks of objects, methods, images, texts, concepts, subjects 
and models, asks: what is it that they do that is fundamentally different from 
one another? Towards what does the speculative turn, turn? 
 
While there is a broad agreement regarding what ‘the long sixties’ denotes, 
from the political revolutions initiated in the rise of movements dedicated to 
civil rights and feminism to the counter-cultural revolutions that emerged 
through experimental drug use (Strain, 2016), others have also adapted the 
71  
term to suit their historical commentaries on a long seventies (Tierney, 2019) 
and a long eighties (Saval, 2013). These latter adaptations highlight the 
flexibility of the notion of a ‘long’ decade in terms of what is at stake in their 
histories: it is somewhat of a journalistic and academic trope that generally 
situates the activities of a particular decade in a wider context in order to 
explores their past roots and their future impact. With the short article 
published in Frieze magazine, The Long Nineties (Larsen, 2012), a name is 
given to the formal tropes, discursive rhetoric and ideological commitments of 
art’s ‘social turn’ that, crucially, “remain unsubverted.” 
 
Larsen’s title cites a 2005 review, also published in Frieze, in which the 8th 
Lyon Biennial is described in positive terms as “an art-historical argument for a 
‘long 1990s’” (Morton, 2005). While this review makes the legitimate point 
that “methods of making and thinking about art don’t become unwelcome” by 
virtue of a mere change in decade, Larsen’s article, published seven years later, 
articulates a weary frustration with ‘methods of making and thinking about art’ 
that persist despite what he outlines as their complicity with “the 
‘governmentality’ of our time” (Larsen). 
 
So, like the lasting significance of the sixties’ social-cultural revolutions, 
Tom Morton, in the earlier Frieze article, intends to highlight a positive legacy 
emerging from the social turn’s own radical shifts that is present not only in 
seminal works of the nineties but in the continued articulation and development 
of these “other time-streams, other histories” in significantly visible and 
historicising events such as the 8th Lyon Biennial (Morton). Morton thus 
reminds us that although many may now look back upon the nineties and see a 
period dominated by the emergence of the social turn (its artworks, discourse, 
images, ideologues, tropes, methods, texts, precursors), it was indeed at 
variance with what it perceived as traditional, or, orthodox. The ‘other history’ 
of the social turn marks the development of an antidote to, or at least a struggle 
against, numerous customary presumptions that had been refined throughout 
modernism and into the supposed decadence of the eighties: 
72  
“No longer something remote, academic and monumental, art became a 
situation or a process. A work was now a club, a bar, a meal, a cinema, a hang- 
out, a dance floor, a game of football or a piece of furniture… The sole author 
and the contemplative beholder were atomized in works that called for 
togetherness, and were often created by collectives or self-organized entities. 
The art institution started to reflect on itself as a critical space, and exhibition 
formats opened up in turn. Art took place anywhere – in front of a video 
camera, on an answering machine, in the urban space. Everyday life became 
meaningful again, even a refuge from late capitalism” (Larsen). 
 
Larsen’s summary pits the work of the social turn against a nexus of 
modern mannerisms. Here, it turns decisively away from the high-value and 
easily-marketable forms such as painting and sculpture, the parenthetical non- 
space and purity of the white cube, the lauded genius and his signature that 
proclaims auteurship, the passive role of the audience or the viewer, the 
hierarchy of low-high culture (or indeed the idea that culture is anything but 
ordinary (Williams)). It involved fundamental shifts in the formal vocabulary, 
ideological commitments, and methods of production, display and 
consumption. (For key texts charting, contextualising and explicating these 
shifts in such a way as to reflect them with a renewed and situated theory that 
would claim to not “take shelter behind Sixties art history” (Bourriaud, 2002: 
7), but rather “to generate a more nuanced (and honest) critical vocabulary with 
which to address the vicissitudes of collaborative authorship and spectatorship" 
(Bishop, 2012: 8) see Bishop, 2006; Bishop, 2012; Bourriaud, 2002; Kester, 
2004; Larsen, 1999). 
 
While this thesis is not concerned with rehearsing or addressing the 
arguments for the successes or failures in the social turn’s aims as listed above, 
I will briefly review Larsen’s critique in The Long Nineties. For the intention 
here is to explain what Larsen means in his use of ‘the long nineties,’ before 
elaborating my own application of the phrase regarding the context and 
prevalent orthodoxies from which the speculative turn in contemporary art has 
emerged. 
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Therefore I will focus not on the well-worn milieu synonymous with the 
emergence of the social turn of the nineties, but rather that of a later moment 
where this ‘other history’ might be better identified as little more than the 
emperor's new clothes; and as an indulgent mannerism that emerged from the 
new courts of the social turn.57 But to conclude an analysis of ‘the long 
nineties’ here would be to deny its fully chronopolitical import. Accordingly, 
my analysis builds on Larsen’s problematisation of the centrality of ‘the social’ 
as “something fundamentally different at different historical times.” And from 
there, towards a socio-cognitive reading of the long nineties: with the materials 
aggregated in the work of the social turn (including the critical vocabulary with 
which it is identified), what kind of concepts, mental models, modes of 
thinking and epistemes are then being inherited by and venerated through its 
perpetuation as the long nineties? I thus lead my examination of the long 
nineties towards a discussion on the role of contemporary art as a distributed 
instance of ExC. That it contributes to the epistemic navigation of the wider 
milieux and ecologies from which it emerges and is an active part of. In terms 
of assessing the work of the social turn along with what I am calling the 
speculative turn in contemporary art, this means considering how they engage 
with and render ‘reality,’ or what philosophy will often refer to as ‘the Real’. 
What then are the manipulative capacities of contemporary art as a distributed 
form of situated knowledge (Harraway, 1988); as a socio-cognitive information 
processing protocol part of a wider cognitive ecology (Bateson, 1972; 
Hutchins, 2010); as a portable cognitive scaffold? 
 
2.1 The Long Nineties 
 






57 I have selected the term mannerism with reference to the developments in 16th century late-
renaissance painting which saw an adjustment from realistic figurative depiction using set rules 
and innovations towards a more fanciful elongation of form  that suggested a more decadent 
figuration. I use the term in the sense of a decadent stylisation, in the form of rhetoric and 
academic affectation, of critical work. 
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Larsen’s checklist of issues concerning contemporary art’s social turn 
easily provides kindling for a variety of critical perspectives on the topic, and 
can indeed be connected with the projects and theses of others in this vein. For 
instance, his lament for a loss of Adorno’s “infinitely difficult” (Adorno quoted 
in Larsen) art can be associated with Bishop’s project of transcending the 
formally relativising, ethically-motivated “shibboleths” of art-criticism which, 
to her, serves the erroneous assumption that participatory practices are 
inherently political and virtuous. Instead she situates work that circumvents the 
“incapacitating restrictions of guilt” (Bishop, 2006: 183) by artists such as 
Christoph Schlingensief, Santiago Sierra, Jeremy Deller, Carsten Höller, Phil 
Collins and Artur Zmijewski within a long tradition of neo-avant garde works; 
“part of an ongoing history of attempts to rethink art collectively" (Bishop, 
2012: 3). Likewise, Larsen’s suggestion that “former keywords of artistic and 
social critique – conformism, alienation, negation – were likewise ejected from 
the vocabulary” of the social turn reflects Markus Miessen’s concerns 
regarding the stasis of consensus that many participatory and relational projects 
arrived at, rather than his preference for ongoing “conflictual participation,” or, 
following Chantale Mouffe, a more dynamic and productive “agonism” 
(Miessen, 2010: 92). 
 
The argument most fully fleshed out in Larsen’s short article, however, 
pertains to contemporary art’s role in a “new economy… brimming with 
imperatives to socialize.” Here Larsen covers some ground that was evident in 
the context of the UK through New Labour’s Third Way rhetoric and its 
seizure of the socially-engaged art model (Hewitt, 2012; Mulholland, 2008). 
This puts forward a social function of art predicated upon art as a service for 
the “public good” (I will discuss some of the assumptions embedded in this 
position below): 
 
“By embracing socially-engaged art practice, the state has funnelled it into 
supporting its agenda of education and community building as a ‘public good’. 
This is Frayling’s ‘force for change’, of the Arts Council’s desire for ‘civic 
pride’ and building ‘vibrant communities’. The function for art here is as a 
form of improvement for those without art in their lives”. (Hewitt, 2012: 109) 
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Regarding the nineties, Larsen notes that “significant artistic positions of 
the decade have rarely been associated directly with power the way that the 
works of Jeff Koons, for instance, were read as unambiguous symptoms of 
Reaganism,” which suggests instead a more insidious association that demands 
a much closer focus. A soft power that manifests in and through the work of the 
social turn. Despite the fact the issue of recuperation has been acknowledged 
by even some of the social turn’s most enthusiastic exponents (Thompson, 
2012: 32), the constitutive rhetoric of criticality, site/context-specificity, self- 
reflexivity, public accountability, and direct participatory public engagement of 
the social turn (that is, as criteria tuned and implemented in a manner 
consistent with a broader cultural episteme (see below) that socialised both art 
and power (Larsen)) ultimately consolidated a “homeostatic,” “palliative” 
function for contemporary art (Vishmidt, 2014: 260-3) as well as generic 
axiomatic conditions such as that of its “indeterminacy” (Malik, 2013). 
 
Here, we can situate Larsen’s critical review of the social turn among those 
who have worked towards disentangling its widely accepted progressive 
rhetoric as a somewhat more ambiguous symptom of socialised or biopolitical 
modes of governance. Such work has tended towards a systemic or ‘macro’ 
perspective which draws attention to the functional attributes of artforms: 
contemporary art is not defined by what it formally is, or claims to be (as per 
Bishop’s project as a means to generate an appropriate system of aesthetic 
judgement (Bishop, 2012: 8)) but rather by what it does; by its behaviour and 
impact in a broader complex system of interacting social, technical, political, 
and ecological actants. 
 
For instance, Marina Vishmidt explores the tendencies of “cultural 
deployments of criticality and participation [which] highlight the reciprocity 
between the normativity of dissent and the acceptability of control” (Vishmidt, 
2014: 260). This is an analysis predicated on the recursivity of second-order 
cybernetics, deeming that ‘participation’ functions as a feedback technology 
which optimizes systemic function, rather than disrupts it: “control simply 
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cannot happen without participation” (254). The ‘system’ described by 
Vishmidt is that of the “structures of finance, legitimation and policy” (268); 
the “market mechanisms and state agendas” that exist as a “far a more porous 
and pervasive condition” (253). That is, Vishmidt considers the combined and 
simultaneous adoption of ‘participation’ in a pervasive cultural logic “as 
received wisdom, utopian hope and managerial technique” (254): the social 
turn is a paradoxical knotting together of the rhetoric of liberation and progress 
with the reflexive techniques of “cultural confinement.” Her argument 
primarily follows “the advent of participatory criticality over distanced 
critique” (259) - what this thesis refers to as the development of a mannerism 
of art’s social turn constitutive of the long nineties.58 
 
Irit Rogoff’s concept of ‘criticality’ is Vishmidt’s primary target as a “form 
of critique” that is symptomatic of the conjuncture of socialised art and power. 
It is with the development of ‘criticality’ that Rogoff intends to circumvent 
complicity with positions of power: 
 
For Rogoff, [critique and criticism] have proven inadequate because criticism 
assumes a position of constituted authority which can exert judgement, while 
critique does this plus requiring an inside/outside model which operates as 
what has elsewhere been called a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ in order to 
perform its stated objectives, i.e. reveal ideologies or challenge assumptions. 
‘Criticality’, she contends, eschews the problematic make-up of these strategies 
in favour of an ethics of ‘occupation’ which does not seek ‘resolution’ so much 
as a ‘heightened awareness’ of the tactical and theoretical compass available to 
cultural practitioners… Rogoff is in fact proposing a form of critique which is 
contingent on inhabiting institutions and speaking from their places of power, a 
form of critique which is contingent on the maintenance of that power and on 
the persistence of solidarity of the powerful with each other. It thus naturalizes 
the institution in its present form as the only possible vehicle for critique, much 
as the market is ideologically anointed as the only social arrangement that 
provides (if not realizes) the possibility of emancipation. By dismissing 
critique because it presumes to judge rather than participate, the gesture of 




58 Vishmidt opts to highlight the internal logical contradictions of the social turn in her 
invocation of its “institutionalization of critique”, as does Larsen in his recognition of ‘the 
social’ as “turn[ing] the screw of institutionalization.” 
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since it also has to assume the established value of critique as intellectual 
currency in the academy and related sites of cultural production”. (257-8) 
 
For Vishmidt, then, participatory criticality and its pervasive cultural logic, 
functions in a palliative, even homeostatic manner that ‘naturalizes the 
institution.’ And this logic can be mapped on to key practices of the social turn 
whereby artworks and projects sought to occupy institutional platforms and 
circuits in order to generate participatory civic discourse enriched by engaging 
“’communities’ and specific, targeted groups” beyond that of an elite or 
detached art world. Foremost in this regard is the idea of the “micro-utopia” 
put forth by Nicolas Bourriaud in his outlining of the art of the social turn as a 
‘relational aesthetics’ (Bourriaud, 2002: 31). Such materialisations of this 
‘cultural logic of criticality’ at once reflect, as Larsen notes, a commercial turn 
towards an “experience economy” (Gilmore and Pine, 1998) as well as provide 
“alibis for domination” (Vishmidt, 2014: 260). Micro-utopias, in this systemic 
formulation, provide a minimal registration of contained dissent: contained as 
discrete novel experiences with artists’ and curators’ inhabiting roles akin to 
that of ‘customer experience management.’ And in the many cases where such 
projects are motivated by the gathering of individuals in order to provide a 
space for dialogue, dissent, protest, or producing altogether new relational 
forms (Bourriaud, 2012: 16), these minor enclaves also function as “sanctioned 
subversion” (Vishmidt, 2014; 263): components within a system that provide a 
regulatory function and are thus “structurally affirmative” (emphasis added). In 
the case of the social turn’s explicitly participatory projects, that diverse 
participation takes place in this way provides a kind of civic bromide which at 
once keeps subversion at a safe remove from power and also allows those in 
power to gesture towards such projects as evidence of a democratic 
platforming of all voices. My question, to carry forward into the next section of 
this thesis which will focus on the content of such projects, is: what kind of 
experience is being managed/provided? What is the signal that such 
experiences carry for those experiencing them? 
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This view towards the language, procedures and pretensions of how 
participatory criticality (and even critique more broadly) manifests a 
‘structurally affirmative’ protocol in contemporary art is also present in 
arguments put forth by many others. Among these are Martha Rosler’s review 
of the various categories of criticality that have emerged as motivating strands 
of ‘political art,’ such as that of “the better behaved forms such as the nicely 
bureaucratic-sounding ‘institutional critique’” and “the curatorial subgenre 
called “new institutionalism”” (Rosler, 2010: 122-3) (the latter Vishmidt also 
brings up as emblematic of a “limited ‘institutionalisation of critique’” 
(Vishmidt, 2010: 255). I agree by positioning this ‘subgenre’ as a mannerism 
of the long nineties). Rosler positions criticality, in general, as a mode of 
“new art academicism” whose rhetoric provides artists with the means to 
“teach art as a source of income to fund their production rather than to simply 
find markets” (119) and to appeal to the “art world core of cognoscenti who… 
favour art with a critical edge” (133). She contrasts this kind of performative 
criticality with that of a more structurally “successful” project (in terms of 
posing challenges to a “reigning paradigm”) such as Feminism, which actively 
sought to “rethink what and who an artist is and might be, what materials art 
might be made of, and what art meant… replacing this with far broader, more 
heterodox, and dynamic categories” (118). 
 
Going on to examine more closely the reciprocal relationship between 
criticality and the “power of the market” (Malik, 2008: 284), Suhail Malik 
follows Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s delineation of what they describe as 
‘artistic critique:’ a mode of critique which “counterpoints the fixity and 
stability of historical capitalist processes and the interests of social critique 
with the freedom of art(ists), the rejection of material or spatio-temporal fixing 
or many other attachments, and the rejection of piety towards work as labour 
(rather than play), reaching a heightened expression around May 1968” (292). 
The significance of artistic critique for Boltanski and Chiapello is it’s uptake 
by which it purports to critique - as we moved into a post-industrial economy 
composed of services, experiences and fluid interactivity, artistic 
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critique has come to become a constituent part of ‘the new spirit of 
Capitalism’. Reviewing the corpus of eighties-nineties (French) management 
textbooks, the authors describe 
 
“this new spirit – autonomy, spontaneity, rhizomorphic capacity, multitasking 
(in contrast to the narrow specialisations of old division of labour), 
conviviality, openness to others and novelty, availability, creativity, visionary 
intuition, sensitivity to differences, listening to lived experiences, being 
attached to informality and the search for interpersonal contacts” (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005: 97) 
 
which is rhetorically isomorphic with the social turn. Malik’s interest in this 
insidious affinity is to recognise this type of rhetoric at play in what he calls the 
“primary market” of art which gives value to the language and methods of 
critique (it gains value by appearing to distance itself from commerce) while 
the secondary market “extends to anything and everything more or less 
indifferently” (288). Here, without explicitly realising, Malik is in-part 
describing the dynamic hypereconomy of contemporary art wherein the 
“situational” (Chislenko and Ramakrishnan, 1998) knowledge of criticality 
produces value for a primary community and thus allows the apparently 
“irreducible surplus of art” (Malik, 2008: 284) to attain value for a secondary 
market. 
 
Of course, each of these authors’ arguments are more nuanced than 
presented here. But the primary aim of this review has been to illustrate and 
expand on Larsen’s positioning of the work of the social turn in relation to “the 
governmentality of our time” and to identify the practices and rhetoric of the 
long nineties as a prevalent orthodoxy. I have focused on the keystone of 
‘criticality’ as the naturalised “generic definition of art” (Beech, 2018: 4) 
which is thus to make a descriptive claim regarding the long nineties as a 
deeply-entrenched, multi-scalar and multi-agent orthodoxy, rather than a 
judgement of its moral consistency. By looking to the work surrounding SR, 
we can also perceive further orthodox presumptions of the long nineties that 
are far more elemental yet certainly related. Namely, that of a profound 
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anthropocentrism that sets the operational coordinates for practices such as 
critique. 
 
While Vishimdt has concluded a “structurally affirmative” function in the 
participatory criticality propounded by Rogoff and instantiated in the work of 
the long nineties, Rogoff herself does declare a broader ambition: “’Criticality' 
as I perceive it is precisely in the operations of recognising the limitations of 
one's thought for one does not learn something new until one unlearns 
something old, otherwise one is simply adding information rather than 
rethinking a structure” (Rogoff, 2003: n.p.). While this formulation seems to 
provide the foundation for thinking heretically with regards to dominant 
structures, institutions and orthodoxy, it is crucial to ask: how is one (or rather, 
how is art) ‘rethinking’ such structures? What models are being inherited 
and/or built for such thinking? 
 
Furthermore, this focus on criticality allows us to ask in the coming 
sections: what is it that makes speculation qualitatively different from 
critique? Or, does the work of the speculative turn rather permit and 
implement, following the logic of heresy, a “transvaluation of critique” 
(Chandler, 2019)? 
 
2.1.2 The Cognitive Ecology of the Long Nineties: The Cognitive Inertia 
of ‘Carte Blanche’ 
 
So even though the work of the social turn has evidently pursued forms of 
praxis that are embedded and embodied through the complex interrelations of 
‘the social’ (“down in it” as Larsen puts it, or “operating from an uncertain 
ground of actual embededness” as Rogoff says), there remains a more 
ambiguous form of detachment; an overlooked remainder of the academic 
idealism the social turn sought to extricate itself from. Bishop alludes to an 
element of this problem in her observation of social turn projects whereby the 
full “narratives” they generate are often only visible to curators and 
institutional stakeholders while artists move on to produce more work, leaving 
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their projects to unfold in such-and-such a context or community, while 
audiences themselves might only engage from a limited perspective (Bishop, 
2012: 6). Thus, these narratives are primarily significant to institutional 
curators as brokers of the value of such work, for art history and for art 
markets. 
 
What I will now review is this overlooked remainder of academic idealism. 
How such formally catalytic projects enact and instill an ideological 
commitment to a liberal humanism through a dogmatic faith in indeterminacy, 
openness, and participatory criticality actually prompts a speculative 
foreclosure in thinking. These orthodoxies counteractively dilute the ambition 
to “rethinking a structure” (Rogoff, 2003: n.p.). That is, when Rogoff addresses 
contemporary art’s social interstices as sites for the “production of knowledge” 
when they are “existing in the realm of potentiality and possibility rather than 
that of exclusively material production” (Rogoff, 2003), attention must be paid 
to how this knowledge is produced: what are the epistemological coordinates 
for Rogoff’s ‘realm of potentiality and possibility’? What defines its horizons? 
How do the artistic and curatorial practices to which Rogoff refers inhabit, 
navigate and contribute to this realm, or, possibility space? I suggest that this 
realm is not so much an active form of potentiality but is rather a homeostatic 
maintenance of orthodoxy and the Overton window; one apparatus among 
many others (for art of course does have a limited reach and must be 
considered among a nexus of other creative, political, technological, 
educational and communicative forms) that constitutes “the hierarchy of 
cultural-cognitive governance” (Donald, 2006: 6). Despite a rhetoric of 
possibility, potential, and revolution (e.g Hirschhorn: 2017) such projects do 
not contribute to altering “the prevailing images and worldview of their 
societies” (Donald, 2006: 6). 
 
This valorisation of indeterminacy, openness, and participatory criticality 
as means towards instantiating Rogoff’s realm of possibility (for codifying 
thinking and action) is a mannerism of the long nineties, assumed by its 
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practitioners as inherently politically virtuous in itself.59 I identify such traits 
with what the writer and curator Matthew Poole describes as the dominant and 
subjectivising “parameters of a liberal Humanist democratic political and 
ethical nexus” (Poole, 2010: 97). As such, the valorisation of bottom-up self- 
organisation, the primacy of lived experience, and a performative “formalism 
of dissent” (Vishmidt, 2014: 258) geared towards the performance of 
“productive tensions” (O’ Neill, 2012: 120), have culminated in the orthodox 
mannerisms of the long nineties: the parameters of the Overton window are 
thus established. Building on the work of Poole along with Beech and Malik, 
such criteria further embody the ambiguous relationship between power and 
the lasting orthodoxies sedimented by the social turn. 
 
So, I will now turn the focus of the discussion away from the intention to 
foreground the contradictions of the social turn as exemplified in Vishmidt’s 
critique.60 Instead, I present the mannerisms of the long nineties as forming a 
contingent cognitive ecology, in order to ascertain some purchase on what 
Rogoff means by the “realm of potentiality and possibility” (in the “production 
of knowledge”). What kind of knowledge, enquiry, modelling and reason is 
enabled by such an ecology and its socio-cognitive technologies? What forms, 
ideas, relations, mental models, and subjects does it (re)produce? How does the 
long nineties think? 
 
I have selected a single example that is broadly emblematic and embodies 
these mannerisms: the aptly-named Carte Blanche (2008-09) at Galerie für 
Zeitgenössische Kunst (GfKZ) conceptualised and led by (then-)museum 




59 Bishop sought to overturn this by working to “restore attention to the modes of 
conceptual and affective complexity generated by socially oriented art project;” (8) 
“analys[ing] and compar[ing] this work as art, since this is the institutional field in which it 
is endorsed and disseminated, even while the category of art remains a persistent exclusion 
in debates about such projects.” (13) 
60 As well as, for example, Bishop’s criticism of the social turn’s active/passive binary: “This 
argument… assumes that the poor can only engage physically, while the middle classes have 
the leisure to think and critically reflect.” 
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emblematic fidelity to an enduring set of fundamental orthodox assumptions 
that, through a naturalised suite of methods and practices introduced in the 
above review, contribute to the sedimentation of a cognitive ecology that the 
speculative turn considers to be inadequate for navigating contemporary 
concerns. Furthermore, this example is especially appropriate in terms of its 
position as a mannerism of such logic (what I am defining as ‘the long 
nineties’) rather than as something that is generically associated with the 
work of the social turn. 
 
Carte Blanche (CB) was a two year project consisting of an invitation to 
eleven private collectors, commercial galleries and business enterprises for 
them to present the art they collected and worked with through the 
infrastructure of GfKZ. This gesture required each participant to cover the 
expenses for each of their own exhibitions including general running costs and 
advertising. While in return, the museum’s curators and resources were at each 
participant exhibition’s disposal (including more ambiguous hypereconomic 
services such as the museum’s ability to enhance the status of works of art 
(Steiner, 2011: 159), and, as we shall see, the discursive mannerisms and ideals 
that contribute to cognitive ecologies).61 Each invited participant was literally 
given ‘carte blanche’ to approach the project as they see best exemplifies their 
interests and distinct commitments to art. 
 
Among the aims of this project its lead curator, Barbara Steiner, has 
outlined a valid interest in exploring alternative forms of funding, hosting, 
displaying, and sharing art in the face of diminishing availability of public 
funding. The project represents the implementation of “public negotiation and 
feedback between the various interests and expectations of those involved in 
CB with a view toward communicating and exploring these” (Steiner in Hegyi 
and Steiner, 2015: n.p.). It is indeed an attempt to “re-think a structure” and to 




61 Or, to put it in the hyperstitional terms mentioned in footnote 24, which fictions are 
invested in, and consecrated through their situational utility, as reality. 
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of criticality: CB is very much a project dedicated to toiling among the extant 
potentialities for alternative ways of doing things provided by its diverse 
participants. 
 
Again, I am not currently interested in reviewing the controversies and 
potential contradictions embedded in such a proposal.62 But rather how the 
project embodies and operates as a cognitive scaffold for sedimenting and 
enhancing the shibboleth of the long nineties. 
 
While a “new vocabulary” that Rogoff initiates in her own work towards 
the (ostensibly heretical) replacement of “inherited words like ‘art,’ ‘audience,’ 
‘curator,’ ‘institution,’ and so on” (Rogoff in von Bismarck and Rogoff, 2012: 
35) has found purchase as an influential taxonomy (a memetic “user’s guide” 
even (Rogoff, 2010)), its uptake in a project such as CB has resulted in what 
Gilles Châtelet has referred to as “the baroque imposture of chaos” (Châtelet, 
2014: 50).63 
 
In her retrospective catalogue essay for the CB project, Steiner shares how 
Rogoff’s “concept of criticality… invalidates the hierarchic, asymmetrical 




62 For example, the publication that documents the development and impact of CB utilised 
“mainly” public funding for its production. According to GfKZ this illustrated  a clear linking 
of “private commitment to public agendas” (Steiner, 2011: 51). While these links may well be 
possible to exemplify elsewhere through the project, the stretch Steiner makes in using the 
book’s public funding as a gesture that makes such links visible in itself is actually emblematic 
of the project’s tendency to make the activity fit with its ideological commitments regardless 
of what takes place. The book  rather acts as a leveraging of public commitments to private 
agendas, seeing as it is among the resources of the public museum that enhance the status and 
value of CB’s participants and their portfolios. 
63 This term is applicable to a vast swathe of projects that emerged through art’s social  turn 
and through the long nineties, when considering this section’s argument. Key works such as 
Rirkrit Tiravinija’s catalytic social situations (e.g pad thai (1990), Utopia Station (2003), 
Soup/No Soup (2012)), along with key terms such as Bourriaud’s “micro-utopias” which 
names such “moments of sociability” (Bourriaud, 2002: 33) as the locus for exploring ways of 
“living and models of action within the existing real” (31), inherently rely upon a valorisation 
of open and free encounter of individuals as a self-organising force. 
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informs CB’s decisive aim to explore with a variety of commercial and private 
bodies, along with the institutions’ combined publics, rather than to presume a 
singular position of assumed “truth” (Steiner, 2015: n.p.) that dictates how the 
economic issues perceived by GfKZ (with its constitutional social 
responsibilities as a public museum) ought to be resolved (Steiner refers to this 
method as “economic criticality” (Steiner, 2010)). Similarly, Rogoff’s 
emphasis on the concept of potentiality as the inhabitation of “the realm of the 
possible without prescribing a plan” (Rogoff, 2006: 7, emphasis added) 
reflects precisely CB’s aim to provide a framework by which the participants 
are given the opportunity to freely express their own methods, models, 
concerns, tastes, and agendas, without institutional coercion. Evident here is a 
relinquishing of control on the part of GfZK regarding what should be shown, 
how it should be shown, and to whom it is addressed. With such a gesture, the 
project immediately invites questions regarding insidious parameters of 
‘quality’ that might lurk beneath the rhetoric of social responsibility adopted by 
public institutions (Steiner notes that among the various reservations her peers 
held regarding the project, was the feeling that it would compromise the 
reputation of the gallery in terms of the quality of work shown (Steiner, 2012: 
259)). Which is to say that it corresponds with Rogoff’s definition of criticality 
in that “while building on critique [it] wants nevertheless to inhabit culture in a 
relation other than one of critical analysis; other than one of illuminating flaws, 
locating elisions, allocating blames” (Rogoff, 2006: 8). 
 
Thus far, the methodology and the aims of CB seems in some ways to 
correspond with how I have framed the work of the speculative turn: It 
implements a revised vocabulary of new terms; it gathers resources in order to 
explore alternative territories and to reform the perceived Overton window; it 
weighs the production of knowledge and opportunities to move in new 
directions instead of via “critical analysis” alone. 
 
However, I will once again defer to Whitehead’s definition of speculation. 
What tethers this project to the long nineties and signifies CB’s methodology 
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as part of its mannerisms, is that it simply remains on “the ground of particular 
observation.” If Rogoff’s vocabulary (explicitly adopted by Steiner) along with 
what CB actually does is motivated by “a flight in the thin air of imaginative 
generalization” with which to land “for renewed observation rendered acute by 
rational interpretation” (Whitehead), I argue that there is no adequate 
conceptual model proposed therein to direct such a flight beyond a “cultural 
confinement” that is insidiously, and somewhat paradoxically, engendered in 
the form of participatory openness and indeterminacy. That by embodying 
“this form of criticality, of never standing outside while deploying some great 
analytical apparatus which allows us to ‘know’ to really, really know what is 
going on,” (8) such projects align their investment in potentiality with the 
absence of any explicit conceptual model or navigational protocol with which 
to properly catalyse “a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization.” 
Therefore, although the cognitive ecology of the long nineties is comprised of 
the rhetoric of possibility and potential (as already noted), exemplary projects 
such as CB demonstrate inertia within a matrix of fixed possibilities rather than 
movement beyond it with which to alter the parameters of the Overton 
window. The rhetoric of possibility, potential, and revolution is not enough in 
itself to foster possibility, potential, and revolution. Such aims are rendered as 
mere affectation,64 engendering projects such as CB as “homeostatic” socio- 
cognitive technologies. They foster a truncation of conceptual resources, 
crystallising the cognitive ecology of the long nineties in such a way as to limit 
not only its potential for thinking otherwise and articulating alternatives, but 




64 Literature and interviews surrounding CB are rife with references to how the project 
“continues to be the subject of lively discussions and even controversy” (Steiner in Hegyi and 
Steiner, 2015: n.p.) yet the content of these discussions are never elaborated, especially in the 
form of any actionable or at least proposed alternative models or conceptual apparatus. If 
examples such as CB do in fact develop new concepts, they must remain within their enclave 
of production and are not articulated for testing and distribution within broader “communities 
of mind.” Would such concepts provide an “ingress to the real” in terms of, in the case of CB, 
parsing, navigating, and manipulating the infrastructural conditions that precipitate Steiner’s 
“economic criticality?” 
65 When attached to projects such as CB or any of the micro-utopian projects of the social 
turn, such aims instantiate “a radical scaling-down of political and cognitive ambition, [where 
the best that may be hoped for] is to achieve small-scale rectifications of universal injustice 
by establishing local, temporally fleeting enclaves of civil justice” (Brassier, 2014: 469). 
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To justify these assertions I will focus further on CB’s rationale and 
activity: how it embodies a dogmatic faith in openness and indeterminacy as 
processes that are ultimately their only product. This is served up especially 
well by CB in the form of an initial exhibition that was staged to not only 
introduce the project’s participants and the forthcoming sequence of their 
individual GfKZ takeovers, but also presented a powerful overarching agenda 
that would come to dominate Steiner’s reflections on the project (in the official 
retrospective publication, interviews, talks, and commissioned essays cited 
throughout this section). So dominant in fact that it is this agenda that 
substantiates CB’s primary socio-cognitive role in the cognitive ecology of the 
long nineties.66 As an introduction to CB the curatorial team of GfKZ 
presented Friendly Enemies (FE), a representative selection of the participants’ 
collections grouped together. FE’s title refers directly to political theorist 
Chantal Mouffe’s conception of agonism in her publication The Democratic 
Paradox (Mouffe, 2000: 13).67 The term ‘friendly enemies’ is used by Mouffe 
to indicate the adversarial nature of those “who are friends because they share a 
common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this 
common symbolic space in a different way” (Ibid.). Such is her differentiation 
between adversaries and enemies. With this work, Mouffe sought to overturn 
the idea that public debate between a multifarious plurality of voices finds 
resolution or consensus and instead, according to her agonistic model, put 
forward the image of public space as “the battleground where different 




66 Therefore, while Rogoff has maintained an astute suspicion of projects that “dictate to 
audiences their mode of participation” in terms of a foreclosure of the “possibilities for a self-
articulation,” (Rogoff, 1998: 129) I go on to argue here that not only does the less explicitly 
prescriptive projects such as CB are just as likely to be sustained by  curatorial assumptions 
but also by broader cultural assumptions. 
67 Mouffe’s work found much traction as a theoretical alibi for art of the social turn and the 
long nineties, and, much like the philosophers of SR who were welcomed into art’s discursive 
networks, she also found herself to be an active voice in contemporary  art publications and 
lectures. 
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reconciliation” (Mouffe, 2008: 13). Hence, returning to Rogoff’s work, “the 
point of criticality is not to find an answer but rather to access a different mode 
of inhabitation” (Rogoff, 2006: n.p.). 
 
Thus CB has foregrounded not any deliverables from a project that initially 
articulated interests in how a public-private partnership model might function 
(Steiner, 2011: 31) or how private protagonists might be involved in the social 
agendas of the museum (Steiner, 2012: 258), but rather a rhetoric of 
“productive interaction,” “implementing frictions,” “setting up points of 
friction,” and “the productive force of conflicts” (258-263). Apparently 
conflicts did indeed “break out” which involved “building walls to block the 
vistas,” the integration of a “gigantic company logo,” and excluding customary 
“wall text, seats for the visitors, and additional mediation” (260). Given the 
social rhetoric in the initial aims of the project, this articulation of conflict truly 
exemplifies Brassier’s observation of a “radical scaling-down of political and 
cognitive ambition.” For such instances of conflict are more akin to those that 
would erupt from the agitation surrounding an undergraduate degree show 
install. The point is, the focus of Steiner and the GfKZ curators was evidently 
never truly fixed on the production of alternative economic models to resolve 
an issue (never mind exploring local/global economic infrastructure), nor on 
articulating new ways in which private partners might bring something to the 
social agendas of the museum, nor even what activity took place whatsoever. 
Instead, with the frame set around this activity by FE, all participants were, 
from the start, considered adversaries before acknowledging whether or how 
they might “want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way.” 
Regardless of what conflict or tension existed (if any), the role CB has played 
as a socio-cognitive technology (i.e in its distribution of concepts and models) 
is to illustrate and enhance the status of a core political model that is here 
codified as “the imposture of chaos.” The signal promoted (through the project 
and its continued articulation across contemporary art discourse channels) is 
not any alternative model but rather the signal-boosting of the extant logic of 
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liberal humanism.68 If such projects can be described as “homeostatic” then 
this adversarial friction or agonism constitutes a form of “good citizenship” 
(Poole, 2010: 97). The openness and indeterminacy of being granted ‘carte 
blanche’ is a liberal humanist instantiation of “cultural confinement.”69 
 
Furthermore, with this example we can witness a model of insidious 
epistemicide constitutive of the long nineties as I have defined it. Diverse 
participants (never mind the diversity of the artworks and the propositional 
potency they might offer as socio-cognitive technologies) who hold views and 
values different from those of one another and even the host institution are 
given a platform with which to perform “self-articulation” (Rogoff, 1998: 129) 
for the sole purpose of exemplifying a collective illustration and institutional 
enhancement of agonism: this process is the product enhanced through 
theoretical, rhetorical, and museological sanctification. This model permits 
institutions such as GfKZ and curator-ideologues such as Steiner to take up a 
moralising posture that is a radical yet measured sophistication in the sense that 
CB was about handling conflicts and promoting productive debate. However 
the particularities of “self-articulation” (never mind the unforeseen hybrid 




68 Mouffe posits her agonistic model as a counterpoint to “the typical liberal understanding of 
pluralism” whereby the multitude of perspectives and values cannot be shared by all but 
nonetheless “when put together, they constitute an harmonious ensemble” (Mouffe, 2008: 8). 
However, this reformulation of liberalism is akin to Rogoff’s reformulation of critique qua 
criticality. My point is that, as with criticality, agonism, as it is instantiated through CB, is 
ultimately directed towards the preservation of manifest norms as a “homeostatic” (Vishmidt) 
technology rather than the rational articulation of new norms. With “the creation of agonistic 
public spaces, where the objective is to unveil all that is repressed by the dominant consensus” 
projects such as CB and those that Mouffe reviews, simply foreground the significance of 
debate and tension as an end in itself, without indicating any navigational import (in 
Whitehead’s terms, there is no subsequent “rational interpretation” because the suite of 
assumptions discussed in this chapter as codifying  the long nineties are committed to abjuring 
rationalist approaches in favour of sustained tension). 
Agonism, and its implementation as a mannerism of critical art practice, is a manufacturing 
of polite dissent. Despite the invitation for diverse participation their multi-modal cognitive 
processes are eclipsed by a single mode of thinking. 
69 Amanda Beech has explored through her art works, such as Statecraft (2008), “the  very 
forceful rhetoric that we find within narratives of freedom” (Beech, 2009: n.p.). 
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significant as it was to demonstrate “a vibrant agonistic public sphere of 
contestation” (Steiner, 2012: 264). 
 
2.2 A Speculative Schism 
 
2.2.1 ‘New Formulations of Togetherness’ 
 
Such catalytic projects that alter the parameters of the exhibition space and 
the curatorial project in order to conceive a space of indeterminate outcome can 
best be summarised by Brassier’s reflection on the production of concepts in 
theory: “experiment at the level of form can mask conservatism at the level of 
content, while conservatism at the level of form may harbour extraordinary 
radicality at the level of content” (Brassier in Brassier and Mattin, 2006: n.p.). 
For what CB’s latent ‘content’ is eclipsed by is the foregrounding of its ‘form’ 
as its primary cognitive resource. 
 
N. Katherine Hayles, a prominent critic and theorist attached to posthuman 
discourses, discusses cultural artefacts in terms of “cognitive assemblages” 
which reflects the previous chapter’s illustration of the inhabitation of 
cognitive ecologies comprised of socio-cognitive technologies (Hayles, 2017). 
I mention Hayles’ formulation as her term is useful for foregrounding the 
malleable (re-)constructibility of such assemblages, our agency within them 
and in their assembly as cognitive scaffolding (how agency can be 
reformulated). That is, these artefacts include contemporary art and its 
discursive regimes which scaffold ways of thinking. Cognition includes but is 
not limited to “the entanglements and interpenetrations of human and technical 
cognitive systems” (40). Models are manipulable “technologies of 
investigation” (Morrison), and the model promoted by CB, and other such 
catalytic projects of the long nineties, is that of a sociality converged around an 
image of itself as an “imposture of chaos” - the dynamism, friction and tension 




70 While I have noted in the previous chapter that the speculative turn instantiates a 
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The inadequacy of such a model as cognitive scaffolding is evident in the 
kind of inertia illustrated here: it does not foster construction, merely a 
simulacrum of it. The biologist Ludwig Fleck was already attentive to such 
impediments to the development of the sciences in 1979, in his discussion of 
scientific descriptions (the metaphors and conceptual models used to identify, 
parse, and describe natural processes) which are often “quite secure within the 
confines of a given thought style” (Fleck, 1979: 38). So I thus follow the 
prompt given in the aforementioned work of Emily Martin (section 1.2.1) who 
notes that “the models that biologists use to describe their data can have 
important social effects,” which for her, means the imposition of incongruous 
concepts such as the intentional action of “personhood” on reproductive 
processes (Martin, 1991: 500) resulting in significant repercussions on issues 
such as abortion rights. In the case of CB and the long nineties, the 
sedimentation and distribution of an image of social choreography as a 
productive end in itself curtails the advancement of alternatives to orthodoxy. 
“New research, old imagery” as Martin puts it (Ibid.). 
 
Against such mannerisms, Beech supports the significance of contemporary 
art’s role in the production of alternative models, or as she puts it, a “thought-
image” (Beech, 2013: 85)71, rather than its role in the mute illustration of 
orthodoxy. In  such images speculative opportunities are offered to think 
beyond the long nineties’ cultural confinement. While the long nineties 
evidently adopts Rogoff’s suspicion of art’s explicitly instructive elements as 
somewhat dictatorial and a foreclosure of potentiality (despite the evidence that 






cognitive ecology composed of “discursive practices [that] constitute the game of giving 
and asking for reasons and outlining the space of reason as a landscape of navigation rather 
than as a priori access to explicit norms” (Negarestani), what is evident in the current 
discussion is a reversal of this: the a priori implementation of norms that eclipse discursive 
practices and their latent potentialities. 
71 “I would offer the dynamic of the ‘thought-image’ to consider the force of materials as 
condition of the concept.” 
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and conceptual stasis)72, I will go on to analyse the distributed production of 
such models as navigational protocols that operate as a speculative wager.73 
Larsen has intimated towards this in his provocative conclusion to The Long 
Nineties: 
 
“Perhaps it is time to re-conceptualize the aesthetic as a mode of thinking in 
order to articulate difference, new outsides and the transcendental, understood 
as the condition of historical practices and that which lies at the edge of social 
relations. The present cannot only be changed from its inside. To regain its 
futurity it must be reconfigured from afar, too.” (Larsen, emphasis added) 
 
Given the previous chapter’s focus on the implications of SR-related 
discourses and how they have motivated contemporary art’s recent history, we 
can also say that a deeper yet related orthodoxy upheld by such projects is that 
of a correlationist “sociocentrism” or “human exceptionalism” (Connolly, 
2017: 20). SR, then, shares a variety of methods for attempting to overcome 
this orthodox humanist parochialism; the “underlying supposition that 
knowledges are actively socially constructed rather than unearthed from a 
mind-independent universe” (Mulholland, 2019a).74 And as such, breaches the 
“old imagery” and conceptual models that forecloses access to, and hinders the 
production of knowledge that copes with, the manifold infrastructural and 
climatological conditions we inhabit. Curator Matthew Poole has also 
considered the inhibiting effects of a pervasive nexus of liberal humanism and 




72 “the true effectiveness of power is all the more savage for its invisibility, that the horizontal 
formations… accelerate the concentration of foci of decision making that can act discreetly 
everywhere and nowhere, without this confrontation being compromised by any of the pomp 
of overly visible verticalities” (Châtelet, 2014: 108). 
73 “Democracy is not deduced from an optimization of preexisting possibilities but emerges 
through a wager… on the excellence of the multitude’s virtualities and its ability to distribute 
them” (Châtelet, 2014: 156) 
74 “Knowledge democracy refers to an interrelationship of phenomena. First, it acknowledges 
the importance of the existence of multiple epistemologies, or ways of knowing, such as 
organic, spiritual and land-based systems, frameworks arising from our social movements, 
and the knowledge of the marginalized or excluded everywhere, or what is sometimes 
referred to as subaltern knowledge. Second, it affirms that knowledge is both created and 
represented in multiple forms, including text, image, numbers, story, music, drama, poetry, 
ceremony and meditation” (Tandon, Singh, Clover and Hall, 2016). 
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privileged figure around which our organizing principles are arranged? What 
happens if artworks (traditionally subjectivized objects) are de-subjectivized in 
this network of associations?”75 Such questions are motivated towards 
speculating about “other ways of subjectivizing ourselves in new formulations 
of ‘togetherness’” that do not adhere to the sociocentric models of the long 
nineties, fostering alternative models that emerge from the ontological 
dethronement of the human subject (Poole, 2010: 100). 
 
We can turn now to examples that have an explicit attachment to the 
speculative turn and to SR. Specifically those that have operated according to 
the logics of OOP such as Christov-Bakargiev’s dOCUMENTA (13) introduced 
in chapter 1. With its enactment of a “vibrant materialism” (Bennet, 2010; 
Mulholland, 2019a) that is foregrounded by the project through a wealth of 
historical artworks picked from modernity, new commissions, sacred objects, 
eco-architectural prototypes, publications, letters, lemonade stalls, borrowed 
objects, scientific projects, geological samples, video footage of protests, found 
objects and even processes of botanic colonisation, we might take up Latour’s 
questions to counter the orthodoxies crystallised through the long nineties: 
“Will a different democracy become necessary? A democracy extended to 
things?” (Latour, 1997: 12). 
 
This list of “participants” (which was the term used by Christov-Bakargiev 
to refer to these presentations as the term ‘artist’ was too narrow (Schoene, 
2012: 36)) resembles a trope known as a “Latour litany” which describes 
diverse “bestiaries of things” (Bogost, 2012: 49). This trope is playfully 
emblematic of the kind of a flat ontology subscribed to by Harman and other 
proponents of object-oriented philosophies. In the context of dOCUMENTA 
(13) such a heterogeneous assembly is representative of a broad re- 
conceptualisation of ‘the social’ in that it conceives of persons, things, natural 




75 The question is echoed in Malik’s articulation of the correlationist network of 
interpretation that “completes” the artwork (Malik, 2015). 
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of an equal ontological status. It offers the conceptual revision of social 
relations as “person-things” that are “mutually enmeshed” (Mulholland, 
2019a);76 as an ecology of entities whose ontological flattening contends that 
“all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally” (Bogost, 2012: 11). 
 
“The Brain” of dOCUMENTA (13), then, is Christov-Bakargiev’s Rosetta 
Stone and illustration of what it is to think in and through a cognitive ecology 
of diverse things when they are understood not as discrete bounded entities 
“but an assembly of relations” (Chan quoted in Farquharson and Wilson- 
Goldie, 2012: n.p). It represents a synthetic and modular cognitive assemblage 
where the aggregate of artefacts and the natural processes of materials establish 
a dynamic model for Laruelle’s proposition that “thinking is everywhere” (Ó 
Maoilearca, 2015: 175). Like a living brain that consists of an archive of 
memories, beliefs, conceptual models, and neuroplastic tendencies, “The 
Brain” of dOCUMENTA (13), following the inferences of ExC, is located 
among myriad external resources whose variable portability with an internal 
neural operating system demonstrates a transformative cognitive augmentation. 
This way of approaching the aggregate materials of the exhibition, and their 
cognitive integration, is articulated in its accompanying publication: 
 
“When an artwork is looked at closely, it becomes, as in meditation, an ever 
more abstract exercise, a thinking and imagining while thinking, until the 
phenomenology of that viscous experience allows the mind to merge with 
matter, and slowly, possibly, to see the world not from the point of view of the 
discerning subject, the detached subject, but from within so-called objects and 
outward” (Christov-Bakargiev and Funcke, 2012, emphases added). 
 
The final point in Christov-Bakargiev and Funcke’s statement here is 
crucial to the curatorial strategy and its work in the speculative “formulations 
of ‘togetherness’” prompted by Poole. Here, “The Brain” and the deliberately 
sprawling assemblage of distributed works, projects, publications, partner 
 
 
76 Latour’s example of such assemblages is presented in his discussion (Latour, 1999: 180) of 
agency in response to the US gun lobby’s dictum ‘guns don’t kill people, people do.’ Latour 
ascribes agency to neither gun nor person but the hybrid-assemblage “person-with-gun.” It is 
with this specific assemblage that a form of action  is enabled, and, I suggest, a specific form of 
thought. 
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exhibitions, talks and seminars that constituted dOCUMENTA (13) recall 
philosopher C. S. Peirce’s reflection on the 18th century French aristocrat and 
founder of modern chemistry’s cognitive extension across the material 
affordances of his laboratory: 
 
Lavoisier’s method was… to dream that some long and complicated chemical 
process would have a certain effect, to put it into practice with dull patience, 
after its inevitable failure, to dream that with some modifications it would have 
another result, and to end by publishing the last dream as a fact: his way was to 
carry his mind into his laboratory, and literally to make of his alembics and 
cucurbits instruments of thought, giving a new conception of reasoning as 
something which was to be done with one’s eyes open, in manipulating real 
things instead of words and fancies.” (Peirce, 1998: 5.363, emphasis added) 
 
The works of dOCUMENTA (13), as socio-cognitive technologies, fulfil this 
“outward” perspective through exemplifying an interconnected field of 
relations and perspectives beyond that of a subjectively codified and discrete 
umwelt.77 As with Christov-Bakargiev’s refusal of a primary curatorial 
“concept” for the quinquennial, keystone works such as Pierre Huyghe’s 
Untilled and Song Dong’s Doing Nothing Garden explicitly defer their 
compositional agency to the “vibrant” anonymous, inhuman processes of 




77 In his ‘A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans’ (Uexküll, 2010), biologist, 
philosopher, and progenitor of ‘biosemiotics’ Jakob von Uexküll outlined what he called the 
Umwelten of various organisms: ticks, sea urchins, amoebae, jellyfish, and sea worms. Umwelt 
was defined as a living being’s perception of its environment derived from biological 
information processed by their distinct sensorimotor systems: a subjective frame of reference 
peculiar to each species. Conversely, he distinguished the concept of Umgebung as that of an 
Umwelt perceived by another species – the situation of one organism observed through a 
differently conditioned Umwelt. By these terms, the ecology of any environment is a 
proliferation, an entanglement even, of diverse Umwelten. von Uexküll’s ‘theoretical biology’ 
is, to some extent, useful for approaching the polyplexity of contemporary ecologies, and 
elaborating their historical distinctions. What von Uexküll’s multitude of Umwelten presents, 
however, is an ecology comprised of discrete subject-units with individual life-words; 
biological filter bubbles that mediate environments according to the necessary information, or 
“carriers of significance,” that allow an organism to survive and flourish. It is easy to see 
within this way of looking at ecologies, it’s relationship with dominant understandings of 
embodiment, selfhood, subjecthood and individuality; a modern ontological seedbed for 
Neoliberal sociality and its platform-marketplace of manufactured Umwelten (see section 3.1). 
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that Untilled comprised no “choreography” or “organization;” that there were 
indeed “rules” but not “a policy” (Huyghe, 2012). This work is essentially 
Huyghe’s demarcation of an existing and largely unaltered composting area of 
the nearby Karlsaue Park. With only a small label marking a walkway leading 
towards what is apparently an unoccupied space, Huyghe draws attention to the 
extant ambient ecologies with equally subtle interventions such as the presence 
of a groundskeeper, a beehive set to replace a reclining sculpture’s head, and 
the introduction of marijuana and hallucinogenic plant specimens to the area. 
Meanwhile Dong recounts a Taoist practice of “doing nothing,” of “non- 
action” (Dong, 2012), that enabled the botanic propagation and colonisation of 
two 20-foot piles of landfill that disrupted the otherwise cultivated landscape of 
Karlsaue Park’s lawn area. 
 
Reflections on dOCUMENTA (13) have noted that Huyghe’s work was 
challenging to actually locate (von Hantelmann, 2017; Viso, 2012) while 
Dong’s use of accumulated biological waste and rubble speaks to that which is 
siphoned and partitioned away from the comfort of modern life. However, both 
materially and emphatically exist and act in ways that are not codified as 
immediately relevant, and even visible, within the modern liberal human 
sensorium. Ryan Gander’s intervention within the ground floor of the 
Fridericianum building’s ground floor helps with this point. I Need Some 
Meaning I Can Memorise (The Invisible Pull) by Gander calls for an artificially 
produced light breeze to occupy this space, “not a strong wind, not 
immediately recognizable as artificial, but physical enough to create a moment 
of wonder in the viewer” (Gander in Christov-Bakargiev, 2012). This similarly 
subtle gesture intimates towards the activity and processes that affect us, on the 
precipice of our perceptual capabilities and beyond. And while Gander’s 
intervention is manufactured and calculated in a way that Untilled and Doing 
Nothing Garden is not, such invisible agencies though situated beyond our 
perceptive threshold, are nonetheless also part of artefacts such as hard and soft 
forms of infrastructure. 
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Here we can find some purchase on Christov-Bakargiev and Funcke’s 
seemingly abstruse and merely poetic conviction that “the phenomenology of 
that viscous experience allows the mind to merge with matter.” When Larsen 
proposes that to gain some direction and leave behind the long nineties 
submitting present conditions to be “re-configured from afar,” we can find in 
dOCUMENTA (13) the reconfiguration of subjective umwelten through the re- 
codification of inert objects as actants or participants in our social and political 
lives: “The question is not whether we give dogs or strawberries permission to 
vote, but how a strawberry can assert its political intention” (Christov- 
Bakargiev quoted in Birnbaum, 2012). In the case of Untilled we see for 
instance the placement of the beehive as a sculpture’s head or another ‘brain,’ 
an allusion to a kind of ‘hive’ mentality that is significantly interconnected 
among the life around it and beyond (we need only think of recent worries 
regarding the declining population of bees and what further impact this has for 
other forms of life on earth in terms of deeply affecting botanic propagation). 
Considering his works often as unscripted ‘scenarios,’ it is evident here that a 
kind of expansion of the logics of the social turn are at work: an open space of 
relationality and sociality, yet played out on a multi-scalar, multi-species, and 
even multi-ambient level. That is, as an artefact Untilled works towards the 
augmentation of the subjective constitution and “‘unweltic’ horizon” of its 
human participants:78 the philosopher of mathematical physics, Gabrel Catren 
refers to this as a “speculative subject” which “besides being able to modify its 
actual experience by changing its state in its Umwelt, also affords mutations of 
the very transcendental frame that defines the “umweltic” horizon of its 
possible experiences” (Catren, 2016: n.p.). 
 
However, it should be noted that in understanding the political import of 
such things in terms of their ‘intentionality’ is to fall prey to an 
anthropocentrism that provokes Birnbaum in his review of the quinquennial. 




78 “The human body shapes and supports the particularity of a place, and so do 
artworks” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012: 7). 
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matter, processes, or strawberries, Christov-Bakargiev need not focus 
resolutely on things in themselves so much as the forms of agency they gather 
within dynamic fields of relations, and conversely, how human agency and 
reasoning is transformed in such a way (for example, in the results achieved by 
Lavoisier through his laboratory-as-cognitive assemblage, but also, as I am 
suggesting, in the revision of the subjective umwelt). 
 
While Mulholland surmises that “we are, perhaps, more likely to appreciate 
the landfill [of Dong’s Doing Nothing Garden] from the biotic perspective of 
what it hosts” (Mulholland, 2019a), he also, crucially, considers this 
perspective as a mutual “transfiguration” that acts as a corrective to the 
intentionality conferred by Christov-Bakargiev: 
 
“Dong enlists unremarkable vibrant matter, not to venerate it over the human 
dasein, but, rather, to allow it to ‘relic’ us, its audience. The transfiguration of 
the rubbish heap only occurs when it entangles human relations, enabling it to 
be contemplated as a horticultural art installation and/or as an exemplum of 
natural history. From an anthropocentric perspective, Doing Nothing Garden’s 
growth, its agency, its transfiguration remains tied to it activating and 
embodying human relations.” (Mulholland, 2019a)79 
 
If we consider that the works mentioned here by Huyghe, Dong, and Gander 
are not simply nonhuman vibrant materials or processes, but a composite of 
these things and the human relations with which they are entangled, including 
the decisional work of the artists. The somewhat more hands-off approaches of 
the artists do not remove them from the works so much as attempt to enact a 
flat ontology of agentic possibilities. And, through the aggregation of such 
works via the expansive and distributed platform of dOCUMENTA (13) as an 




79 The phrase used here, “to ‘relic’” is an example of a concept immanently configured through 
the artistic research of the Confraternity of Neoflagellants, of which Mulholland is a member. 
It describes the dynamic co-constitution of a hybrid entity as a “subject-object” (Confraternity 
of Neoflagellants, 2013: 135). The work of Kodwo Eshun, which has focused on the 
speculative incursions of the sonic materials of modern black-diasporic music, similarly enacts 
a “non-logocentric vision” (Christov- Bakargiev, 2012) as dOCUMENTA (13) and 
“transmaterializes your sensorium through the onomatopoeic illogic called HipHop” (Eshun, 
1998: 12). 
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thinking through its influence across international art worlds. The 
‘biennialisation’ of such discourses is inarguably a signal boost for SR and its 
experimental application in fostering new and critical ways to “see the world 
not from the point of view of the discerning subject, the detached subject, but 
from within so-called objects and outward.” 
 
This renewal of critical perspectives according to the inferences of SR and 
SR-related discourses is something embedded in Christov-Bakargiev’s primary 
aims with dOCUMENTA (13): 
 
“The emancipatory potential for thinking in new ways without producing 
constituted knowledge that is instrumental and easily transformed into 
negotiable investments could lie in an accord between human and the many 
non-human intelligences, affects and beliefs, emotions and forms of trust, that 
can be established among all the life-forms on the planet. This doesn’t 
indicate less interest in humanity and people, their lives and cultures, their art 
an imaginations. It is based on the principle that more potential lies in 
“becoming-with” than in mistrust, fear, and competition over resources and 
possibilities.” (Christov-Bakargiev) 
 
Thus the works, projects, and curatorial strategies of dOCUMENTA (13) 
embody a proposal to revise some of the inherent assumptions embedded in the 
terms with which the social turn and the long nineties have operated. For 
example the “common symbolic space” that Mouffe posits as the contested 
ground upon which the adversarial processes of agonism takes places and that 
has been the space in which the critical analysis of power relations has been 
conducted according to a humanist orthodoxy ultimately allows for a 
constricted perspective. Commenting on the tradition of critical theory, Levi 
Bryant has noted 
 
“It’s tendency is to see all power as semiotic or discursive and to see all 
beings  as effects of the signifier, foreclosing the role that non-signifying 
entities play in exercising power or social relations, and making it difficult to 
analyze the real properties of nonhuman entities and the differences they 
make in the world” (Bryant, 2013: 19) 
 
And so on one hand dOCUMENTA (13) offers exemplary applications of 
Bryant’s alternative model of a borromean critical theory that pays attention to 
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the non-signifying agentic entities inhabiting Lacan’s Imaginative and Real 
realms, in addition to that of the Symbolic. This model offers the opportunity 
to revise our common understanding of what constitutes a social space, what 
inhabits it and what it can be; with the knotting together of the social and the 
real that subsists beyond or beneath our “umweltic horizon” (Catren), we can 
“open a space for perhaps unrecognised ways in which power functions to 
perpetuate unjust social relations” (Bryant, 2013: 20). Furthermore, this space 
is populated by the kind of “speculative subject” that (contrary to the 
assumptions of a liberal humanism, and even Mouffe’s “radical” model that 
determines subjects to be discrete, bounded, and individually constituted 
discursive units) embodies a constitutive essence of reviseability. 
Commensurate with this, is an instantiation of Latour’s question regarding a 
revised democracy, where agonism might better be understood as a mutual 
entanglement. The multiple scales of real properties of nonhuman entities, 
when understood as significantly pertaining to social relations and an expanded 
symbolic space, operate as a “vector of revision” (Negarestani, 2014: 435).80As 
well as revising an “umweltic horizon” the orthodox formalisation of what a 
‘human’ is has thus been reconfigured.81 I will explore this idea in more detail 
in the final chapter but I have already established the extended modularity of 
cognition while the psychoactive plants introduced into Karlsaue Park by 
Huyghe, as well as embodying a contested political and legal profile and 
geopolitical status, allude to the interactive potency of the human biome, that a 
single subject contains not an immutable essence but rather a contingent 
population of cells, biota, fungi, bacteria, and other organisms that react in 
varying ways with the (often invisible) world around us. When Larsen suggests 
 
 
80 “Inhumanism is the extended practical elaboration of humanism; it is born out of a diligent 
commitment to the project of enlightened humanism. As a universal wave that erases the self-
portrait of man drawn in sand, inhumanism is a vector of revision. It relentlessly revises what it 
means to be human by removing its supposed evident characteristics and preserving certain 
invariances. At the same time, inhumanism registers itself as a demand for construction, to 
define what it means to be human by treating human as a constructible hypothesis, a space of 
navigation and intervention.”  
81 Christov-Bakargiev asks in a curatorial statement: “What does it mean to know things that 
are not physically perceivable to us through our senses? What is the meaning of the exercise of 
orienting in though towards these location?” (Christov- Bakargiev, 2012: 7) 
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that the orthodoxies of the present must be “reconfigured from afar,” we see in 
examples such as these that real processes and nonhuman entities existing at 
diverse scales and participating in invisible ecologies (which include our own 
cognitive and biotic development) are capable of fulfilling his suggestion. 
 
The instantiation of this heretical turn in thinking with contemporary art is 
embodied in some of the subtle decisions of dOCUMENTA (13) as an entity. 
For example, the commissioned intervention in the Documenta typeface by the 
graphic design company Leftloft suggest that the “case-sensitive inversion… 
expresses the reversal of the order and a dynamic desire for renewal” (Leftloft). 
And, the dOCUMENTA (13) publication which collected its series of 
commissioned pamphlets, interviews, statements, and essays into a single book 
was named The Book of Books, which seems to deliberately play with the tone 
of theological scripture, here re-written as a heretical gesture of renewal. 
However, I will conclude this section with some critical analysis and 
challenges to the speculative turn as it is exemplified in projects such as 
dOCUMENTA (13), specifically in terms of articulating “new forms of 
‘togetherness.’” My concluding examination of the work of dOCUMENTA (13) 
turns on questioning its implementation of what I call the speculative turn’s 
constitutive axiomatic heresy. This will also be compared to some of my own 
curatorial projects which motivated some of my earlier Ph.D. research, the 
exhibitions Exta (2015), CHEMHEX EXTRACT (2016), and Vaporents (2016). 
 
Here, I am concerned with the formal resonances of dOCUMENTA (13)’s 
curatorial and artistic ‘openness’, with that of CB and the catalytic work of the 
long nineties. As already noted, dOCUMENTA (13) consciously departed from 
the quinquennial’s formulation of a guiding “curatorial concept” and was rather 
exemplified in the open field of relations (the “frenetic dance”) that “The 
Brain” set up, along with the explicit “doing nothing” of Dong’s earthwork and 
the “untilled” framework of Huyghe’s open-ended scenario. While I have 
argued that the material contingencies of such works have enabled a 
“transfiguration” of the subjective umwelt, the question remains: how is this 
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expanded field of relations structured? According to what conceptual 
framework does one conceptualise, represent, and codify the (re)formulation of 
a field of social relations, its actors, and the interactions therein? Is this a 
conceptual framework that enables the construction of the kind of conceptual 
machinery that enables a manipulative and agentic “ingress to the real” 
(Brassier)? I approach these questions via the anthropological work carried out 
under the project of TTT (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel, 2007; Holbraad, 
2011; Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017) as well as Laruelle’s formal construction 
and articulation of what he calls non-philosophy. 
 
The function of this openness and indeterminacy in CB, I argued, further 
sedimented latent assumptions in the organisation of participatory expression 
and “self-articulation.” This confirmed a bias towards the liberal humanist 
representation of a democratic space, which behaved as a technology of 
homeostasis and cognitive inertia. In the case of dOCUMENTA (13) I submit 
that in its embracing of curatorial and artistic ‘hands-off’ methods, it indeed 
answers Latour’s question regarding the extension of a democracy extended to 
things. A “thought-image” of a revised democracy whereby the political impact 
(or as Christov-Bakargiev would have it, the intentionality) of nonhuman 
things, natural processes, anonymous materials, and even ‘invisible’ human 
artefacts such as distributed infrastructure, is imbricated with the social life of 
humans. My question is whether this “thought-image” is actually a revised 
concept reshaped by the native contingencies that the works present, or, 
following the method of TTT, even though there is a clear effacing of the 
ontological boundary between ‘people’ and ‘things,’ does dOCUMENTA (13) 
rescind the analytical status and opportunities inherent to ‘things’ by binding 
them to “an alternative ontological order (e.g. that of collectives, assemblages 
or the Actor Network)” rather than “free[ing] it from any ontological 
determination whatsoever” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 210)? 
 
dOCUMENTA (13) in its formal instantiation of openness and 
indeterminacy, and in its imposition of anthropocentric qualities such as 
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intentionality, agency, and even democracy to things, determines a fixed space 
of probabilities for thinking. Christov-Bakargiev intends to explore “thinking 
in new ways,” to see “from within so-called objects and outward,” yet does so 
within parameters that confer human qualities on things rather than 
heuristically and speculatively interrogating the native “conceptual 
affordances” of things (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 217). Rather than 
thinking from within things, this is an anthropocentric ensouling of them. For 
TTT the alternative method involves “de-theorizing the thing, by emptying it 
out of its many analytical connotations, rendering it a purely ethnographic 
‘form’ ready to be filled out contingently,” to “heuristically disentangle things 
from people, in order to explore how far and in what ways the former make 
their own kinds of difference to the way they can be conceptualized” (216). 
Christov-Bakargiev herself cites philosopher of feminism and science Karen 
Barad’s encouragement that “we understand how matter matters” (Barad, 
2003: 803).  
 
       To make of this statement more than simply an empty slogan it is crucial 
to consider once again the careful material construction of cognitive 
assemblages, which includes conceptual models, in order to open “critique to a 
more inclusive and powerful set of resources with which to analyze the 
contemporary situation that confronts us, including but not limited to the 
entanglements and interpenetrations of human and technical cognitive systems” 
(Hayles, 2017: 40). Hayles continues, “providing the conceptual scaffolding for 
such analyses is therefore a profoundly political act” (141). Just as Lavoisier 
augmented his dreams with his “instruments of thought,” his alembics and 
cucurbits, it matters precisely what populates our laboratories, which artefacts 
constitute our cognitive ecology (versus the apparent arbitrariness of “The 
Brain”). 
 
So, when Poole asks what “happens if the individual human subject is not 
considered as the privileged figure around which our organizing principles are 
arranged,” this means meeting the “de-subjectivized” artwork and its 
“conceptual affordances” by emptying “out the notion of ‘thing’ of its 
contingently a priori metaphysical contents” before we “formulate a way of 
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allowing it to be filled by (potentially) alternative ones in each ethnographic 
instance” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 211). I propose that such a 
formulation depends on the construction of conceptual models as “technologies 
of investigation;” as the cognitive scaffolding with which to replace outmoded 
or inappropriate alembics and cucurbits. 
 
My own practical exploration of how this would work will be discussed in 
the following sections of this chapter. My curatorial projects are concerned 
with the exploratory articulation of a “speculative subject,” (what Laruelle 
refers to as “Subject = X” - a futural subjectivity simulated, or in his 
idiosyncratic vocabulary, “cloned,” using the transcendental material which 
comprises the real in order to foster new decisional procedures rather than 
imposing those of philosophy (Laruelle, 2012: 15)),82 and concomitant 
“formulations of ‘togetherness.’” That is, my own projects participate among a 
milieu of contemporary art for whom a collective inferential modelling 
constitutes their procedural heresy. While Christov-Bakargiev purports that 
“the human body shapes and supports the particularity of a place, and so do 
artworks” (Christov-Bakargiev, 2012: 7), this milieu and my projects question 
the debilitating presumptions inherent in the articulation of ‘the human body’ 
as a universal model.83 
 
Speculative reconfigurations of such bodies present “the hypothesis of a 
body as something which is produced or manufactured, distributed or allocated, 
[so that] we can also think about the means of its production” (Vishmidt, 




82 Brassier describes this simulated “Alien-subject” as “an organon devoid of every  residue 
of phenomenological determination or intra-worldly experience” (Brassier, 2001: 357). 
83 “The idea of the ‘Human’ implied in the Humanities - that is to say, the implicit 
assumptions about what constitutes the basic unit of reference for the knowing subject 
- has historically been the image of Man as a rational animal endowed with language. This is 
the humanist core of the classical ideal of ‘Man’… This is an ideal of bodily perfection which 
doubles up as a set of mental, discursive and spiritual values” (Braidotti, 2013: 1-2). 
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image,” (by manipulating the orthodox humanist conception and navigational 
conditions of ‘the body’) it is possible to gather traction on the present nexus of 
power relations that determine what bodies are or should be (and how this 
‘shapes and supports the particularity of a place’). Furthermore, following 
Malik’s provocative construction of generic coordinates for an art that does not 
follow what he defines as “contemporary art,” the somatic speculations I will 
address collectively and procedurally generate the coordinates for what else a 
body can be that is not beholden to the limitations of orthodox categories.84 
These revised coordinates are arrived at by a distributed and multi-modal 
“rational enquiry” of how the contingent constructs of bodies, and the notion of 
embodiment, evolve and adapt to technical-environmental conditions as well as 
diverse corporeal self-articulations and interventions (as political acts). Which 
is only possible through such an enquiry’s commitment to pursuing “cognitive 
interests that are generated anew by breaking with past modes of 
understanding” (Brassier, 2015: 218). The exploration of expanded somatic 
forms and the collective inferential (re)modelling of bodies (and embodiment) 
through contemporary art, constitutes an axiomatic heresy whose work upon 
the body is a labour of transfiguration; of mutation. Humanism’s nucleus is not 
arbitrarily dethroned of its primary ontological status. It is reconfigured 
materially and conceptually, and it is relocated among dynamic and multi- 
scalar (social, technical, political, ecological, imaginary, and cosmic) ecologies 
of “mutual enmeshment.” 
 
[Interlude] The Labour of Speculation: To Work A Concept 
 
The concluding sections of this chapter exemplify how this speculative 
reconfiguration has happened, and continues to happen, across a distributed 
milieu of contemporary art (a contingent, dynamic nexus of artists, artworks, 
discourses, theories, concepts, relations, institutions converging as an 
information processing platform we can call contemporary art), and what this 
speculative reconfiguration enables (as an information processing protocol we 
 
 
84 See again Smithson’s confining “fraudulent categories.” 
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can call an uneven and combined heresy). Firstly, I will discuss some of the 
methodological approach I assembled and introduced in chapter 1. With this I 
can outline a way one can better understand the work of contemporary art’s 
speculative turn, which, I argue, is a multi-modal instantiation of philosopher 
of science Georges Canguilhem’s idea of working concepts: 
 
“To work a concept is to vary its extension and comprehension, to generalize it 
through the incorporation of exceptional traits, to export it beyond its region of 
origin, to take it as a model or on the contrary to seek a model for it – to work a 
concept, in short, is progressively to confer upon it, through regulated 
transformations, the function of a form.” (Canguilhem, 1963: 452) 
 
What Canguilhem describes here is a process by which concepts, and the 
knowledges they enable/produce, are recognised as embedded within and 
determined by discursive orthodoxies that limit their use and application, 
unless they are ‘worked’ as or through models. Such work is to implement 
concepts, which is to discursively and systematically render them according to 
models as constructed “representations of physical animate systems that 
support our understanding of those systems” (Schank, May, and Joshi, 2014: 
147). That is, working a concept is a procedural process that revises and hones 
the concept as a consistent and applicable tool within a representational 
framework (our image of the world around us) in order to enhance (or, in a 
more accurate and ideologically neutral phrasing, to transform) our 
understanding of what it represents (the world around us, and beyond us).85 
Thus, we have here a view to contemporary art’s work in relation to the 
production of concepts that serve as Brassier’s “ingress to the real.” The 
following sections then, deal with contemporary art’s procedural and 
distributed articulation of models with 
 
 
85 “The image of the world around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model. Nobody in 
his head imagines all the world, government or country. He has only selected concepts, and 
relationships between them, and uses those to represent the real system” (Forrester, 1971). 
And, “Instead, a representation is seen as a kind of rendering – a partial representation that 
either abstracts from, or translates into another form, the real nature of the system or theory, or 
one that is capable of embodying only a portion of a system” (Morrison and Morgan, 1999: 
27). In this way, models can be used as a situated technology of simulation and prediction: this 
is used day-to-day by humans and sundry creatures in order to navigate their immediate 
environments by modelling future actions. 
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which to refigure, reclaim, and engineer concepts. Such models are determinate 
in their (re)construction and implementation, yet do not fully jettison 
indeterminacy by locating its value in terms of the models’ status as socio- 
cognitive “technologies of investigation” - in their determinate incorporation of 
representative materials they heuristically produce a space of reasons with 
which to test and render conceptual affordances (Morrison and Morgan, 1999: 
19).86 However, as we have seen, and given their representational status, “all 
models are wrong, but some are useful” and therefore attention must be paid to 
the kinds of models are used (see above discussion on the work of Martin and 
the “social effects” of models). 
 
This methodological approach for contemporary art’s combined and 
uneven heresy, its speculative schism, is concerned with the production and 
propagation of new models. The work of Morehshin Allahyari, Kodwo Eshun, 
Laruelle, and that of TTT is especially instructive for analysing its 
implementation through a broader milieu whose work plays a significant role 
in the speculative turn in contemporary art. 
 
Eshun’s 1998 publication More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic 
Fiction establishes much of the groundwork for such a speculative 
methodology. The book is concerned with a continuum of popular Black 
Music, opening with the phrase “[g]ood music speaks for itself” (Eshun, 1998: 
00[-007]). Eshun’s declaration signifies the book’s labour of combating the 
“troglodytic homilies” of “Great British cretinism,” the “giant inertia engine” 
of music journalism, and the mannerisms of “CultStud” where “theory always 
comes to Music’s rescue.” The remit of More Brilliant is summed up by Eshun 




86 Morrison and Morgan go on to say that models constitutively “limit the domain of abstract 
concepts” (20). This may seem counter-productive for a thesis and a body of work concerned 
with speculation, however, I argue that it is necessary. It may produce  a particular domain of 
potentiality, but it is indeed a particular and new domain of potentiality. Without the 
inscription of this domain, I have suggested that the open and  indeterminate “realm of 
potentiality and possibility” (Rogoff) has enabled cognitive inertia. 
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“[e]verywhere, the 'street' is considered the ground and guarantee of all reality, 
a compulsory logic explaining all Black Music, conveniently mishearing 
antisocial surrealism as social realism. Here sound is unglued from such 
obligations, until it eludes all social responsibility, thereby accentuating its 
unreality principle.” (Eshun, 1998: 00[-004]) 
 
In this instance Eshun’s invocation of “the ‘street’” is familiar as a trope in 
modern journalism and music discourse, yet as a “compulsory logic” it also 
embodies, in Laruelle’s terms, a Decisional apparatus that forecloses the 
conceptual affordances of Black Music by invoking a predetermined 
transcendental category. By forcing the logic of social realism, which has been 
a longstanding popular analytic for Black Music in dominant discourses, the 
“antisocial surrealism” and the speculative work therein is ignored. 
Consequently, Eshun disregards what he suggests might be a more familiar 
canon for Black Music and focuses on a continuum of artists that span various 
genres yet share a characteristic disposition for imaginative, surreal, mystical, 
science-fictional, weird, experimental, and posthuman interests. Which is to 
say, a nexus of concerns that do not cohere with an orthodox conception of 
Black Music. This orthodox conception displays, to Eshun, a “lazy, pompous, 
lard-arsed, top-down dominance” that precludes the kind of labour (and care) 
that More Brilliant exemplifies in building new theories with sonic material 
and instead crystallises a “cultural confinement” around “fraudulent 
categories” (Smithson). If we consider again Martin’s “social effects” of 
models then we can find in the memetic distribution of such “compulsory 
logic” a formidable censorship and suppression of Black Music as a 
multitudinous artifactual intelligence that fosters diverse (unorthodox) logics. 
 
So when Eshun scorns the orthodox faith in “comforting origins and social 
context” he does so in favour of excavating new concepts, terms, syntax, and 
theories from the sonic material he focuses upon. More Brilliant, before it even 
begins, credits Eshun as its “concept engineer,” which removes him from the 
milieu of authorship that brings its precogitated concepts and theories to bear 
on Black Music, and situates him as someone who wants to build and construct 
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something with this material. Whether navigating the “mixillogical” studio 
work of George Russell, the time travelling “psychoacoustic illusion” of 
Herbie Hancock, the “PhonoFictional engines” built by the Electromagnetic 
MCs, or the “Posthuman Rhythmatics” of Drexciya, More Brilliant is 
dedicated to amplifying Black Music’s misrepresented speculative long tail. 
The kaleidoscopic and dense array of surreal neologisms it presents are, as 
Eshun would go on to say of the proliferating sub-movements of 2017, 
“actually forms of life.” I will refer to More Brilliant again in section 1.2.3, but 
it is salient to mention for now that Eshun’s work here is an early instantiation 
of TTT’s suggestion that “the things encountered in fieldwork are allowed to 
dictate the terms of their own analysis – including new premises altogether for 
theory” (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel, 2007: 4).87 In terms of TTT’s strategy 
of treating a thing “as heuristic” More Brilliant pays strict attention to 
following the conceptual navigation inferred by Eshun’s objects of study. The 
result is to embody a key element of speculation which is that of a recursive 
inferential self-transformation in terms of thinking: discourse is infected and 
mutated by the concepts, or “thoughtprobes,” at work within Eshun’s sonic 
material.88 Eshun then translates89 the posthuman, technological, 
remixological, and digital logics permeating a continuum of Black Music 
through a commensurate music discourse that works concepts through this 
music’s diverse models of thought, fashioned after an “unreality principle:” 
“the music captures you and abducts you into its world” (Eshun, 1998: 
A[178]). Just as Laruelle’s remonstration of Philosophy’s foundational 
Decision to split itself from the world in order to make it intelligible according 
to its own “standard” (Laruelle), “colonising” (Viveiros de Castro), or 
 
87 “Far from needing theory's help, music today is already… pregnant with thoughtprobes 
waiting to be activated, switched on, misused” (Eshun, 1998: 00[-003]). 
88 “material artefacts may be said to ‘emit concepts’ as radiation beams from radioactive 
materials, and in that sense may be subject to self-scalings, self-transformations and indeed 
self-abstractions” (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 236). “The conceptual and lexical 
arrangement that speculative thought imposes in order to make the claim outside of the 
cognitive basis for speculation also reorganizes the conditions and schema by which such 
speculative endeavours are taken” (Arvanessian and Malik, 2016: 12) 
89 “good translation allows foreign concepts to deform and subvert the conceptual 
apparatus of the translator” (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 87). Here it is appropriate to 
acknowledge the voice of Viveiros de Castro as one that appears among a chorus of much 
louder speculative expressions throughout this thesis, yet is brought into brief focus at 
times in order to recognise his work’s tandem commitments to “that of establishing the 
conditions under which alien concepts can be ‘translated’ into our own conceptual 
language without having to leave the world they necessarily carry with them at the door” 
(Holbraad and Viveiros de Castro, 2016: n.p.). Which is to again draw attention to 
Whitehead’s defining quality of speculation as a renewal of observation – that it mutates  
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“fraudulent” (Smithson) model consists of a re-positioning of thought among 
rather than above the world and its conceptual affordances (O’ Sullivan, 2017: 
280), Eshun’s thinking and writing is immanently modelled after the life- 
worlds of Black Music. 
 
While Eshun re-inscribes bodies of work within a continuum of music and 
art that fashions speculative logics, concepts, and worlds, artist Morehshin 
Allahyari similarly “re-figures... forgotten or destroyed histories – from the 
ones destroyed by ISIS in 2015 to the female/queer figures from ancient 
Middle-Eastern mythical narratives and texts that are usually misrepresented” 
(Allahyari in Allahyari and Paul, 2019: n.p.). Allahyari utilises 3D scanning, 
rendering, and 3D printing technologies to excavate figures and stories of 
Middle Eastern mythologies. A project such as Material Speculation: ISIS 
(2015-16) works towards reconstructing artefacts that have been purposefully 
destroyed. Here, Allahyari recovers twelve statues from the Roman period city 
of Hatra and Assyrian artifacts from Nineveh by using 3D scanned data to 
produce new copies for display. Stored within each cloned item is a USB flash 
drive containing the data used to reproduce it as well as images, maps, PDF 
files, and videos documenting the destruction of the artefacts. In working with 
various archeologists, historians, and museum staff from Mosul Museum, 
Material Speculation: ISIS instantiates a political gesture of archiving and 
securing precarious histories that suffer under the continuous threat of 
terrorism and colonialism. With this last point in mind, Allahyari ultimately 
situated the work within an institutional archive in the Middle East to support a 
cultural commons of the region. This gesture was a move towards resisting the 
“digital colonialism” inherent in the potential free circulation and consumption 
of the artefacts among primarily Western institutions. 
 _______________ 
extant modes of thinking. While Viveiros de Castro is one among many unnamed 
speculative thinkers that could elaborate alternative versions of this thesis, I have opted to 
focus on the related work of TTT as an expedient schema for acknowledging and 
translating concepts that are ‘emitted’ by the native ontologies of things that substantiates 
a reflexive implementation of SR’s aims (particularly those of Brassier’s concept-
engineering). Further, TTT as a method in this thesis is to be taken as an 
acknowledgement that this work fills a methodological gap of SR philosophies, that 
Holbraad and his colleagues expound and also test ways in which concepts can be 
engineered in terms of a complicity with anonymous materials: they put into practice a 
form of what Negarestani proposes may be a non-correlationist art practice in his essay 
Complicity with Contingency (Negarestani, 2011) and they also exemplify my shared 
interest in eliding the perceived opposition between extreme materialist and rationalist 
positions – complicity with materials in their work evidently engineers concepts.
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In this example there is an evident labour of resistance and protection 
for specific cultural histories. It points towards multiple scales of abstract, 
ideological, and physical violence and their accumulative epistemicidal 
function. A similar kind of labour which is at work in Eshun’s diminishment of 
the Decisional apparatus that sanitises, and colonises, the cognitive import of 
Black Music. However, with Allahyari’s later work, SHE WHO SEES THE 
UNKNOWN (2017 - present), her method of re-figuration adopted a more 
speculative mode of “activation” in addition to digital “preservation.” What is 
sought to be “activated” is an occulted and oppressed kernel of epistemic 
potentiality that has been systematically expunged from mythical figures and 
images. 
 
Through SHE WHO SEES Allahyari researched and accumulated various 
texts and imagery relating to Middle Eastern mythic figures and monstrous 
jinn: Ya’jooj and Ma’jooj, The Laughing Snake, Huma, and Aisha Qandisha. 
These resources are presented through a project website and various public 
talks that accompany the project’s installations. The installations include 3D 
printed forms extrapolated from these resources as well as 3D rendered video, 
virtual reality, or hypertext that articulate a revised narrative around each 
figure. Allahyari’s research highlights a nexus of colonial and patriarchal 
appropriation of these figures that has taken place “over 1,500 years,” resulting 
in a misrepresentation that re-aligns their potentiality with dominant (orthodox) 
narratives. Allahyari notes that “Huma, for example, originally was queer or 
genderless, but through years of oral and written narration, these jinn have 
become more male” (Allahyari in Allahyari and Kuennnen, 2018: n.p.). The 
digital extrapolations of Allahyari’s research foregrounds a means of re-
figuring these narratives, informed by the affordances of media, and media 
economies, such as 3D printing, digital sculpting software, and 3D scanning.
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With the mythical jinn figures Ya’jooj and Ma’jooj that represent the 
potential for spreading mischief and chaos on earth, Allahyari re-figures them 
as Ya’jooj Ma’jooj, a conjoined figure that highlights her re-appropriation of 
their narrative. With Ya’jooj Ma’jooj (Fig. 6) for example a video is presented 
which records the manipulation and (re-)construction of figures using 3D 
modelling software: mesh skeletons and texture mapping processes are visible 
for the 3D models; an initially undefined pixel mass begins to take the form of 
a monstrous figure as more visual data is gathered and applied. The process 
takes place in a virtual 3D modelling space where the screen captures the 
manipulation of an object rotated and manipulated by movements that index 
the artist’s hand at work on a mouse or tablet. The malleability (and thus the 
potentiality) of such myths are presented here within an economy of digital 
apparatuses and the individuals/agendas that operate them. With this kind of 
presentation and its manipulations there is a substantial realisation of 
Laruelle’s work towards a non-aesthetics adjacent to his non-philosophy 
project which aims to “follow the movements of contemporary art in the most 
profound manner, not in order to describe the changes under the same codes, 
but to import these types of changes within aesthetics itself, and to build 
scenarios that are themselves theoretical installations” (Laruelle, 2012: 11, 
emphasis added). Allahyari finds in these mythic figures latent conceptual 
resources to be worked, which in her case requires engaged research in their 
cultural histories of creation, distribution, and manipulation. Working these 
concepts, for Allahyari, demonstrates a form of digital activism whereby 
myths and images are re-figured with the material affordances of digital 
reproduction and distribution. The result is a myth-figure that acts as a re-
figured cognitive scaffold or “theoretical installation,” an adapted shared 





Morehshin Allahyari, 2019, She Who Sees The Unknown: Ya’jooj Ma’jooj (still). 
 
While Laruelle constructs non-philosophical models of thinking by 
“follow[ing] the movements” (conceptual affordances) of the material itself, 
whether this is contemporary art or Christian mysticism or Marxism (Laruelle, 
2011; 2010; 2000), Allahyari exploits90 the resources embodied in Ya’jooj and 
Ma’jooj in order to present a timely image that emits concepts (Holbraad and 
Pedersen) and renders thinking with a new set of parameters: it acts as a 
speculative image. Ya’jooj Ma’jooj was developed and presented during the 
“travel ban” that was implement by Donald Trump’s administration as a 
measure of U.S domestic security by restricting the travel allowances of 
Muslim-majority countries. Allahyari’s project produces a re-figured image 
that can be mapped on to her own and many others’ experiences of being 
controlled and marginalised as a collective ‘Other’ by a powerful authority. 
Using a re-figured, many-headed, and feminine mythological figure as an 
avatar for this collective marginalisation provides an opportunity for a 
contemporary archetype. Of course this is an archetype laden with the mythos 
 
 
90 I use the term “exploit” following its usage in computer ‘hacking’ to denote the seeking 
and taking advantage of a vulnerability or flaw in a system: “a resonant flaw designed to 
resist, threaten, and ultimately desert the dominant political diagram” (Galloway and 
Thacker, 2007: 21). 
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of Ya’jooj and Ma’jooj whose troublesome and chaotic potentiality led to their 
exclusion from humanity, detained behind a wall that was said to one day 
crumble and lead to apocalypse.91 With Ya’jooj Ma’jooj Allahyari presents a 
heretical form of agency that is seething with potentiality in the margins of 
orthodoxy and authority; a paradigm of thought that is occulted by the 
Decisional apparatus of orthodoxy and reconstructed using digital media and 
research as a speculative activism. 
 
What these examples show, through their speculative labour, is an 
activation of artefacts for their latent conceptual potency. They substantiate 
Canguilhem’s concern for concepts that need to be worked, to export them 
beyond their “region of origin,” to excavate them from systemic orthodoxy that 
confers upon them a meaning rendered from the perspective of authority, and 
instead, in the cases of Eshun and Allahyari, attends to “regulated 
transformations” that allow for such artefacts to embody and “emit” their own 
epistemic frequency. So while dOCUMENTA (13) gathered a diverse body of 
artefacts in order to promote their expanded field of relations and social 
histories, the examples discussed here proposed instead an active working and 
manipulation of these relations in order to foster their rational potential as a 
mode of artefactual intelligence. Rather than augmenting one’s umwelt to 
include things and relations beyond a codified humanistic view, as I argued 
that dOCUMENTA (13) has done, Eshun and Allahyari show in different ways 
the possibility of intervening in this umwelt in a more forensic manner. They 
work the conceptual affordances of their chosen artefacts in ways which 
manipulate their socio-cognitive value, actively and speculatively intervening 
in the conceptual possibility space that such artefacts proffer. 
 
The work of Eshun and Allahyari draws attention to contemporary art’s 
own version of what Laruelle refers to as “standard philosophy.” While 
“standard philosophy” is that which works from the Decision to separate 
philosophy from the world and to confer upon it, from this authoritative 
 
 
91 See footnote 20. 
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distance, a system of thinking and conceptual apparatus that belongs to itself to 
the exclusion of ways of thinking and conceptual affordances native to the 
world, we can say that a “standard contemporary art” is that which bolsters 
these orthodox modes of thinking and codifies the world accordingly. So as 
with Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” or “non-standard philosophy” what we find 
here is rather a heretical working and transmutation of concepts according to 
the occulted conceptual affordances of material artefacts. As things that exist 
within the contemporary socio-cognitive economies of Black Music or Middle 
Eastern mythology, they enact “transformations in the conception of reason 
itself” (Mackay). 
 
2.2.2 Re-figuring ‘The Body,’ Re-figuring ’The Body Politic’ 
 
Turning now to the projects Exta (2015) and CHEMHEX EXTRACT 
(2016)92 that I curated in collaboration with curator Lucy Sames, I will outline 
some of contemporary art’s recent work in re-figuring the possibility space of 
somatic “identities [that] are available to ground [and revise] such a potent 
political myth called ‘us’” (Haraway, 2001: 296).93 These projects started from 
our interests in posthuman techno-biological speculation and the myths that 
may accompany them, whether as some kind of future ritual or even a re- 
articulated “mystic fiction” such as our contemporary body-politic.94 From 
what present or near-future conditions and materials would posthuman entities 
 
 
92 See Exta and CHEMHEX EXTRACT sections of the portfolio PDF, along with  
relevant folders in the accompanying USB drive. 
93 I add “revise” here to acknowledge that with new information processing platforms (bodies) 
there is new information processing protocols emerging (thinking, or, even more alien 
processes [see again (Holbraad and Pedersen, 2017: 210) regarding the imposition of human 
traits and intentionality on non- or more-than-human forms]). It is also significant to 
acknowledge the collaborative work of choreographer Kasia Wolinska and writer Frida 
Sandström who note that the “[s]ensible and careful recompositions of the self and the spaces 
that are shared enable collective speculations that test the social itself” which is to 
acknowledge the forms “community” and “togetherness” assumed and inherited and then 
projected. 
94 Ernst Kantorowicz’s term for the body politic, “mystic fiction” (Kantorowicz, 1997: 4), is 
used to notify his audience of a collective “political myth” that shares a genealogy with “the 
collective corpus mysticum, the Church” (198). Our projects thus considered the future 
versions of collective articulation similarly tempered by residual  atavisms. 
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and collectivities emerge? Such a question demands attention paid to 
contemporary issues as well as employing future-oriented speculation. The 
catalytic model or ‘thought-image’ we used between ourselves and in 
discussions with artists was that of a haruspex divining an ecstatic vision of a 
future collectivity from the ‘entrails’ of our Body Politic. This image was 
constructed as a means to facilitate thinking around the emergence of new 
forms from the death of old forms. I also develop and explore some of these 
ideas, specifically the transforming sensoria and architecture of subjecthood 
(the “re-orient[ation] and re-calibrat[ion of] the human mind and body to 
tempestuous techno-environmental conditions and moistmedia-ecologies” 




Exta and CHEMHEX explored the working of humanist conceptions of the 
body and the body politic in contemporary art. These projects exploited the 
conceptual resources of body horror and of occultism which are present in the 
guiding image motivating these projects: that of a haruspex divining 
speculative futures from the entrails of the present. In addition to these 
substantive affordances, the figure of the haruspex here also offers an 
opportunity to explore how alternative images of the future are produced: how 
“entrail-reading as a cultural practice... can illuminate the general logic of 
cultural representations, and the way in which they are constructed and 
processed in a cross-cultural manner” (Abbink, 1993: 723). We asked 
ourselves and the artists we worked with: what future subjects, what future 
form of sociality, might a haruspex envision from the entrails of the present? 




95 Throughout my various projects and in some of the ‘mutated’ reflections in this thesis, I 
adopt a stylized manner of writing that is a hyperbolic combination of unusual concepts. This 
is done in way to conceptually and affectively map this practice on to the mystic “use” of 
language as articulated by Culpitt (Culpitt, 1998: 120), see section 2.3 for a full quotation in 
relation to the work of Jenna Sutela. 
96 “In one direction, mystical vision secrets the subject, unites it with the Hidden… In the 
other direction, mystical vision hacks open the subject, evaporates, and airs it into  the 
limitless open of perfect, primordial actuality” (Masciandaro, 2016: 276). 
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While these two projects were formulated and presented as a curatorial 
collaboration, the following reflection is my own research, analysis, and 
conclusions. 
 
Haruspicy has historically been concerned with a particular event involving 
a local milieu such as the outcome of a battle, an illness, a wedding, a burial, or 
a journey, so that an answer may be divined for a specific question and earn 
relevance within the formal social architecture of a community. Consequently, 
I view this complex arrangement as a collective and multi-modal process that 
involves multiple agencies in the production of a mutual divinatory experience 
or hallucination: the haruspex, the public address of a relevant question, the 
material affective contingencies of the gutted entrails, and the social context 
that couches and names the ritual’s significance. 
 
A history of haruspicy derived from antiquity places a singular expert, the 
haruspex, in the position of objectively ‘reading’ marks and signs in the exta of 
a sacrificed animal according to a set of pre-determined rules to produce results 
of a binary nature – yes/no. The anthropological studies of Jon Abbink that 
focus on entrails-reading among the present-day Me’en society in south- 
western Ethiopia instead propose a dialogical approach. This contemporary 
approach is more in tune with my positioning of significant interlocutors within 
the divinatory ritual – the dead and thus decomposing visceral matter, the 
environment, the supplicant and spectators of the community and the 
galvanising authority figure(s) leading the ritual. (Abbink records that in Me’en 
readings, a domesticated animal belonging to the social make-up, a medium 
that belongs both to the encultured community and the ‘natural’ world, is 
sacrificed for the purposes of a collective reading process). In this case, 
conclusions are drawn from the ritual based upon leading (rather than binary) 




what the entrails offer in terms of distinct colourations, marks and general 
condition. But meaning is arrived at through deliberation among the 
interlocutors present, rather than simply an expert translation of signs 
embedded in the decaying tissue. 
 
From this rite, we can derive a fertile ground upon which to constitute the 
formal composition of Exta as a public entrail-reading-ritual: the art exhibition 
here as an existing cultural ritual that elicits behaviours and tropes as a situated 
communication to an audience, positioning Exta as a site of the “public- 
divinatory type” of reading. (Abbink differentiates this type from the “oracular 
type” which is described as a more private, short-term prophecy based on the 
interrogation of events specific to individuals and families rather than larger 
communities (Abbink, 1993: 711)). As detailed by Abbink, this type of reading 
offers a ritual catalysed, motivated, and led by communal dialogue. Exta and 
CHEMHEX, then, posits the artworks as intensive indexes of cultural interests 
– embodiments and explorations of particular social preoccupations. Which is 
to say that they function as socio-cognitive technologies. 
 
Exta and CHEMHEX were explicitly introduced as a particular type of 
reading-ritual, beginning to formulate a question with which to address an 
audience. Abbink goes on to describe the public divinatory types of entrail- 
reading, referring particularly to extant burial ceremonies of community 
members, which 
 
“allows people (like neighbours or respected community elders) to transmit and 
summarize ideas, opinions or feelings about the state of affairs with regard to 
the group to which the dead person belonged... [and] allows predictions about 
the future circumstances of the relatives, the deceased’s offspring and the area 
in which he/she lived.” (Abbink, 1993: 715) 
 
As stated, these projects aimed to begin operating on the corpse of the body 
politic, to reveal speculative visions about future bodies and their 
environmental collisions, corruptions and conditions.97 What does a future 
 
 
97 Maridien Schneider’s book ‘Cicero ‘Haruspex’: Political Prognostication and the 
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populace look like when immanently birthed from the exta of the present, 
rather than inferred as a futuristic imagination based on the normative 
orthorexia of transhumanism?98 Our projects aimed to conjure an answer in the 
form of ecstatic visions of posthumanist variations of the body: a “long tail of 
(human) bodily difference” (Crespo, 2015) that revises the humanist ideal of 
the body politic. Specifically, a vision as a mode of speculation motivated by a 
vector of decay where the “grave is an oasis” (Cioran quoted in Shipley, 2015) 
payed attention to artworks that conjured images of future bodies rendered as 
imperfect entities entangled among and constantly negotiating with the 
contingencies of techno-environmental conditions. These projects were 
particularly interested in how this enmeshment and ongoing negotiation is 
productive of evolutionary corruptions that profane the powerfully safeguarded 
ideal of what is meant to be human, with the differentially and hopefully en- 
monstered.99 These variations questioned the very idea that the human is 
indeed a self-evident category, that it is a revisable and precarious construct 





Viscera of a Deceased Body Politic’ (2013) traces Cicero’s methodology and practice as a 
political commentator, comparing his forecasting to that of a haruspex operating on a 
deceased body-politic. My interest in this, with regard to the elaboration of a public-
divinatory reading ritual, is related to Cicero’s pronouncement that divination as a political 
tool and technology needed to be developed for the “sake of the republic.” 
98 Posthumanism is an exploration of how humans are contingently co-constituted by 
environmental and technical conditions, and an exploration of how this more-than-human 
evolution might be steered according to a relevant “posthuman ethics” that builds on the 
revision of perennial categories such as the self, whereas transhumanism is tethered to an 
ethics of “self-enhancement” that, although is committed to exploring the efficacy of new 
technologies for accelerating and intervening in the evolution of the human, retains a fidelity 
to the “constitutive metaphysical oppositions of humanism” (Wolfendale, 2015). 
Furthermore, with this metaphysical attachment comes an inherited belief in a singular and 
universal modality of progress rather than contingent non-linear mutation, which Exta 
explored. I also consider this difference when articulating the speculative potential of socio-
cognitive  technologies as scaffolding: that they do not inherently imply a modality of 
progress or improvement which sits within a narrow bandwidth of what thinking, or indeed 
the human, can be. 
99 “I [use] the term ‘hopeful monster’ to express the idea that mutants producing monstrosities 
may have played a considerable role in macroevolution. A monstrosity appearing in a single 
genetic step might permit the occupation of a new environmental niche and thus produce a new 
type in one step” (Goldschmidt 1940: 390). 
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A number of the artworks of these projects elaborated upon this kind of 
speculative teratology100 with corrupt glimpses of a monstrous future socius 
and its re-/de-forming multitude of bodies: 
 
The idea of the human becomes a smooth gradient of different worms, flies, 
wasps, plants and fungi. The toad, the miasma, the sludge and the human all 
become part of a differential field wherein each entity can gradually unfold into 
another regardless of the congruity of their traits, environments and habits 
(Negarestani, 2010: 413) 
 
The language here demonstrates our understanding of the fate of the so- 
called body politic, and it’s modular citizenry of individuals. Expanding on 
Cicero’s method of “going through the motions of a haruspex, inspecting the 
entrails of the corpse politic of the res publica,” (Schneider 2013: 203), Exta 
and CHEMHEX follow and imagine the formal implications of such a 
(symbolic) decomposition. Less like the body of an ‘artificial man,’ structured 
according to the idealised image of an “a priori or “natural” body... in which 
(material and moral) integrity is both the original and perfect condition, and 
the necessary condition for the continued well-being of the members and of 
itself” (Sullivan 2005: 328) and more like a monstrous re-figuration along the 
lines of the DC Comics character, Swamp Thing: an entity ontologically 
perforated by, somatically corrupted by, and acting in convergence with the 
non-human contingencies of its environment. The traditional myth of the 
wholesome body politic is rendered dead, re-formed as a decaying corpse, a 
“fibroproliferative mess” with an inherently nebulous structure; perforated and 





100 Braidotti argues that the figure of the monster acts as an unstable and shifting site of 
semantic reconfiguration: “it is in the language of monstrosity that difference is often 
translated” (Braidotti, 2002: 175). This is key also to Allahyari’s use of monstrous figures as 
embodiments of feminine and queer positions. 
101 Negarestani’s “negative building vectors of decay” (Negarestani, 2010: 387) are  helpful in 
considering the organic possibilities that emerge from decomposition of another form. See also my 
Whale Fall project in the accompanying portfolio as a continuation of this logic. 
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topology of a swamp, with its muddied thresholds between land and water, 
and sundry creatures evolved to traverse and dwell in such an environment. 
 
The long tail of re-figured bodies102 that constituted Exta and CHEMHEX 
included Eva Papamargariti’s self-aware virtual avatars aggregated from digital 
models, Joey Holder’s experimental military robotics emulating the 
movements of snakes, Lewis Den Hertog’s paranoid-delusional teddy bears 
which embody a nexus of contemporary pathologies and commonplace 
structural hostilities inscribed within online subcultures, Plastique 
Fantastique’s ritual invocation of a chimeric macromutation: the Bi-Son Oil-
Man, and Gary J. Shipley’s description of a damned and heretic community, a 
septic multitude solemnly referred to as “the fucked” (Shipley, 2015). 
 
Shipley’s film essay, which featured in Exta, outlined this community as an 
invisible multitude that desecrate and “re-consecrate,” or re-figure, their flesh 
through unorthodox unions with God; as “Mystics [that] desecrate their own 
graves, the grave of human form” (Shipley, 2015). “[T]he fucked” echoes at 
once the early 20th Century Fortean researcher Charles Fort’s own invocation 
of anomalous phenomena and “data that Science has excluded” as “the 
damned” (Fort, 2001: 1) as well as Allahyari’s occulted multitude of Ya’jooj 
Ma’jooj, suggesting a continuum of heretic subjects determined by the 
Decisional apparatuses of orthodox authority.103 Exta and CHEMHEX situated 
a long tail of bodily speculative reclamation and re-consecrations of the 
category of ‘human’ among this continuum and as a re-figuration of 
‘community’ as a “fibroproliferative mess” entangled among a nexus of 
 
 
102 “You will remake my name and image / Of a thousand bodies borne by days away” (Pozzi 
quoted in de Certeau, 1992: 296). 
103 We can also find a significant resonance with the category of the “Poor image” as defined 
by Hito Steyerl in her suggestion that “Poor images are the contemporary Wretched of the 
Screen” (Steyerl, 2012: 32). Steyerl’s Poor image refers to the circulating digital copies of 
images that embody a loss of fidelity to an “original,” embodying a corrupt quality. 
Similarly, the circulation of concepts outwith the strict  purview of authority are corrupted by 
their re-use. 
122  
technological and ecological contingencies; Othered by the orthodoxy of 
humanism. We proposed that “other ways of subjectivizing ourselves in new 
formulations of ‘togetherness’” appear not just as humanist variations of 
discrete citizen-subjects separate from the world and living ’together’ in 
communal harmony, but rather as a constant negotiation between material 
conditions and shifting orthodoxies. For our imagined haruspex, 
 
“organs cease being silent and emit disturbing noises. Mystic phenomena give 
form to these insane noises come from elsewhere (is it the angel, is it the 
devil?) and perceived as questions or threats for the consciousness that the 





While Exta and CHEMHEX were a commitment to divining the contingent 
mutations substantiating a long tail of human bodily difference and 
somatechnic potentiality,104 Vaporents105 highlighted the speculative and 
navigational resources of what is referred to as a digital native: 
 
“A dank enlightenment is gaming your bones. What do you do? 
 
Vaporents is a multi-reality biome; a post-digital swampscape of bacterial 
gameworlds, ambient trans-architectures, genetic dreampunk fictions, 
labyrinthine nanobot industrial-complexes, dirty wifi, and interfaces-interfaces- 
interfaces- interfaces... 
 
With the delirious logic of a lucid dream or a psychedelic vision, Vaporents 
explores the speculative navigational resources required of digital natives 
immersed in the hypercontextual virtualities of a post-continuous present. The 
transversal experience of negotiating the dynamic gamespaces of post-digital 
culture demands a user-erotics of speculation, simulation, puzzle-solving, 
ceaseless intuition of occult algorithms... All of which perpetually re-orient and 
 
104 Somatechnics is a term coined by Gender and Women’s Studies theorist, Susan Stryker, 
and colleagues, during discussions occasioned by ‘Body Modification’ conferences at 
Macquarie University, and highlights the intextricability of the soma (body) and techne 
(craftsmanship), suggesting a discourse on the political, ideological and ethical implications of 
bodies that are necessarily forms that negotiate, and re-negotiated with technical 
environmental conditions and material. 
105 See Vaporents section of portfolio PDF and the relevant folder of material provided in the 
USB drive. 
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re-calibrate the human mind and body to tempestuous techno-environmental 
conditions and moistmedia-ecologies. From the mannerisms of intimacy that 
bind and connect us, to the subsequent capacity to dream, design, and enter into 
projects of collective rationality through digitally altered states. “ (Sutherland, 
2016) 
 
Two exhibitions provide a possible genealogy for Vaporents: Les 
Immatériaux curated by François Lyotard and Thierry Chaput at the Centre 
Pompidou in 1985, and, Ariadne’s Gone Virtual by 0(rphan>) d(rift>) at 
Underwood Street Gallery in 1995. These exhibitions, as well as Vaporents, 
enact what Lyotard referred to as a “dramaturgy of information,” in the sense 
of producing an immersive environment that formally dramatises concepts 
rather than illustrating or depicting them alone. This method of curating chimes 
with the aforementioned SR-derived neorationalist mode of gaining purchase 
upon the ‘real’ by conceptual navigation. What both of these exhibitions do, as 
progenitors, is provide an understanding of the exhibition space as a medium 
through which one physically and psychologically navigates a complex, non- 
linear environment designed to disorientate the user/viewer/spectator for 
specific reasons. In the case of Les Immatériaux, this was done in order to 
present a labyrinthine structure (with an audio ‘guide’ comprised of extracts 
from Maurice Blanchot, Antonin Artaud, various pieces of music, etc. which 
did not elucidate any ‘correct’ pathway or narrative for the exhibition) through 
which individuals would come to recognise the nature of the ‘new materials’ 
Lyotard proposed as re-orienting life in the technologically-mediated world. 
These materials were not ‘immaterial’, as a direct translation of the title might 
suggest, but rather another substrate of materiality that is native to an 
informatic or cybernetic social environment. 
 
Ariadne’s Gone Virtual developed this mode as a comparable “dark maze 
of video, physical and textual objects:” 
 
“A labyrinth or network of paths - image/text/sound fusion. 0rphan Drift> is 
building a labyrinth which is inside out, or without walls. It is composed of 
surfaces; video, material fabrics, and objects (or navigational tools) which 
make up spaces, or zones. In these zone stories are told through images and 
sound, and the stories, like us, move through different states. These stories are 
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of the interface adaption - danger circuit that is our lives. This is a nervous 
network, a schizoid novel visualized - made experiential.” (0(rphan>) d(rift>)) 
 
The aim here, was to similarly entangle the exhibition user/visitor within a 
dramaturgical experience reflective of then newly-available domestic 
technologies which opened up virtual, cybernetic spaces of interaction, and 
attendant reformulations of subjectivity which were then being considered as 
native to these spaces. 0(rphan>) d(rift>)’s and Lyotard’s recognition of virtual 
spaces and worlds as materially augmenting and altering reality is highlighted 
in 0(rphan>) d(rift>)’s suggestion of an aesthetic “evolutionary strategy” of 
“everting the virtual:” an adaptive mechanism for navigating and traversing “a 
new kind of environment” (Roberts, 2016: n.p.). 
 
These exhibitions are touchstones for my own attempt to elaborate such a 
dramaturgy of the experiential architecture of contemporary digital culture and 
the concomitant speculative subjectivity of digital natives. Specifically, in 
establishing the psychological conditions, environmental affordances, and 
transcorporeal resources with which such subjects might act speculatively.106 
Given my previous outlining of how users/subjects are embedded, or 
networked, as media within cognitive loops comprised of externalised material, 
and within infrastructural mechanisms that, as totalities distributed beyond 
human scales of perception (and thus operate indifferently to the needs and 
desires of humans), Vaporents concerns itself with the unarticulated 
possibilities and demands of this subjective re-positioning107 rather than 






106 “we can foster the sense of enfolding, in which the “outside” is always already within, 
inhabiting and transforming what may or may not be still “human” through continual intra- 
actions. In this dynamic scenario, matter— nature, if you will—is always an agent of change 
and always already within and without the permeable membrane of the human. This sense of 
trans-corporeality may best be understood as posthuman in that material agencies reconfigure 
the very boundaries of the human as  such” (Alaimo, 2010: 154). 
107 “…players not only play the game but are also played by the game, disciplined by  the 
game’s logic into an identification made more intense by the kinaesthetic and embodied 
aspects of game play” (Hayles, 1999: 315). 
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strictly humanist form of thinking. That there might be a form of reason native 
to these conditions of subjectivity. 
 
The environment taken to be presently given by Vaporents is the 
“codification of the everyday as ‘ambient’ media, a background hum to which 
we are acclimatised and accustomed, in which we live and breathe, and into 
which ‘digital natives’ are born” (Coley and Lockwood, 2012: 50). And that 
the topology of this climate of ambient media is a gamespace, nesting multiple 
and parallel “natural-seeming gameworlds” (60). This is to inhabit a cybernetic 
environment that instantiates a ‘third-order cybernetics,’ wherein 
computational circuitries and media are engrained in cognitive and affective 
loops of human subjects, constituting a “mixed, augmented and increasingly 
complex reality, [where] we find ourselves in dynamic relation with multiple 
time/spaces, dipping in and out of pervasive data streams, adapting to subtle 
systemic shifts” (35). Thus, the cognitive-affective condition of anticipation 
within third-order subjects, or digital natives, is exploitable as a means of 
generating value. If the mechanisms of anticipation are open to colonisation by 
third-order market forces, then does this manipulation engender a kind of 
speculative foreclosure? ‘How one might dream the future through a hybrid 
machine-vision’, is one of the questions I posed to artists in approaching them 
to produce new work for Vaporents. 
 
So this multi-world, multi-future environment is the navigable field I 
intended to highlight as the seedbed for posthuman techno-environmental 
chimeric subjectivities, and their attendant psychedelic modes of orientation.108 
The title of the exhibition is, then, meant to obliquely, speculatively, name 
these subjects. Borrowing the term ‘vapor’ from vaporware and its construction 





108 “Psychedelia implies a transformation of human subjectivity towards the post- human, 
and opens up a conception of the machine as something that should be articulated in 
complementary, rather than antagonistic terms to what is human” (Larsen, 2013: n.p.). 
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extrapolate another future scenario,109 and also from the online music sub- 
genre ‘vaporwave’ which through a hypnagogic, hazy sound engenders a 
similar kind of “chronosickness” (Williams, 2013: n.p.) in terms of mixing 
images of a cyberpunk future with samples remixed from 80s and 90s 
nostalgia. While ‘ents’ refers to a fictional race of beings described by J. R. R. 
Tolkein, aligning the nature of digital natives with that of the strange beings of 
speculative fiction. 
 
The kind of speculative subjectivity is posited, in the context of Vaporents, 
as being always in media res as per the transmedia imperative to break with 
linear narrative form as a mode of parsing information (and reality), and thus in 
a temporal state of disorientation. Disorientation, as a state pregnant with the 
possibilities of immanently new forms of bodily and conscious experience, can 
be unpacked with reference to Steigler’s account of “epiphylogenesis,” or the 
co-evolution between human and technological environs that has a de- 
contextualizing effect: 
 
“it disorients them by undermining the singularity of their here and now while 
simultaneously endowing them with a different kind of existence. As 
paradoxical as it may seem, disorientation thus lands human beings in a new 
place. It spatializes them in accordance with disorientation’s own coordinates” 
(Rebedeva, 2009: 82). 
 
Consequently, disorientation as a speculative opportunity was yet another 
theme that I broached with the artists I invited to participate in the exhibition. 
In describing the post-digital imbrication of dry silicon-technology and wet- 
biologies110 as a swampscape (see chapter 3) that can be navigated by a 
“productive conceptual vertigo,” (Willis, 2016: n.p.) the artists and I 
discussed producing  an exhibition that dramatised disorientation as a form of 




109 Vaporware is commonly known as a product that is promised for a future release  but 
never materialises. 
110 See Ascott’s articulation of “moistmedia” in (Ascott, 2001).
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2.3 The Invention of a (Strange) Science (part 1) 
 
I will conclude this chapter with my own fitting elaboration of a heretical 
systematisation of knowledge at work through my projects and the speculative 
milieux and ecologies they indicate. While the aforementioned 14th Istanbul 
Biennial, SALTWATER: A Theory of Thought Forms curated by Christov- 
Bakargiev, attempted to combine art with “other knowledges” (Christov- 
Bakargiev, 2015: XLIII)111 by platforming an array of occulted and unorthodox 
systems of knowledge in a kind of cabinet of curiosities style. In this final 
section I will outline an ‘other knowledge’ system that emerges from art itself, 
particularly that which has motivated the speculative turn. As I have been 
arguing, the work of the speculative turn has been towards the advancement of 
a lexicon of re-figured and worked concepts and images as cognitive 
scaffolding for thinking anew, for further speculation: the Overton window is 
breached with these tools and their rational operation. 
 
Insofar as this thesis has reviewed and analysed various philosophical-
artistic materials that have allowed me to deliver a singular definition of the 
speculative turn as a broadly instituted mode of praxis, the research and 
experimentation herein allows me to construct and implement my own form of 
(heretical) conceptual scaffolding. The ‘working’ of concepts practiced by 
Eshun (concept-engineering) and Allahyari (re-figuring), and experimented 
with by me through my own projects, both illustrates the kind of speculative 
conceptual schematisation that Brassier has insisted upon in terms of “forg[ing] 
the explanatory bridge from thought to being,” that is, to inculcate thinking 
with the conceptual affordances and contingencies of diverse yet specific 
materials. This is where work such as Eshun’s and Allahyari’s illustrates a 
mode of implicit anti-correlationism in terms of forging a “complicity” 
(Negarestani, 2011: 11) with the anonymous contingencies of materials (sonic, 
digital, mythological, conceptual, haptic), and therefore with the ontological 
order of things exemplified in the work of TTT, betraying orthodox or 
common-sense humanist hierarchies and modes of understanding. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, some of the work of this thesis has been in 
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the formation of a specialised assemblage or toolbox that puts to use the 
proposals and implications surrounding the speculative critique of 
correlationism. How I have put this material to use will be introduced via the 
below discussion on de Certeau’s mystics, and illustrated in the final chapter: 
the toolbox assembled via this engagement is one that drives the conceptual 
work of my ongoing project Most Dismal Swamp (Chapter 3). Such is also the 
case with the instructive work of TTT and the thinkers who have nurtured this 
anthropology-based methodology: it is the methodological crux of TTT which 
has been analysed and implemented as a means of properly considering extant 
yet under-analysed speculative work (Eshun, Allahyari…), and of forging my 
own novel yet methodologically resonant speculative art/curatorial practice.  
 
The Exta and CHEMHEX projects exemplified a steadily growing interest 
across contemporary art in mysticism, occultism, magic, shamanism, ritual, 
witchcraft, and even more esoteric fringe practices such as tulpamancy. Among 
a vast profusion of events and publications demonstrating this uptake include, 
for example, Spike Art Magazine’s Winter 2019 issue dedicated to exploring 
these “esoteric, cybernetic, psychedelic, technoshamanic worlds,” as well 
Impakt Festival’s 2017 iteration curated by Haunted Machines, Haunted 
Machines & Wicked Problems, which, through three exhibitions and a four-day 
symposium, addressed “the relationship between technology, religion, magic 
and the occult… how in magic, the spectacle is used to hide technical 





111 Such “other knowledges” and much of what I have referred to, along with the forthcoming 
discussion on de Certeau’s mystics, is akin to the “subjugated knowledges” of Michel Foucault 
whose alterity are an active substantiation of expressing resistance to established norms by 
fostering alternative forms (Foucault, 1980: 81). 
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complex technologies; and how we use monsters to think about when things go 
wrong.” The exhibition AGENCY curated by James Bridle at Nome Gallery, 
Berlin, is instructive in considering this esoteric turn, in Bridle’s articulation of 
the significance of “mythology [as] the constant retelling of old stories under 
the conditions of the present” (Bridle in Shipwright, 2018: n.p.). 
 
While I acknowledge that this vast profusion of activity (which has even 
recently been referred to as “the ritual turn”) merits attention and analysis in its 
own right and as such would (and undoubtedly will) necessitate numerous 
further Ph.D. projects, my aim here is not to locate it as a distinct genre for 
consideration. Instead, I argue that this kind of activity is significant as a 
branch of contemporary art’s parallel distributed processing power: a 
cognitive assemblage is furnished with the experimental images, protocols, 
navigational tools, materials, concepts, axiomatic principles, and models of 
these mystic knowledges as a means to think otherwise and to tether this 
thinking with that which is deemed as heresy. That is, the work of the 
speculative turn is best considered as the “invent[ion of] speculative sciences at 
the intersection of arts, humanities and sciences” (Blackman).112 And this 
‘invention of sciences,’ as with Laruelle’s construction of other modes of 
thinking with the material historically taken as distinct from thinking (as per 
the a priori Decisional of Philosophy), is heretically constituted by what we 
choose to be our “alembics and cucurbits” as socio-cognitive resources, 
whether this be manmade artefacts or biotic processes: 
 
“…humans are better off appealing to nonhumans. Endowed with their new 
semiotic powers, the latter contribute to a new form of text, the experimental 




112 This kind of cross-contamination among disciplines with a disregard for professional 
boundaries reminds us once more of Laruelle’s suggestion that “only heretics have both 
philosophy and religion, philosophy and science together at their disposal” (Laruelle, 2012: 
284). And, furthermore, of Roger Caillois’ “new plea for a diagonal science… [which would] 
seek to make out the single legislation uniting scattered and seemingly unrelated phenomena. 
Slicing obliquely through our common world, they decipher latent complicities and reveal 
neglected correlations" (Callois, 2003). 
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which was previously applied only to the Scriptures and classical texts - and 
the new instrument that produces new inscriptions.” (Latour, 1997: 23) 
 
Occultism and mysticism, as with Latour’s hybrid of traditional “exegesis” and 
“experimental… new inscriptions,” represent here a reconfiguration of an 
orthodox concept space with the dark matter of that very orthodoxy; a kind of 
return of orthodoxy’s repressed.113 In Latour’s examples he expands on the 
potential agencies and inscriptive capacities of nonhuman actants that work as 
much as humans within the networks of scientific discovery, discourse, and 
representation. 
 
I have already alluded to Eshun’s invention, of such sciences, through 
working the occulted conceptual affordances and speculative value of Black 
Music, where “music's mystifying illogicality is not chastised but systematized 
and intensified - into MythSciences that burst the edge of improbability, incites 
a proliferating series of mixillogical mathemagics at once maddening and 
perplexing, alarming, alluring” (Eshun, 1998: 00[-004], emphasis added). And 
also Fort’s invocation of anomalous data in order to forge “[a] procession of 
the damned. By the damned, I mean the excluded. We shall have a procession 
of data that Science has excluded." But what kind of science is (re-)figured 
through the kind of contemporary art I have discussed? Given the features and 
functions I have focused on thus far, from Allahyari’s instructive practice of re- 
figuration to my own project’s articulation of speculative subjectivities, I argue 
that the work of the speculative turn is best considered as a contemporary 
articulation of de Certeau’s conception of mystics (as a “new” or “strange 
science” (de Certeau, 1992: 11; de Certeau, 2015: 3)). Contrary to the 
axiomatic openness and indeterminacy of the long nineties that buttressed an 
orthodox nexus of liberal humanism, mystics articulates a suite of resources as 




113 “Indeed, ‘mystical words,’ in having a secret referent, are not engaged in the entire set of 
seductions or manipulations generated by the hidden; they are themselves caught up in the 
labyrinthian relations of the fictions they produce with the realities they reveal” (de Certeau, 
1992: 98); “The hidden begins to take on the aspect of a plot” (de Certeau, 1992: 97). 
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“rearticulation, the reconfiguration, of what [the given] might be” (Beech, 
Canini, Fisher, Grant, and Mackay, 2010: n.p.). 
 
A translator’s note in the first volume of de Certeau’s The Mystic Fable 
provides some clarification of the term mystics and my use of it here: 
 
“The theme of Michel de Certeau’s Mystic Fable is la mystique. This term 
cannot be rendered accurately by the English word “mysticism,” which would 
correspond rather to the French le mysticisme, and be far too generic and 
essentialist a term to convey the historical specificity of the subject of this 
study. There is no need here to retrace the steps by which la mystique, the 
noun, emerged from the prior adjective, mystique .......But it may be of some 
interest to note that this grammatical promotion has its parallel in English, in 
the development of such terms as “mathematics” or “physics,” fields of inquiry 
of increasing autonomy, also taking their names from an adjectival forerunner. 
I have, therefore, in extremis, adopted the bold solution of introducing a made- 
up English term, mystics ...... to render la mystique, a field that might have won 
(but never did, in English) a name alongside metaphysics, say, or optics.” 
(Smith in de Certeau, 1992: ix-x)114 
 
To situate the work of the speculative turn within a continuum of mystics is to 
involve it in a tradition of heresy: a distributed social practice, as de Certeau 
emphasises, that corrupts and reforms doctrinal orthodoxy; mystics115 “subvert 
their religions’ local knowledge and practices” (Kripal, 2004: 489). This is also 
not the “scientific assimilation” or “colonizing” (de Certeau, 2015: 14) of 
mystics but rather a tracing and mapping of its logics, its “mystic operations” 
(21) with regards to the work of the speculative turn. With mystics there is an 
opportunity for the practical elaboration of a science, a shared body of work or 
enterprise wherein images and concepts are shared, worked and tested (108), 
yet in a manner motivated by an axiomatic heresy: mystics is a religiosity 
founded on “a new articulation set out by the same symbols” (Ibid.).116 “The 
 
 
114 “…and it tends to define the status of a discourse or a science in its own right that will be 
referred to by a new noun, la mystique [mystics]” (de Cearteau, 2015: 112). 
115 Mystics concerns “the function of persons or groups who defy a church its authority  in 
doctrinal matters, but claim to bear witness to the true spirit in separating themselves from 
corrupt institutions” (de Certeau, 2015: 20). 
116 Furthermore, I do not situate all contemporary work that makes reference to mystical, 
occult, or magical forms in this category of mystics. For example, there are those which 
ostensibly render a fidelity to such ‘other knowledges’ yet are axiomatically opposed to the 
deviation from orthodox inheritance in the production of a “mystic language” as mystics
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book increasingly replaces institutions, considered as being decadent or 
corrupt” (122, original emphasis) and works against the perceived static 
orthodoxy of the church by creating, through newly transmissible forms such 
as the novel with its “vulgar tongues” (123) in place of ecclesiastical latin. 
Such texts form a network spanning generations and traversing geographies for 
a discourse to take root117 within this “theatre [which] is transportable, 
manipulable, and available for all sorts of intellectual or phantasmagorical 
operations. Everyone thus has a laboratory for experimentation” (Ibid.). Not 
only do such heresies find a more expedient mode of propagation but, as with 
Latour’s “new form of text, the experimental scientific article” their re-worked 
images and concepts form the scaffolding which “facilitates more complex 
possibilities of signs, and, in particular it gives more flexibility to the relations 
between “ideas.”” Again: the Overton window is breached with these tools and 
their rational operation, via the work of mystics. 
 
The economy of mystics entails a discursive, which is to say a rational, 
flourishing of practices: a distributive artifactual intelligence, comprised of 
“fables” and experimental texts, that re-figures not only the body of the mystic 
herself118 but the very idea of a “body of doctrines” held in place by 
ecclesiastical authority. With its worked and working concepts it fosters a 
“language of movement [which] implies a continual transgression of fixed 




constitutively demonstrates. These are practices that I would name with the term mystic 
fundamentalism which is to say that they operate as an index of what mystic, occult, or 
magical practices are supposed to look like rather than constructing a contemporary cognitive 
scaffolding that continues the speculative  work of their forebears and puts to work the 
conceptual resources of the material. 
117 “The datum is buried: it may sprout some day” (Fort) 
118 Referring to the divine experiences of the 17th Century Christian mystic Jane Lead, whose 
path to divine union was characterised by illness, Francis Lee writes that, “the whole 
constitution of her body had been for some time before entirely infected and corrupted so that 
she compared it to a rotten sack... She was even wont to say that all that was put into it was just 
as if it had been thrown into a filthy receptacle, and that there was in her body a continual 
springing up of corrupt matter, which it was impossible to get rid of or entirely exhaust” (1704: 
MSS C.5.30). Her somatic corruptions are likened to a fetid wellspring of thought, comparable 
to the fecund entrails examined in Exta. 
133  
2001: 40). New images and concepts are hypothesised through revising that 
which is inherited by way of “[t]he crafts and science of the times enter[ing] 
mystic language” (de Certeau, 2015: 110). Which is to say that, in the case of 
the work studied by de Certeau, that such bodies of doctrines are re-figured by 
the procedures of a “diagonal science” (Callois). Rather than deferring to a 
fixed higher authority these procedures, or “mystic operations,” combine the 
significance of subjective experience, private reflection, social discursive 
mediation of ideas, and the material conditions of new media: “only heretics 
have both philosophy and religion, philosophy and science together at their 
disposal” (Laruelle, 2012: 284).119 
 
As with Allahyari’s fashioning of narratives for Middle Eastern myth- 
figures from personal experience, contemporary political concerns, and 
oppressed voices, or Eshun’s midwifery of Black Music’s latent 
“mathemagics,” or Laruelle’s construction of multiple “philo-fictions” as a 
replacement thought-model for that of Philosophy’s singular Decisional 
framework, mystics operates by way of a use of tradition and its conceptual 
resources in the organised fabulation of “fictive discourses in a rigorous 
theatre” of (worked) concepts. In other words, mystics is the speculative 
modelisation and working of concepts that makes vital use of “privileged 
spaces” outwith the fixed coordinates of orthodoxy.120 New coordinates are not 
simply produced through arbitrary fancy but through the mode of abductive 
inference “which uses a multimodal and synthetic form of reasoning to 




119 “[T]he mystic conception aims to emancipate the reader-subject and to credit him with an 
existence if his own, detached from any subjugation or conformity to the book” (de Certeau, 
2015: 121). 
120 “While the overall location or ‘site’ of mystic literature in this period should not be 
oversimplified, Michel de Certeau suggested that there were “privileged spaces for the 
development of mystical insight and practice, not least within certain social categories. De 
Certeau noted that mysticism seemed to be closely related to forms of instability or  social 
disinheritance” (Sheldrake, 2001:42; de Certeau, 2000; 191). I suggested in footnote 36 that 
contemporary iterations of these “privileged spaces” exist in the form of discursive sites such 
as para-acadmic organisations, artist-run gallery networks, sub rosa chat servers, and even 
nightclubs or illegal raves and soundsystems (see Braw and Gamble, 2017). It is these kinds of 
spaces that have consistently enabled my own curatorial work.
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O’ Sullivan expand on this with the thought that “abduction involves an 
experimental attitude, but also a pragmatic modelling of different realities 
which proceeds through, imagining and imaging, performing and making, 
alongside more abstract reasoning” (Burrows and O’ Sullivan, 2019: 349). 
 
My invocation of mystics here functions as a model with which I can map 
the activity of contemporary art in terms of its “invent[ion] of speculative 
sciences” and also as a substantiation of what Deleuze would call a 
“deterritorialization of a major language” (O’ Sullivan, 2005). That is, the use 
of given codes and semiotics towards, a “stammering and stuttering of 
language, a making strange of typical signifying regimes” towards a productive 
reterritorialisation of language.121 What mystics provides for this 
conceptualisation of “minor literature” is a suite of conceptual and genealogical 
resources with which to delineate a contemporary iteration of these operations 
that is consistent with the art of the speculative turn. That from the confines of 
orthodoxy comes a “universal and teratological language” (de Certeau, 1992: 
66) with which to think; to renew thinking; to speculate. Furthermore, this 
articulation of such a minor language is shared across, even enabled by, the 
relationships between mystics and the orthodoxies of the church; between para-
academia and academia (e.g the aforementioned genre of theory-fiction); and 
the experimental spaces/economies in which my own projects have found a 
foothold among others’ work rather than the galleries, museums, and biennials 
that have broadly thematised concepts rather than heretically worked them. 
Therefore, ‘curating a heresy’ is indeed something that demonstratively 
happens around the peripheries of the institutional art world: in the minor 
worlds of more ephemeral and precarious project spaces, social media 
accounts, websites, and parasitical communities of practice. In terms of how 





121 “This writing style is a permanent exercise in transposition: it therefore gives 




Like the “diagonal science” of mystics that traverses and uses tradition 
(working its concepts), personal experience, emerging philosophies and 
sciences, poetry, the “vulgar tongues” of non-experts and other such heresies, 
the work of artist Jenna Sutela, specifically the paired nimiia vibié and nimiia 
cétiï projects, brings together diverse resources in the fabulation of such a 
“teratological language.” 
 
Don Cupitt, who discusses the salience of mysticism as a parallel modern 
science, argues 
 
“The reason why mystics use language in the strange ways they do is 
twofold: on the one hand, they are trying to play games with language in 
such a way as to destabilize structures of religious oppression that are firmly 
built into language. . . If a mystic’s writing sometimes appears far-fetched or 
fanciful, the reason is not that he or she is a soulful eccentric with 
idiosyncratic ideas about heavenly matters, but rather that religious utterance 
is surrounded by very severe pressures and threats of a political kind.” 







And so it is with nimiia vibié and nimiia cétiï where we are introduced to a 
“more-than-human language”122 brought together through various sources: it 
embodies a “turn to the exegesis of “wild” voices”” (de Certeau, 1995: 85). 
Sutela’s project substantiates my own suggestion for the reformulation of 
Haraway’s dream “not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel 
heteroglossia” (Haraway, 2001: 316) according to the conjunctive logic I 
specified in chapter 1: as a common language-and-infidel heteroglossia; a 
rational schematisation of and with the immanent conceptual expressions of 
speculation; a realisation of Beech’s aforementioned “construction of another 
language.” nimiia cétiï (2018) and nimiia vibié (2019) (a video work and a 
record release via the electronic music label PAN, respectively) form this 
teratological language, via the use of a sophisticated neural network, from 
diverse resources and data. Sutela invokes the work of the late 19th century 
medium Hélène Smith whose séances, she claimed, granted visionary access to 
Martian societies where she recorded their gestural and vocal utterances via 
acts of automatic writing which at the time had gained interest among 
spiritualist and proto-surrealist work. Smith’s ‘Martian’ vocabulary was 
recorded using Sutela’s voice to produce a dataset of ‘words’ for a Machine 
Learning algorithm developed by Google.123 A further dataset that was 
produced involved the recorded microscopic movements of Bacillus subtilis 
which is a bacterium hypothesised to have arrived on Earth from outer space 
or even Mars. This bacterium is used as a primary ingredient in natt, or 
fermented soybeans, and is also used in space exploration as an ‘extremophile’ 





122 Available at: https://p-a-n.org/release/jenna-sutela-nimiia-vibie/ [Accessed: 18 
Nov. 2019] 
123 Damien Henry, Experiments Lead at Google Arts and Culture: “It’s very important for us to 
work with artists because it is the opportunity to use algorithms in a way that they are not being 
designed for.” Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaoZV7jPo10 [Accessed: 18 
Nov. 2019] 
124 These two uses also allow Sutela’s work to situate, or rather distribute, the human 
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recording the bacterial movements is trained to encode them to a high 
dimensional latent space where the movements can be traced and rendered as a 
system: a message  is channeled from a non-speaking entity. From this, a kind 





Jenna Sutella, 2018, nimiia cétiï (still). 
 
Machine Learning processes, or, what Sutela refers to as “the computer 
shaman” seeing as the computer possesses the shamanic capacity of 
“transversal communication between incommunicables” (Viveiros de Castro, 
2014: 151), provides the protocols through which a collision of 19th century 
Martian séances and a pro-biotic bacterium produces a kind of superposition, 
or, Laruelle’s “cognition of the third kind.” For a new and incomprehensible 
language is indeed abstracted and produced according to nonhuman systems. 
What is crucial to emphasise here is that Sutela is not guilty of a ‘mystic 
 
 
“sovereign-subject” across a continuum that works through the invisible gut-biome activity of 
humans-as-holobiont and beyond the human terrestrial home. Furthermore, just as the 
compositing of multiple perspectives Holder achieves in Adcredo, I argued, permits a 
scaffolding of perception towards looking and thinking with the conjunctive logic of 
superposition, Sutela’s work here enables a vastly multi-scalar perspective that aligns 
heterogeneous elements across a continuum that reach from the micropscopic to the cosmic. 
Acknowledging this continuum, and locating ourselves within it, scaffolds a re-building of 
one’s sensorium or Umwelt as capable of parsing significance and multiple nonhuman scales, 
substantiating some concretely potential faculties of a possible “speculative subject” (Catren) 
or “Alien-subject” (Laruelle). 
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fundamentalism’ whereby inherited spiritualist, shamanic, occult or mystic 
semiotics are simply mimicked. Instead, nimiia cétiï and nimiia vibié generate a 
nonhuman language that acts as a cognitive scaffolding for speculative thinking 
around these new technologies,125 as well as the provenance and microbial 
genealogy of our own biological and ‘human’ bodies. 
 
“forget ([“language”, “code”]) 
# forgetting language 
# forgetting code 




# d--d-divinity” (Sutela, 2019) 
 
What this thesis ultimately posits for the work of the speculative turn, is 
that the disparate forms or texts produced by individual artists with uniquely 
forged perspectives, positions, and often neologistic fidelities (see Eshun 2017) 
is an uneven and combined heresy. Mulholland (2019b) differentiates the 
pedagogical trend motivating art schools’ modern tradition of fostering “a 
personalised ontology” summed up by the institutional inscription “you are an 
artist,” while the university by contrast intones that “you may make a 
contribution to your discipline,” productive of “a commons of collective 
wisdom” (26). However, what the work of the speculative turn demonstrates is 
rather a significant complication of the tenor and makeup of the phrase, you are 
and artist: the singular individual, the “sovereign-subject” is an orthodox and 
humanist fiction, replaced by a dynamic, mutable, and precarious assemblage 
of relata. It is replaceable with speculative fictions.126 And, furthermore, while 
the university, as Mulholland has it, circumscribes a matrix of possible 
disciplines and methods by which one may “contribute,” the model of mystics 
 
 
125 “the work is also about intelligent machines as aliens of our creation. There’s an 
interesting link between the project of talking with aliens and the problem of talking with 
machines. We built (at least some of) the aliens ourselves and now the challenge  is to 
understand the nonhuman condition of these machines that work as our interlocutors and 
infrastructure” (Sutela in Obrist and Vickers, 2019: 141). 
126 I have already shown that this is not a simple process but involves a speculative 
labour. 
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has it that a contribution can be made via the unique configurations of 
potentiality embodied in its mystics. Therefore, I argue that the long tail of 
diverse speculative experiments produced by individual artists are indeed 
contributions to an iterative and reflexive uneven and combined heresy; a 
“strange science” that is tuned to the contingencies and complexities of 
contemporary political, technological, and climatological upheaval, as well as 
the refined understanding of ourselves and the world produced by the sciences. 
Across the field of contemporary art, concepts and models that represent the 
body (the liberal humanist sovereign subject) and the body politic 
(formulations of togetherness) are revised, worked, shared, examined, re- 
figured, and evaluated in an active and distributed act of social manipulation. 
 
Sutela’s projects do not aim to promote some kind of truth but rather 
contribute to the working of concepts and models with which we can 
understand and inhabit the world. They are part of an uneven and combined 
heresy; an information processing protocol iteratively and procedurally 
developed by the distributed evaluation and development of contemporary art. 
Works such as nimiia cétiï and nimiia vibié exist as inherently distributive 
entities whether this is through nimiia cétiï’s appearance in various group 
exhibitions where it is brought into conversation as a variable among different 
ideas and materials or nimiia vibié’s circulation through the economies of 
domestic music consumption and music journalism. Through this distribution 
the works and their re-figured concepts are at once evaluated among the 
broader milieux of contemporary art and as speculative socio-cognitive 
technologies where they furnish thinking with new potentialities: this mystics 
“is a fable because it cannot claim the status of definitive truth. It is a language 
without obvious power. Yet paradoxically, that is its strength. It calls  into 
question strategically defined, and apparently definitive, systems of meaning” 
(Sheldrake, 2001: 45). 
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3. Most Dismal Swamp: 
Dredging a Dank Enlightenment From a Swamp of  Heresies 
(means going in up to the chin) 
 
In addition to my projects discussed so far, I developed and presented a 
curatorial project named Most Dismal Swamp (MDS) across two London 
galleries and online. While MDS continues to expand beyond the timeframe of 
this Ph.D. as well as the remit of its thesis, I will focus on MDS’ two inaugural 
projects, Swamp Protocol (2019) and Whale Fall (2019).127 With MDS I led 
the research and thinking of this Ph.D. thesis towards new methods and 
conclusions that I argue are highly significant for discussing and advancing the 
work of the speculative turn. 
 
This final section functions as an introduction to the speculative methods, 
work, and overall significance of the MDS project. Here, I will outline what 
MDS is and how it has, firstly, led the research of this thesis; secondly, 
provided a site for further experimentation and implementation of the ideas I 
have already discussed, and lastly, how it functions as a speculative socio- 
cognitive tool; how it “emits” and “works” concepts as a cognitive scaffold. 
This section is then both a future-oriented conclusion that presents a model for 
curatorial-artistic practice that rigorously engages with and advances the work 
of the speculative turn, and it is also an introduction for couching a 
considerable portion of this Ph.D. thesis portfolio and the lexicon/concepts 
this emits - projects that were formulated, researched and developed through 








127 See Most Dismal Swamp, Swamp Protocol, and Whale Fall sections of the portfolio PDF 
and the relevant folders of material in the accompanying USB drive. 
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There is information  conveyed through the portfolio that does allow these 
projects to ‘speak for themselves’ - the present section is an extrapolation of 
this information that demonstrates and analyses the deformation and 
subversion of conceptual apparatus they foster. Eshun’s More Brilliant for 
example is a methodological ally for this section: More Brilliant is to Black 
Music what the Dank Enlightenment is to selected work of the speculative 
turn. More Brilliant and the Dank Enlightenment name aggregate “theoretical 
installations” (Laruelle), built from materials, their concepts, and their 
concept-work: they are strange sciences that although they work with fictions, 
they are not fictions.128 Which is to say that it is not an inherited category but 
rather something that is ‘emitted’ by their collective labour and rationality. 
This Dank Enlightenment will be elucidated in the final section via the work 
of the ‘patron saint of swamps’ Henry David Thoreau and with direct 
reference to the MDS projects included in the portfolio.  
 
Given that the material within the portfolio presents its own speculative use 
of concepts and language, I will also allow a more sober and analytic tone to 
merge with the concepts these projects “emit;” I will allow the language and 
conceptual schema of this thesis to become “weirded” by its content.129 This is 
to allow the for the consideration of and the taking-root of more speculative 
propositions and refigurations. More Brilliant, like Laruelle, articulates theory 
as translated and mutated by the affective and conceptual vectors of Black 
Music: Eshun builds a language and a syntax with these materials. And so in 
this section, I methodologically open up the discussion of relevant concepts, 
analyses, and arguments to the properties of what I call the “swampscape.”130 
 
128 “Rather than fictionalizing science, a mysticism for today would have to Weird it” (Wilk, 
2019: n.p.). Ben Woodward has discussed speculation’s capacities in the “weirding” of 
philosophy (referring to the work of Laruelle as much as the category of Weird fiction 
synonymous with horror writers such as H. P. Lovecraft) insomuch as a “mad speculation” 
incurs philosophy-proper to become “less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more 
adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality” (Woodward, 2011: 5). 
129 See footnote 128 on “weirding.” 
130 Philosopher Nicola Masciandaro has expressed this dynamic with regards to the studious 
“participation” with theory-fiction and the genre of Black Metal (rather than propagating an 
orthodox form of philosophy about these materials): “Black metal theory expresses a need to 
reopen music to the philosophy of music and philosophy to the music of philosophy in a black way” 
(Masciandaro in Irtenkauf and Masciandaro, 2014: 237, emphasis added); “theory-fiction as the 
mutual hostage-taking of theory and fiction” (Masciandaro, 2011). See also previous instance of 
Beech’s discussion on “the force of materials as condition of the concept.” (Beech, 2013: 85) 
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This written section, and a work such as More Brilliant, then embodies 
Whitehead’s aeronautic simile for describing the method of speculation in that 
it exemplifies the “land[ing] for renewed observation rendered acute by 
rational interpretation” after having made its “flight in the thin air of 
imaginative generalization.” I will demonstrate how this method is, crucially, 
navigational and transformational as suggested by Whitehead. 
 
3.1 The Swampscape Model: a ‘protean cartographic 
hologram’131 
 
Having conjured the image of a “post-digital swampscape” in the research 
and press release that accompanied my Vaporents project, I invested in 
interrogating what this image could mean and in developing its speculative 
potency further. This decision presented the thesis research with an opportunity 
to consider the significance of ‘the swamp’ as a navigational model; a 
conceptual resource for apprehending, analysing, and speculating (in the 
fullest, generative sense that I have been outlining) with the materials of the 
given. And, with the opportunity to make substantial connections with this 
project and those also finding an implicit or explicit interest in swamps for 




131 In ‘The Coming Anarchy’ political theorist Robert Kaplan writes, “Imagine cartography in 
three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of 
group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and 
the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, 
indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies. Instead of borders, 
there would be moving ‘centers’ of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would 
be in motion. To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as 
migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map 
of the world will never be static. This future map—in a sense, the “Last Map”—will be an ever-
mutating representation of chaos.” Kaplan’s commentary is here useful for understanding the 
significance of updating not just the content of maps, but the very model of the map as a socio-
cognitive technology. His evocation of multiple and simultaneous vectors of power that are 
dynamic and shifting with the fluidity of communal identity and its concomitant allegiances to 
such powers, echoes the paradigm I argue here that is apprehended in using the swampscape 
model. 
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this research and the concurrent practical experimentation and realisation of its 
inferences, I asked the following questions: What might a contemporary 
swamp-thinking, a swamp cognitive ecology, entail? How and why would it be 
relevant? What could it do as a socio-cognitive technology and as a curatorial 
model? What “strange science” might emerge from the swamp? If we map the 
logics and potencies of the swamp on to reality as means of generating the 
concepts with which we apprehend the real, as per Brassier, then what kind of 
“space of contemplation” (de Certeau, 2015: 119) are we discussing, and what 
kind of contemplation is enabled? What refigurations of personhood and 
sociality does this conceptual model make thinkable? With this image, how 
might we “construct other theoretical images of theory?” (Viveiros de Castro, 
2014: 77; see also footnote 130). With this model, I generate a lexicon of “new 
terms” and refigured concepts to find purchase among the social networks and 
hypereconomy of contemporary art. 
 
The conscious endeavour of investing in this research and practical 
curatorial work started in earnest at the end of 2017, when I formulated two 
proposals outlining what I called MDS and its first two outcomes: Swamp 
Protocol (SP) and Whale Fall (WF) which I shared with artists and the two 
institutions with whom I presented these outcomes (arebyte and Gossamer Fog, 
London).132 These first projects committed the proposed aims of MDS to 
practice: to present and work with contemporary art according to a novel 
method, to produce research, and to operate as a record label. To explain the 
aims and their implementation, it is best now to cover the initial theoretical 





132 These proposals were also reformulated as a successful funding application to Arts Council 
England which was submitted August 2018, with funds received shortly after  as the project 
entered the practical production phases. For a timeline of pre-production, production, post-
production and presentation activity, see portfolio. Furthermore, the minor spaces that these 
projects inhabited (two experimental project spaces dedicated to exploring the fringes of 
digital cultures, my own website and social media account, and further online platforms 
dedicated to boosting the signal of contemporary art experiments that fly ‘under the radar’ of 
more visible orthodoxies – tzvetnik.online, aqnb.com, ofluxo.net). See footnote 120 on 
“privileged spaces” nourishing minor languages.
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Having already given consideration to the use of the thought-image of the 
swamp in  Vaporents I was already familiar with some of the potentiality of 
what it might mean as a model for thinking about aspects of contemporary life, 
for instance in the artist Femke Herregraven’s invocation of swamps as a 
means to discuss informatic networks and the geographies of contemporary 
finance:133 
 
“I am interested in the swamp’s immateriality and its functions through 
language because, looking at it symbolically and historically, it represents a 
place that we morally condemn and lock out. There is sickness, insects and dirt 
in it… Gossip is a sort of information intelligence in a social network. By 
gossiping and rumouring we also, as humans, get an idea of where our position 
is in a social group. Recent trading algorithms are structured around how 
people gossip, which is symbolically connected to the swamp.” (Herregraven, 
2016) 
 
Here, the swamp is a conceptual heuristic to help parse and apprehend the 
activities of algorithmic and financial infrastructure. On one hand, in the work 
Sprawling Swamps (2016-ongoing) it refers to the politically and geologically 
unstable territories where Herregraven’s fictional infrastructural systems are 
situated, reflecting the strategic location of existing financial operations. While 
on another hand such a project also invokes the character of swamps, its 
disruption of the presumed stable binary between land and water as a way of 
thinking about how and where (financial) value is produced and what forms of 
governance are involved. My aim here is not to analyse Herregraven’s work in 




133 Other artists I might refer include Precarious Inhabitants (2017), a video installation by 
Eva Papamargariti that leveraged the visual language of swamps and swamp- creatures in 
“addressing issues of symbiosis and transformation between human, AI machines, animals and 
other organic and synthetic bodies.” Danklands (2014) by writer and artist Holly Childs maps 
some of the characteristics of swamps to the experience of navigating post-internet culture. 
Jakob Kudsk Steensen’s various virtual  reality and CGI explorations of wetland environments 
that works towards making visible the precarious ecologies and their imaginative qualities that 
are being eroded under climate change. And, Swamp (1971), a short film by Nancy Holt and 
Robert Smitshon which encapsulates the disorientating experience of navigating swamps. 
These artists, excluding the latter, each participated in the SP project. While these represent a 
handful of examples of contemporary and recent art’s work with swamps, I will also refer to a 
broad corpus of work from literature, cinema, fiction, and other areas that contribute to the 
conceptual resources of the swamp as a thought-image. 
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use of the swamp as a mental model; a model that builds an understanding of 
something through invoking the topology, cultural histories, and imaginary of 
the swamp.134 
 
However, I will dedicate remaining focus on my own extrapolation and 
construction of a model I have termed swampscape which motivated the work 
of MDS. 
 
MDS is a project for simulating and exploring a pervasive contemporary 
ecology that I argue has come to be defined by the entanglement of multiple 
and simultaneous logics, systems, temporalities, and realities. Following the 
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s constitution of an analytic framework that 
foregrounds the relations between global cultural flows he terms 
“ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “financescapes,” and 
“ideoscapes,” (Appadurai, 1990: 6-7) MDS names and unpacks a further 
dimension for a contemporary speculative ecology: swampscapes. 
 
This ecology, I argue, emerges from a dynamic confluence of: globally 
networked media and social media platforms whose algorithms have been 
developed to tailor search-queries and news-feeds with what is perceived to be 
desirable content for each user (built from data-agregated user-profiles) that 
functions as substantial confirmation bias of individualised worldviews; and, a 
naturalisation of speculation that I have referred to as a contemporary 
epistemic long tail. The means of “eco-cognitive engineer[ing]” (Magnani, 
2013: 50), whereby diverse cultural artefacts such as artworks, blog posts, 
misinformation, memes, and music scenes constitute stigmergic environmental 
modifications (in terms of being artefacts that circulate and forge varying 
degrees of influence within a cognitive ecology), have crossed a threshold of 
access towards their popular and broad, domestic implementation. 
 
 
134 Such a use of the image of the swamp has also found purchase with a broader range of 
researchers and practitioners, as evidenced in the Lithuanian Pavilion at the 2018 Venice 
International Architecture Biennale, The Swamp School, organised and led primarily by 
architects Nomeda and Gediminas Urbonas. 
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“The other day I was tinkering around in my garage and I decided to build 
a new ideology,” blogged the far-right ideologue Curtis Yarvin (aka ‘Mencius 
Moldbug’) (Moldbug, 2007). Yarvin’s invocation of amateurism and maker 
culture here is indicative of emergent practices in the collective eco-cognitive 
engineering of new ideologies; new futures. It is symptomatic of a broadly 
uneven and combined heresy: an emerging long tail of speculative politics that 
aims to disrupt, re-form and hard-fork the Overton window of viable political 
discourse. It is the sweeping realisation that all things could and ought to be 
otherwise; that reality is revisable. 
 
This distributed heresy is discernible in the growing public distrust and 
structural suspicion of technocratic regimes and establishment doxa (seen as 
elite, detached, corrupt and wielding undue authority).135 What is now apparent 
from a glance at our contemporary mediascape is growing social fragmentation 
and growing investment in diverging alternative ideals whether this is 
actionable plans, experimental ideologies, speculative discourses, non- 
conforming identities, or conspiracy theories. Each belongs to a bottom-up 
revision of what is perceived to be the present hegemony (importantly, 
different tribes perceive different elites; different “cathedrals” and realities).136 
They are further exacerbated by the hardwiring of liberal possessive 
individualism and tacit online communication protocols into how public 
discourse plays out across a proprietary mediascape: militantly aggressive filter 
bubbles vying to signal-boost their homebaked truths; an arms-race to 
hypecraft an alternative future doxa – an “eco-epistemic warfare” (Magnani, 
2013: 2016). Yet the present remains a swamp-like, inextricably entangled, 
adversarial Mixed Reality paradigm; “a multiplicity of rogue nows” as member 
of the artist collective Confraternity of Neoflagellants’ Norman Hogg puts it; a 
 
 
135 de Certeau analogously describes mystics as a “reaction to the vanishing of truths, the 
increasing opaqueness of the authorities and divided or diseased institutions” (de Certeau, 
1992: 14). 
136 Conservative political commentator Rush Limbaugh as even parcelled the worlds  of 
political discourse into “The universe of lies and the universe of reality” (Limbaugh, 2009: 
n.p.). 
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noisy bazaar of amateur heresies mounting in parallel against the elite 
cathedral they each variously perceive as cultural orthodoxy. 
 
Holder’s Adcredo illustrates this ecology in its depiction of multiple and 
simulatenous realities merging and mutating among one another according to 
the logic of digital compositing of figures and forms. We can see here an 
organisation of heresies according their multiple and simultaneous existence; 
forming a world of distinct multiple and simultaneous images of conflicting 
worlds. To use the term that Henry Corbin derived from Islamic philosophy, 
this is a mundus imaginalis (Corbin, 1976): “If imagination is an individual 
faculty and the imaginary a social context, ‘imaginal’ is simply what is made 
out of images, an adjective denoting something that can be the product of both 
an individual faculty and a social context” (Bottici, 2011: 63). A dense 
swampscape of images living in combined simultaneity among one another 
akin to the modes of digital compositing ubiquitous in contemporary film, and 
which MDS has adopted the logic and practices of in the curation/production 
of SP and WF: “an assemblage that constructs a set of discrete elements from 
different moments and sites of recording, modelling, or animation into a 
unified visual field” (Williams, 2017; 19). (See the below refence to Whale 
Fall (lectio divina) for my work on explicating how this logic is embedded in 
subjective Umwelt). 
 
The term swampscape calls upon the histories, understandings and 
characteristics of wetlands to form a heuristic model in order to better 
comprehend the technical, ecological and experiential complexities of the 
contemporary world. As sites that have routinely been defined negatively in the 
west as anomalous and horrific spaces at odds with dominant images of moral, 
industrial and scientific progress, swamps are uniquely positioned as a rich 
heuristic resource: a concept-space ripe for dredging. What speculative 
opportunites are swampscapes harbouring? 
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An essential characteristic that is key to swampscapes is their anomalous 
constitution “in a classificatory order predicated on a hard and fast distinction 
between land and water, time and space” (Giblett, 1996: 4). Simultaneously 
solid land and fluid water yet also neither, swampscapes embody a topology of 
muddy indistinction and taxonomic heresy.137 This is relevant for 
understanding a contemporary condition that has emerged from the teleology 
of modernity and the fragmentation of postmodernity, into the entangled 
simultaneity of multiple, nested logics: a quantum ecology that blurs, combines 
and superposes fact and fiction, nature and culture, technology and the occult, 
past and future, authentic and synthetic, work and play, science and mysticism, 
self and other, “the dry world of virtuality and the wet world of biology” 
(Ascott, 2001: 9), online and offline, human and nonhuman. Instead of 
legitimising a binary thinking, these terms rather mutate and constitute an 
explosion of complex new relations. These relations (and how they relate) 
must be parsed in order to navigate the multi-reality biome, the Mixed Reality 
paradigm, of swampscapes with any agency. 
 
Regarding the architecture of this Mixed Reality paradigm as a “heretical 
ecology,” see the film essay I made and included in the portfolio: Whale Fall 
(lectio divina mix).138 The visual component of this film is material taken from 










137 I do not invoke a ‘muddy indistinction’ as a vagary, or a mystification but rather as a 
conceptual resource. Also, this kind of viscous indistinction might also be utilised in order to 
question Appadurai’s description of ‘cultural flows’ in terms of what MDS calls an ideology of 
fluidity secreted within such language. Evocations of ‘fluidity’ and ‘flows’ in the language of 
art, criticism, technology commentary and business is ubiquitous – is it indeed accurate or 
appropriate? I propose that it is indicative of a post-political inclination to veil the cultural and 
structural restrictions that commonly impede social and economic mobility. 




Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Whale Fall (lectio divina mix) (still), Most Dismal 
Swamp, London. 
 
In terms of outlining this multi-reality biome and its heretic ecology of 
inhabitants, I may refer to exhibitions such as the aforementioned Les 
Immatériaux which actively investigated the impact of, and the shifting 
contingencies of, materials within a context of informatics. More recent 
examples which produce a vivid map of the swampscape’s holographic and 
quantum topology include Ambient Intelligence (2017) curated by Felice 
Moramarco, which in working with Sutela, Holder, and Anna Mikkola, 
described the “convergence of nature and computation [which] brings about 
what has been called a new ecological paradigm, which is the result of the 
multiplicity of natural and artificial, human and non-human agents.” With 
‘swampscpape’ I am providing a model for apprehending and working with 
such an ecological paradigm that is composed of a dynamic multitude of new 
materials, new intelligences, and new realities. 
 
This brings up a further key attribute of swampscapes: their adverse 
navigational conditions. The uncertain terrain that swallows the tracks and 
restricts the progress of those who aim to forge a path through these spaces has 
long been a subject of aberration in western cultures. But, MDS explores the 
disorientation associated with swampscapes’ erasure of “established classical 
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concepts of vista, horizon and landscape” (Fritzell, 1974: 530) as a modality of 
re-orientation; as a condition for thinking in multiple dimensions. Such an 
exploration will help to develop methods of navigating the hyper-baroque 
architectures of extraterritorial geopolitics, fictional infrastructures, legal 
mystifications, ambient intelligences and adversarial virtualities. What kind of 
reasoning, intuition, speculation, navigation, solidarities, altered states of 
consciousness and communication may emerge? Might some collective project 
of Dank Enlightenment be fostered? 
 
3.2 The Invention of a (Strange) Science (part 2):  
      Dank Enlightenment 
 
“Instead of piling on more hybrids, exceptions and anomalies, we need a 
glossary for a new normal, and for its design and redesign” (Bratton, 2017: 
10). 
 
“Can we aspire to Enlightenment without modernity? My hypothesis… is that 
we are going to have to slow down, reorient and regulate the proliferation of 
monsters by representing their existence officially” (Latour, 1997: 12). 
 
“The empirical basis of objective science has, thus, nothing absolute about it. 
Science doesn’t rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structures of its theories rises 
above a swamp, like a building erected on piles driven down from above into 
the swamp” (Popper, 2005: 94). 
 
Among his numerous publications and journals, the 19th century poet, 
philosopher, and ‘patron saint of swamps,’ Henry David Thoreau documented 
the occasion of his near-complete physical immersion into one of the various 
swamps he explored. Content and up to his chin in mud; sense and thought 
disoriented in the thick tangle of a “dismal” environment. Content amid the 
indistinct and wild slurry. Content in “scenting the wild honeysuckle and 
bilberry blows, and lulled by the minstrelsy of gnats and mosquitoes.” Such 
ardent immersion exemplified his unorthodox approach as a scientific thinker – 
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a rational materialist that would earnestly describe “a swamp as a sacred place, 
a sanctum santorum” (Thoreau, 2017: 75). A strange science whose laboratory 
was a sacred spaced of reflection; a cognitive scaffold comprised of dynamic 
“alembics and cucurbits” (Lavoisier) of wild honeysuckle, bilberry blows, the 
minstrelsy of gnats and mosquitoes. 
 
Thoreau’s method defined him as a committed immersant within a reality 
set apart from, and in resistance to, the insatiable progress of the world of 
western modernity: for the improper ground of the marshes and their pestilent 
dangers such as malaria, or ‘swamp fever,’ was often proven as “the great 
original obstacle to progress” (Beloc, 1923: 14). Yet, importantly, his method 
was not one devoid of systematic reasoning, nor removed from enlightened 
public discourse. Through his experimentally multi-modal work encompassing 
romantic poetry, political essay, personal reflection and historical analysis he 
forged a speculative mission that sought to explore how the poetic, the 
scientific, the human, the nonhuman, nature, and culture might be re-ordered 
and re-combined by his perception of the swamp as a potent space of elemental 
transformation: 
 
“Hope and the future for me are not in lawns and cultivated fields, not in towns 
and cities, but in the impervious and quaking swamps... When I would recreate 
myself, I seek the darkest woods the thickest and most interminable and, to the 
citizen, most dismal, swamp... out of such a wilderness comes the Reformer 
eating locusts and wild honey” (Thoreau, 2017: 73) 
 
This view from the swamp; from the faithful immersion into its deep, 
ancient bogs, provides a perspective infected by an intense intimacy. From here 
Thoreau sees in the tangled weeds: “healing herbs;” in the intoxicating swamp 
gas and miasma: the “night thoughts of earth;” in the swamp: a “temple” 
(Thoreau, 1980: 238-449). And conversely, from his perspective a suspicion of 
modern institutions is fermented: “what would become of us if we took our 
walks in a mall?” (Thoreau, 2017: 40). 
 
Reverently submerged in the vegetal morass, in the noise of the swamp, 
Thoreau’s approach and protocol can be understood as an inflection of that 
other “strange science” which de Certaeu named mystics and the strange 
sciences of contemporary art’s speculative information processing protocols. 
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Among the aspects of mystics that de Certeau outlines, attention is paid to it 
as “a manner of using received language differently.” It is this (mis)use of the 
established language, symbols and concepts of their faith that marked the 
mystics as heretics: those who defy the orthodoxy of the church not by any 
desire to destroy it but to transform and mutate the institutional narratives and 
practices that dominate their spiritual life. Their heresy was thus not destructive 
in character, but speculative. Such transformations were practiced through a 
radically intimate commitment to their faith, and that their faith might 
transcend the boundaries of orthodox enclosure; an immersion into the ecstasy 
of divine communion that the church saw as undermining their authority as 
mediator of the gospel. Sense and thought disoriented in the ecstatic 
intoxication of divine experience. Religious doctrine tainted with mystics’ use 
of the deviant views of science, philosophy and direct, transformational 
experience. While Thoreau has conventionally been associated with practices 
of ‘walking’ and romantic perceptions of losing oneself in nature, here I am 
concerned with his more radical re-figuring of a “swampspeak” (enabled more 
accurately by immersion rather than simply ‘walking’) and what this means for 
the potential for a concomitant Dank Enlightenment harboured in the work of 
MDS (that is, a system of thinking and lexicon re-figured among the 
contemporary swampscape, as Thoreau’s thought and “swampspeak” was re-
figured among environments such as Walden Pond).  
 
Mystics, in the 16th and 17th centuries, as outlined by de Certaeu, was like a 
distributed laboratory or think-tank engaging the unsanctioned and disparate 
voices of those creating new, experimental forms of reason – both lay and 
specialist. Both the work of Thoreau and that of mystics then, are examples of 
truly “experimental sciences” with their subjects so deeply immersed in their 
objects of study, that their practitioners, and their disciplines, as Thoreau states, 
are fundamentally recreated. Their product was a new corpus; a re-combined, 
re-constituted, re-formed, language and system. As de Certeau calls it, a 
“teratological language;” a monstrously chimeric conjunction and mutation of 
given forms. While the practitioners of mystics produced their heresies, 
Thoreau in his temple-laboratory worked towards the creation of an “eco- 
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logic” (Giblett, 1996: 228) by transforming the traditional (western) pejorative 
view of the swamp.139 
 
So, since Thoreau validly asked ‘what would become of us if we took our 
walks in the mall?’ what has become of the mall? Well Thoreau may already 
have offered an answer that pushes towards a rudimentary understanding of 
the contemporary swampscape: 
 
“let us settle ourselves, and work and wedge our feet downward through the 
mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and 
appearance, that alluvion which covers the globe, through Paris and London, 
through New York and Concord, through church and state, through poetry and 
philosophy and religion, till we come to a hard bottom and rocks in place 
which we call reality.” (Thoreau, 1982: 350) 
 
This is to say that the characteristics of swamps provide a useful lens with 
which to re-consider the contemporary world and its institutions: “the bogs and 
quicksands of society.” This manifests not only in the swamp’s physical 






139 “Thoreau values precisely those usual pejorative connotations” (Giblett, 1996: 233). 
Thoreau’s lexicon is littered with a combination of sacralising and pejorative terms, the latter 
of which have resulted in a common language, or “swampspeak” (Giblett, 1996: 8) of dismal 
or fetid atmospheres as well as monsters, danger and disease. Such a cultural rendering of 
swamps has emerged from centuries of colonial frustration with the swamp’s supposed 
recalcitrance or its inherent difference from the  Decisional apparatus of modernity: the 
calculable value of discrete entities. While Giblett notes that Thoreau does indeed “subvert” 
such tropes (229-235), I would add to this that there is a notable form of superposition 
happening in Thoreau’s writing: using a word such as Dismal, which had long been a word 
associated with swamps through everything from poetry to scientific reports, rather than a 
word like ‘beautiful’ (which inheres to a value system and a Decisional apparatus distinct from 
the swamp itself), is to encourage such a word to be more than one thing simultaneaously – 
much like the muddy indistinction of the swamp, and my own swampscape model, itself. 
Thoreau’s usage embodies a “culturing of language by the wetland” (Ryan, 2020: 75) akin to 
the mutation of concepts, language and syntax by the transcendental immanence  of Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy. 
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As with Thoreau’s “swampspeak” (along with the proposed lineage of 
Allahyari’s re-figuring of narratives for Middle Eastern myths from personal 
experience, contemporary political concerns, and oppressed voices, or Eshun’s 
midwifery of Black Music’s latent “mathemagics,” or Laruelle’s construction 
of multiple “philo-fictions” as a replacement thought-model for that of 
Philosophy’s singular Decisional framework, or mystics’ operation by way of 
a use of tradition and its conceptual resources in the organised fabulation of 
“fictive discourses in a rigorous theatre” of (worked) concepts), I have worked 
towards rendering a glossary of new and revised terms through the 
swampscape model and with the entanglement of various artworks towards the 
articulation and renewal of what Clark calls “public language,” the “magic 
words” and external artefacts that augment human cognition (Clark, 1998; see 
also Wheeler, 2007 and Culpitt, 1998: 120 on the mystic “use” of language). I 
have named this emergent system, in the spirit of a methodologically ludic 
‘strange science’ that is immanent to the swampscape model, Dank 
Enlightenment: a procedural project by which the ‘entangled simultaneity of 
multiple, nested logics’ of the swampscape is parsed and analysed by the 
conceptual scaffolding afforded by MDS projects as speculative socio-
cognitive technologies. In other words, a situated attempt to “forge the 
explanatory bridge from thought to being” (Brassier). 
 
If the “night thoughts of earth” influenced the formation of Thoreau’s 
“eco- logic,”140 then the night thoughts of the swampscape is a Dank 
Enlightenment: an immersive strange science and contemporary “eco-logic” 
composed of the swamscape’s native artefacts and socio-cognitive 
technologies; the native ontologies that scaffold thinking in multiple and 
simultaneous dimensions. To conclude the thesis I will substantiate this 
heuristic term with reference to some of the material-conceptual nuances in the 
aesthetic decisions and the technical makeup of MDS projects as “thought-
images” (Beech), enabling the extrapolation and uptake of a speculative 
glossary; a suite of native concepts that MDS ‘emits’. This rendering of a 
glossary resonates with the work of others I have already discussed in detail, 
particularly that of Eshun’s concept-engineering. It is also a commitment to 
                                                   
140 What Thoreau means here by “night thoughts of the earth” maps directly on to the explanation of 
Eshun and Allahyari’s (among many others’) “complicity with anonymous materials” mentioned in 
Section 2.3, see also (Negarestani, 2011). 
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the analyses and conclusions made throughout the thesis by embodying a 
practically speculative model for my work.  
 
I have already put to work a unique lexicon throughout the thesis, loading 
and promoting the use of terms that have either been previously un-used or 
under-used to discuss contemporary art, including many of my own coinage, 
among them: distributed information processing protocol, cognitive ecology, 
socio-cognitive technology, combined and uneven heresy, working concepts, 
mystics, un/orthodoxy, Overton Window, transformative navigational 
protocols, multi-scalar, epistemic long tail, cognitive scaffolding, eco-
cognitive engineering, thinking through things, expanded umwelt, conceptual 
affordances. And, crucial to the present topic, I have already started to deploy 
and explain terms that embody Dank Enlightenment before it is explained: 
swampscape, multiple and simultaneous realities, Mixed Reality paradigm, 
biosemiotics, multi-reality biome. I will now continue, and close, with further 
clarification of Dank Enlightenment via the concerns and aesthetics of MDS 
(with reference to portfolio artefacts). 
 
As concluded in the previous section, thinking in multiple dimensions is 
something key to navigating what I have described as the contemporary 
swampscape: a multi-reality biome precipitated by the social impact of the 
ubiquitous and commercial acceleration of CPU and GPU-power, CGI and 
digital compositing techniques, graphics editing software, social media 
platforms deploying individually-tailored feedcrafting algorithms and data-
harvesting, artificial intelligence, and a broad scope of immersive 
virtual/augmented/mixed reality facilities (procedural compositing of virtual 
elements and real space using spatialised audio, eye-tracking, retinal 
projection and real-time spatial meshing), things such as reality and fiction or 
authentic and synthetic or online and offline are ever-more enmeshed. Here we 
have another kind of swamp, unevenly distributed and with a similarly 
indistinct ground; populated by avatars, data-shadows, bots, web-scrapers, and 
deepfakes instead of Thoreau’s “minstrelsy of gnats” or von Uexküll’s ticks 
and worms. So this thinking in multiple dimensions is to render thinking 
according to the contingencies and conceptual affordances of the swampscape. 
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This swamp model maps smoothly onto the definition and function of the 
“composite image” which film theorist Evan Calder Williams explains is “an 
assemblage that constructs a set of discrete elements from different moments 
and sites of recording, modelling, or animation into a unified visual field” 
(Williams, 2017: 19). These are images found across cinema, art, advertising, 
television, and arguably most contemporary visual culture – the composite 
image is an elemental and globally definitive component of technological 
cultures, specifically the Mixed Reality paradigm I have outlined already. 
They typically include elements such as human actors/models, digitally 
sculpted and animated 3D models, sandbox 3D virtual environments, 
procedural textures and procedurally-generated assets such as dust particles, 
filmed chroma-key surfaces upon which alternative backgrounds or images are 
set, and all manner of aggregated synthetic additions or edits realistically 
merged together by sophisticated (and relatively accessible) software.  
 
Here I have found a core motivation in forming a novel curatorial 
methodology; for curating a heresy: I deliberately involved many of the above 
Mixed Reality and digital compositing tools or techniques in the curatorial and 
presentation process towards “join[ing] the discontinuous and far-flung 
without flattening their particularities” (21-22). In directing film shoots and 
virtual productions using various artist’s objects, animations, digital assets, 3D 
virtual environments, poetry, music, performances, costumes, etc. I have 
formed projects that act as mixed reality biomes: highly dynamic spaces where 
a multitude of works that each index different worlds, logics, narratives, and 
realities have been carefully composited together to form a single work, yet 
without ‘flattening their particularities’, which, in this case, involves their 
distinct conceptual affordances. For example, in the production of Whale Fall 
(Fig. 9), I curated and commissioned the work of 19 artists as if each of these 
artworks were some form of new life emerging from the carcass of a dead 
whale (see the discussion on decay vectors in Section 2.2.2a). The result was 
more of a lively festival akin to a “minstrelsy of gnats”; a multitude of 
umwelten flourishing in this strange environment. This image might also be 
deemed heresy by the orthodox means of curating artworks as clearly labelled 
discrete entities that remain separate and thus create their own separate zones 
of reflection and distance for a viewer – a mode attuned to and reproductive of 
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Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Whale Fall 
 Still shows work by Hannah Rose Stewart, Marta Strazicic, Tea Strazicic, and 
Theo Triantafyllidis. 
 
Furthermore, this method of composite curating was also applied in further 
ways during the production and presentation of WF. In making the digital 
‘club’ depicted in Fig.9, I discussed with the artist Hannah Rose Stewart how 
the textures of this asset could also contain works by other contributors: I 
commissioned @baojiaxiang to design posters and flyers for fictional club 
nights using images provided by Department of Decay – these works were 
then embedded in the textures of the walls that Stewart produced for her 
digital models. When the project was presented at Gossamer Fog, I 
commissioned Stewart to create high-resolution versions of these textures that 
I printed as large-scale wallpaper sections to be applied to the gallery walls 
(Fig. 10). As suggested regarding the ‘particularities’ of these composited 
artworks, models such as Stewart’s club and her animated alien dancing 
creatures still maintained relative autonomy in terms of representing and 
calling towards ideas of non-human communities emerging from and 
inhabiting marginal and strange spaces; spaces that may have once been made 





Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Whale Fall installation view. Wallpaper by Hannah 
Rose Stewart; screen shows procedurally animated version of Whale Fall by 
Chritsopher MacInnes; floor littered with flyers designed by @baojiaxiang and 
garments by MBJ Wetware. 
 
 In these densely composited scenes, recombining artists’ works in 
moving image and in bespoke gallery installation, I aimed to produce 
compression fields or temporary mixed reality biomes (terms of my own 
immanently constructed unorthodox vocabulary, see below for more on these) 
that also draw viewers into them as complicit actors; as entities living among 
these dynamically ‘weird’ and ‘heretic’ ecologies. In attempting to achieve 
this I drew upon and implemented lessons explored in the Vaporents project 
and in Les Immatériaux, in terms of the use of immersion and disorientation as 
useful modes of engagement (as well as key characteristics of swamps and 
their traversal). As well as the modes of compositing exemplified in the fine-
tuned compositing of digital assets in real-life filmed situations such as the 
digital models of Lara Joy Evans and David Atlas (Fig. 11); overlaying 
various images in the editing process; combining and entangling artist works 
as described above; sequentially cutting between different artworks; filming 
various works in one scene or shot; and the game engine environments such as 
the whale fall scene I directed and the Virtual Reality recording by Jakob 
Kudsk Steensen, it was also key to these projects to decide upon means by 
which an atmospheric immersion would be achieved. Consequently, the 
versions of SP and WF presented as installations at arebyte and Gossamer Fog, 
respectively, differed from their counterparts that could live online in 
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perpetuity (the versions included in the portfolio USB). With SP I designed an 
installation that distributed the filmed elements over various screens, including 
one multi-projection screen composed of a custom aspect-ratio (utilising 
neural processing to expand the central image of the film outwards to the 
edges of the frame), six linked screens I embedded in the floor in order to 
resemble pools of imagery, and lastly, a spatialised 8-channel version of the 
soundtrack by producer Anni Nops (Fig. 12-13). An aesthetic-curatorial choice 
was made here to attempt to alter the space of viewer contemplation, from 
something that is traditionally distanced to something that is much more 
involving, even overwhelming (physically and even mentally, in terms of the 
potential for disorientation and information compression).  
 
                   
Figure 11. 
Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Swamp Protocol 





Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Swamp Protocol installation view. Anni Nops 




Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Swamp Protocol installation view. Anni Nops sound 
installation, Most Dismal Swamp screens. 
 
 In addition to creating physically immersive and atmospheric 
presentation spaces, that aimed to engender a feeling of immersion into 
another thick and swampy reality, the “dramaturgy of information” (Lyotard) 
was also played out at the level of aesthetic choices made during the post-
production process of finalising the films  (editing, visual effects, digital 
compositing). In planning this process, I paid attention to Williams’ reflection 
161  
on recent cinema, specifically that of the 2014 blockbuster, 300: Rise of an 
Empire: 
 
"Space is no longer presented as a semi-coherent volume, or even a 
determinate plane with suspicious depth. Instead, it is a liquid quality of 
attention that condenses and pools around individual gestures, magnetically 
sucked toward that which compels it and causes the advance of time to itself 
halt, before being shoved away again to the next sight in a continual whiplash 
of redirection and speed ramps" (Williams, 2017: 203) 
 
From this analysis of cinematic technique (that is intended to affectively 
charge the audience and physically immerse them within a scene’s frenetic 
action) I explored the possibility in presenting artworks in a way that, like the 
disorienting horizonless space of swamps, made the space they shared 
ambiguous, an “incoherent volume” that the viewer would share with them. 
Particularly in SP I experimented with making this process seem more viscous 
and slow than fast and frenetic (Fig. 14). Here, I attempt producing a 
disorienting/re-orienting compression field in which art is presented – an 
ambiguous plane lacking in the depth of field required to make proper 
(navigational) sense of what lies ahead, as if immersed among the thick 




Most Dismal Swamp, 2019, Swamp Protocol  




Furthermore, using features in post-production suites such as the ‘emboss’ tool, 
162  
which is used to give the illusion of selected areas in the image 3D depth, were 
employed for the reasons that a) they can be combined with other tools easily yet 
are still somewhat recognisable as an artificial addition which I aimed to make 
clear, and b) when applied to a moving image the tool does not distinguish the 
depth of field in the image with the same acuity as the human eye, resulting in a 
more spatially ambiguous and even flattened image. This tool was used in 
different ways to experiment with depth and how this affects a natural sense of 
orientation in navigating a space. And, this also adds to my next point in terms of 
further encouraging ambiguity between the distinctions of (filmed or CGI) 
environments and artworks – performances, objects, digital assets, environments 
and more are more effectively entangled upon the screen, creating an extreme 
composite.  
 
In a 2007 article that challenges the “orthodoxy” of noise music and its 
formal commitments as a “genre predicated on the negation of genre” (Brassier, 
2007: 167), Brassier explores how his chosen noise-music examples “forcefully 
short-circuit incommensurable genres” by presenting a “surfeit of information” 
traversing “dub cut-up, free-glam, and electro-acoustic punk… cartoon musique 
concrete and slapstick art-brut” towards the “production of hitherto unknown 
genres” (167-73). In this formulation I find an opportunity to entangle the 
multitude of “incompossible” (172) realities, logics, and worlds indexed by the 
many artists that are part of SP and WF (the number of artists and collaborators 
was certainly significant to presenting a final ‘surfeit of information’, especially 
when inhabiting a shared ambiguous space. Here is where I emerge with the term 
mixed reality biome as a concept emitted by the work of MDS – a model for 
apprehending an environment composed of multiple and simultaneous heresies, 
consistent with both Brassier’s litany of genre-compounds as well as the 
subcultures and micro-movements listed by Eshun in Chapter 1. 
 
With these projects, I have started an ongoing curatorial-artistic project 
where I explore and amplify the terms of what I have outlined as a Mixed 
Reality paradigm, by way of deploying my conceptual model of the 
swampscape. The swampscape model gives form to the abstract and complex 
realities of the lived experiences of a networked ‘new normal’ – allowing 
these realities to be parsed and understood in new terms and as a narrative that 
163  
renders them swamp-like; by making use of the swamp as a tool – a culturally 
loaded conceptual tool. This system of understanding I have named Dank 
Enlightenment – a ludic exploration that is motivated by the various artists and 
artefacts that contribute to this way of thinking and have already appeared in 
MDS projects and in this thesis. As I have already discussed in terms of ExC 
and cognitive ecologies that distribute thinking among artefacts, environment, 
and various external things, Dank Enlightenment is the latent conceptual 
affordances ‘emitted’ by the artefacts, environment, and various external 
things that comprise this mixed reality paradigm. MDS is my attempt to 
contribute translatable artefacts and socio-cognitive technologies that draw 
attention to this reality and to boost its native mode of thinking: that of 
thinking in multiple and simultaneous dimensions, which has drawn my work 
towards speculating via composite images, producing mixed reality biomes, 
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